Brainwashing in the High Schools

An Examination of Eleven American History Textbooks

E. Merrill Root

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Publisher's Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author's original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader's benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

BRAINWASHING IN THE HIGH SCHOOLS

BY

E. MERRILL ROOT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

DEDICATION 4

1—Why We Are Losing the Cold War 5

2—Eleven Textbooks 12

3—People's Democracy or Constitutional Republic? 19

4—Nation Indivisible or Class War 25

5—What They Do to the Constitution 37

6—What They Do to the Founding Fathers 53

7—How They Exploit the Gilded Age 69

8—The Seamy Side of American Life 85

9—How to Apply the Double Standard to History: the New Deal 101

10—Brainwashing in Foreign Affairs 119

11—Anti-anticommunism 131

12—Tainted Sources 139

13—How to Win the Cold War 148

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 152

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 153

DEDICATION

To: JOYCE AND FRANK, AND LESLIE AND STEPHEN,

that the truth may make them free

1—Why We Are Losing the Cold War

THE United States is losing the cold war. It is losing, that is, the intellectual and spiritual war, the war of ideas and ideals, which is the real war. Naturally, then, the great question is: *Why?*

U.S. News & World Report, in the issue of February 24, 1956, released an interview with Major William E. Mayer, United States army psychiatrist and one of the army's experts on brainwashing. Major Mayer's report is a most disquieting document. He affirms that, for the first time in American history, one third of all the American soldiers made prisoner in Korea succumbed to brainwashing by the enemy:

> ...they became something called "progressives." By the Communists' own definition, this meant that a man was either a Communist sympathizer or a collaborator—or both—during his stay in a prison camp.

Military weakness was not involved here. "No," Major Mayer says, "it is something more than that. It goes deeper. The behavior of many Americans in Korean prison camps appears to raise serious questions about American character, *and about the education of Americans.*"{1}

When asked why, he answered: "Because, in my opinion, the behavior of too many of our soldiers in prison fell far short of the historical American standards of honor, character, loyalty, courage and personal integrity."

Major Mayer was asked if these men had yielded under physical torture. He answered, "No, this third that I am talking about were not subjected to physical torture, according to their own statements." They surrendered to brainwashing. Brainwashing, the major said, is "a calculated attempt to distort men's convictions and their principles...and to supply them with a mass of specific information." It is the eroding of the mind, the infiltrating of the spirit, and finally the paralyzing of the will. The men who withstand it are those whose minds are firm and clear and in possession of the truth.

The major continued: "It is my impression that brainwashing is an extremely effective weapon which, if it finally succeeds, will render mechanical weapons, if not obsolete, at least needless, since *we are engaged in a war basically of ideas.*"

The brainwashing was based on the Communists' contempt for the American mind as the product of American education. He said:

> They obviously believed that the average American soldier was poorly informed to an extreme degree about his own country, his own economic and political system; was even more poorly informed about the politics, economics and social problems of other countries; was an individual who based his sense of security and often of superiority on transient, materialistic values, and was a man who, if deprived of material sources of support, would prove to be insecure, easily manipulated and controlled, *lacking in real loyalties and convictions.*

Major Mayer attributes this intellectual vacuum to the "*formal education*" of the one third who succumbed. He was asked, "Where does our education seem to be falling down?" He answered:

> Again I can only retreat into things the prisoners themselves said. *From these things it is tragically clear that the American educational system, fine as it is, is failing miserably in getting across the absolute fundamentals of survival in a tense and troubled international society. This failure needs to be publicized.*

Major Mayer was specific:

> A returning prisoner often made reference to the fact that he was given by the Communists a very intensive education about America, *a Communist viewpoint of history which evidently emphasized every possible defect in our development and our attitudes, and the soldier would confess that his own knowledge of the American system—of our history, our politics, our economics—was insufficient to enable him to refute this Communist version, even in his own mind.*

The major points out that during the brainwashing every fault of America was chalked in and every virtue of America was erased out; that the education of most Americans had failed to prepare them to meet the intellectual erosion and the political indoctrination. They had received no fundamental facts and no enduring principles from their "formal education" to counter the Communist brainwashing.

The major was asked, "Weren't they taught this [knowledge of the American system] in school?" He answered, "Many of them said they weren't. Many of them said they didn't know."

One quality, the major found, had been especially lacking in their education—a love of country, a sense of patriotism. He said:

> I think a great many people feel that references to patriotism and love of country are *somewhat embarrassing, unsophisticated,* or foolish flag-waving. I think this is to a very considerable degree the result both of well-meaning liberals, so called, as well as others

whose intentions are clearly destructive, *to create the attitude that we should abandon love of country and patriotic ideals, as being identified with this evil thing called* "*nationalism.*"

Conclusions similar to Major Mayer's were reached by the Defense Department's Advisory Commission on Prisoners of War, in a report of July 29, 1955, and by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the armed services. Admiral Radford said, in a speech at White Sulphur Springs, almost the same things that Major Mayer said. An INS news dispatch in the *Richmond Palladium-Item,* September 11, 1956, reports:

Admiral Arthur W. Radford told the southern governors council that the U.S. is failing to instill pride in the American way of life among its youth.

He said that if American youth aren't taught more about what this nation's democracy means, communism can come to the United States. He added:

"We cannot write communism off the books simply by saying: 'Oh, it can't happen here.' Because it can, if we allow ourselves to lower our guard or *diminish our active patriotism*."

The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff said bluntly: "We seem either unable or too lazy, to do enough to explain, teach, and most of all to demonstrate publicly before the world the fundamental, basic facts of liberty.

"Too many young men come into the armed forces with too little understanding of their responsibilities for citizenship. There are too many who are apathetic toward responsibilities and complacent about the long term continuance of their society."

Radford said in his prepared remarks that when American soldiers are sent overseas "they are not well enough equipped to convince others that the path of freedom is the best path."...

Radford contended that the homes and schools of America share with the military establishments a responsibility for improving the soldiers' moral outlook. He said: "The skills we teach in the service can only pyramid on the moral character and basic foundations already built in the home and classrooms."

Nor is it only the armed forces that tell us these disturbing truths. Edward Hunter, a writer, spent two years in Asia, studying the war for men's minds and the Communist techniques in brainwashing prisoners of war and their own captive and enslaved peoples. He returned and wrote a book, *Brainwashing in Red China* (1956), which he followed up in 1958 with a second book, *Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Defied It,* showing how the mind can defend itself against such attack. He says, in a letter to the National Review, June 6, 1956:

The men and women who have broken under brainwashing pressures, and who have created great and unnecessary suffering for their buddies, country and themselves, were in a pathetic number of cases softened up for their crack-up by just the state of mind exhibited in the Princeton episode [the invitation of Alger Hiss to speak]. This is a matter our schools, colleges, and universities should consider of critical importance, so that they no longer are

manipulated into a position of weakening minds, for all their pretentious buildings and super-duper equipment.

A government publication (*The Great Pretense,* May 19, 1956, House Report No. 2189) gathers the opinions of the foremost experts on communism in the United States. The conclusion to which they all come is that, because of our naïveté, our lack of political and intellectual sophistication, our lack of realistic thinking, our spongy education on the nature of collectivism and the true nature of American principles as set up by the Founding Fathers, we are today losing the cold war. It is as if the very roots of America were being frozen by the New Ice Age. One of the contributors, J. Edgar Hoover, says:

> In recent months, the united front campaign, always a dangerous Communist tactic, has received even greater emphasis....The Communists are confident that if they can openly cling to the coattails of reputable groups, eventually they will succeed in wearing the entire suit....If America's resistance can be softened by the lies shouted from these heaps of concealed communism, the party will be in a better position to launch a frontal attack upon our government. (P. 173.)

In the same publication, on page 42, Max Eastman, a leading authority on communism and anticommunism, says flatly:

> ...we are at present losing the cold war, we are being defeated by the totalitarians on a world scale....

The great question is: *why* are we allowing ourselves to suffer this miserable and wholly unnecessary defeat?

The cause is, in large measure, the failure of American education, as Major Mayer says, "in getting across the absolute fundamentals of survival in a tense and troubled international society." Consider the facts. Children, by the law of the land, are compelled to attend our schools for many years. What sense does it make for our country to *force* them to take an education that makes them susceptible to collectivism in milder forms—and then to *force* them to go out and fight the armies of collectivism in its most drastic form?

School superintendents, principals, and teachers are in a position of crucial responsibility: theirs is *a captive audience.* The child is compelled to listen to what they teach; to read the texts they select; to subject himself to their indoctrination. If the schools and the teachers leave the child "poorly informed to an extreme degree about his own country, his own economic and

political system...” and if they misinform him about other countries, telling him (for example) that the regime of Mao Tse-tung is merely a “democratic revolt” of “gentle agrarian reformers,” his mind will be a chaos.

The teacher is placed *in loco parentis,* in the place of the parent. If, in accepting the trust that makes him as it were the intellectual parent of the child, he fails to give the child the facts of life; or if, through ignorance or by indoctrination he gives the child false and perverted facts, he abuses his sacred responsibility to the captive child. As a scholar he betrays his trust and is a traitor to truth and a perverter of children’s minds.

Now, the fact is that, in one particular war, one third of our young men who were captured did succumb to brainwashing. Even more sobering, the case history of this war, dealing with a representative cross-section of our youth, establishes a probability table. It means, by projection, that our young people are being so poorly educated that, under comparable circumstances, the entire third would succumb. And, as Major Mayer points out, it is often the “brightest intellectually” who most easily give way—the privileged and not the underprivileged, the brainy and not the dull.

Now, this has never happened in America before. It must, therefore, have a cause in our contemporary life; and since it has to do with a vacuum in the *mind*, we can only attribute it to the educational system that has taken upon itself the training of our youth.

This is certainly not to absolve the parents who allow themselves to be excluded to so great an extent from the academic training of their children. Parents are morally obligated to instill at home the spiritual basis and the moral values of life; and parents should object militantly when they find their children being indoctrinated and brainwashed with the relativism, the collectivism, and the nihilism of the hour. The parents are culpable both in what they fail to give their own children and in what they allow the schools to give their children. But, still, much of the blame rests upon the schools, the teachers, and the textbooks.

The Communists, in carrying out their systematic brainwashing, knew what they could count on. Edward Hunter, who interviewed many American prisoners of war after their release from Communist control, told the author how the Reds capitalized on the soft spots in American education. “The

Communist indoctrinators," he said, "took advantage of the Americans' limited knowledge and understanding of American history and political philosophy. Even American college graduates had not been prepared by their educators to explain, to themselves or to their captors, what their freedoms and way of life really meant. All this had been taken for granted, like the air they breathed, and was not based on any solid intellectual looting. Their interrogators, however, were frequently well versed in American history and social conditions when these were brought up for discussion during brainwashing sessions. The Communists were easily able to befuddle the Americans. The next stage, disillusionment in the American way of life and American principles, was easy to bring about. The American prisoners lacked the specific information on the mechanisms of American political life and on the motivations which had kept America free. Playing on the prisoners' ignorance of history was a calculated part of the Communist strategy."

These young men yielded because they have never been taught to understand, as their Communist masters did understand, American politics, American economics, American history, and American ideals. They had a vacuum where they should have had a storehouse of knowledge about the American Revolution, the Founding Fathers, the Constitution, and the nature of our constitutional republic. They did not know American literature, which emphasizes self-reliance and "the infinitude of the private man." They did not value the heritage of the unique American Revolution, which set man free from mass; which sought to guarantee that government should keep hands off and that the individual should have liberty to use opportunity with initiative; which made the State a tool in men's hands or a road under men's feet and not a fetter around their necks. And they were not told by their teachers what Marxian collectivism is. They were left so naïve and unsophisticated that they had no rebuttal with which to blow away like a cobweb house the half lies and shabby slanders of cynically clever Chinese or Russians.

Confronted with these facts of American education, educators deny them. But let us prove by evidence from eleven dominant textbooks in American history used in high schools the country over that the facts are so. And as we study the texts in documented detail, let us keep certain standards in mind:

I. Our American Revolution is unique because it aimed at setting *the*

individual free to work out his own problems in his own way. Government, in our constitutional republic, is to be regarded, in Washington's great words, "like fire—a useful servant, a terrible master." The American way is not to allow the *government* to be the sole, central agent of economic, cultural, and social advance: the central agent is the private man, functioning on his own initiative, individually or in free association with other groups of his own choice.

II. Politically speaking, our government *is not a* "*democracy*" *but a constitutional republic,* with checks and balances designed to curb the public state and to enhance the individual. The American dream is not to set man under the state but to set the state under man. The constitutional division of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial is as wise as it is deliberate. The *executive*—the president—is especially hampered and is made only one out of three. The United States is a federated republic: as a final protection of the rights of man, the rights of the *individual states* are jealously guarded against the encroachments of federal power. The tenth amendment to the Constitution safeguards the residual rights of states and individuals against federal encroachment.

III. Economically speaking, the good life, the increasingly better life, *is not to be created by government handouts or fiats but by the initiative of private man,* given opportunity to buy and sell freely, to make and trade, to use his creative energies as his God-inspired spirit urges him to do. Individuals will do most for the good of the group by competition, by the incentive of profit, by their own energies—never by the coercive, abstract planning of the State.

Because of this philosophy (which is in accord with the natural way of life) —a philosophy enunciated by the Founding lathers and guarded by the Constitution—the United States has become a workshop of incredible potential and a storehouse of incredible plenty, such as the world has never seen before or elsewhere.

IV. Also—because of this philosophy—our wealth (which is true *commonwealth*, in which every worker shares) has been accompanied by intellectual, religious, and spiritual freedom.

Every book on American history that is true to the facts of life will make all this clear and will endow youth with a mighty arsenal of truth, enabling it

to protect itself against collectivist brainwashing. If our young people know the truth, in its pleasant and unpleasant aspects, the truth shall keep them free.

Thus this book is a study of our formal education which, Major Mayer says, has been "failing miserably in getting across the absolute fundamentals of survival in a tense and troubled international society." We engage here in a study of education as it is in our high schools—of the battle for the mind as it exists there—and we try to show that the dominant textbooks used in American history do *not* get across "the absolute fundamentals of survival" today.

We shall give documented proof that this is so. Here, in our preliminary approach, let us give only one example of a pervasive trend. That trend—and all the texts share it in greater or lesser degree—is to dissolve commitment to the nation in order to bring about what is sincerely regarded as a wider and higher global commitment.{2}

Here is an example. In the Foreword to *The United States and World Relations*, by Mowrer and Cummings, we read (p. ix):

> No teacher or student can read this book without rising-above whatever hometown, in-group, small-scale views he may have held, whether by conscious, misinformed intention or by virtue of an innocent provincialism.

The words seem not only innocent but admirable. Who wants "small-scale views'? Or even, perhaps, "hometown" views? Who wishes "an innocent provincialism"? But this is a frank and fair statement, by the book's own chosen spokesman (Henry W. Holmes, formerly Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education), of the undoubted effect of the book. That effect is to detach a student's interest from the nation, and to center his interest rather in a global superstate. The authors believe that this is good, or they would not so have written the book. They have a right to that belief and to the expression of that belief. But educators do not have the right to present that belief alone, without presenting also the belief that the United States is more important to Americans than any global government. Certainly their equating of local allegiances with "small-scale views" or even "innocent provincialism" (as something narrow) is not strongly conducive to developing in students a love of the United States of America which cannot be shaken by the brainwashers. The end product of globalism must be to dissolve or diffuse

one's faith in the quantitatively smaller but qualitatively greater unit of the United States. This can easily lead to the attitude, as phrased by Major Mayer, "that we should abandon love of country and patriotic ideals, as being identified with this evil thing called 'nationalism.'"

But our design covers a wider field and seeks a greater critique: it is to examine, as fairly yet as frankly as we can, these textbooks in American history and see what they say. Eleven texts are considered, and our study of these constitutes a study of the case history of a single great American high school, in an exceptionally conservative locality, that used all these books, and no others, during the school year.

2—Eleven Textbooks

THE eleven textbooks which we will examine are published by some of the largest and most respected publishers. At least some of them are used in the high schools of every state in the Union. The state of Tennessee, for example, includes eight of the eleven on its approved lists.

To bring our discussion home in the most particular manner possible, we have investigated one of the largest high schools in the United States, Evanston Township High School, in Evanston, Illinois. The superintendent of that school, Dr. Lloyd S. Michael, has informed us that, in various history courses of the school, nine of these texts—and only these nine—"were adopted for the school year 1950-1951." According to his letter to a former member of the Evanston school board of June 11, 1956, "the only text addition in United States history since 1952 is *History of a Free People*, by Bragdon and McCutchen." In July 1952, *The United States and World Relations,* by Mower and Cummings, was added to the list.

The complete list of books used in the Evanston Township High School follows:

The United States—Experiment in Democracy, Avery Craven and Walter Johnson (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950)

The Making of Modern America, Leon H. Canfield and Howard B. Wilder (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952)

America's History, Lewis Paul Todd and Merle Curti (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950)

The American Story, Ruth Wood Gavian and William A. Hamm (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1951)

Story of America, Ralph Volney Harlow (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951)

A History of Our Country, David Saville Muzzey (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1950)

History of United States, Dwight L. Dumond, Edward E. Dale, and Edgar B. Wesley (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1948)

United States History, Fremont P. Wirth (New York: American Book Company, 1952)

History of the American Way, Harold Underwood Faulkner, Tyler Kepner, and Edward H. Merrill (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950)

History of a Free People, Henry W. Bragdon and Samuel P. McCutchen (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954)

The United States and World Relations, Lilian T. Mowrer and Howard H. Cummings (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952)

Dr. Michael in his letter, explains how some of these texts are used:

Of a total of 18 classes, all classes except three were assigned to read all of Canfield and Wilder. The rest read chapters 1-13. In addition to the assignment above: Approximately 20 students read all of Wirth, *United States History.* Approximately 50% of the students read most or all of Todd and Curti, *America's History.* Approximately 50 students read Craven and Johnson....Oilier students read some chapters in one or more of these: Muzzey, *A History of Our Country;* Gavian and Hamm, *The American Story;* Faulkner and Kepner and Merrill, *History of the American Way;* Dumond, Dale, Wesley, *History of United States.*

In addition to the formal text used in each class, "Each teacher also [had] several copies" of each of the other texts, to which he might refer students at will. All the texts being "available for circulation from the book room," a teacher might refer students to supplementary reading in any of them. These books are the core of American history as taught in the Evanston Township High School.

History of a Free People, by Bragdon and McCutchen, *was introduced after 1952,* after private individuals had made known their conviction that the ten texts in use were committed to collectivism.

With this qualified exception (Bragdon and McCutchen do not even mention Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, or other Communist infiltrators on high government levels, and they label attempts to curb subversion as "hysteria" and "a Red scare"), we will see that these texts, with varying emphases and techniques, take not an individualistic but a "social" view of American history. *All* tend to idolize "the common man" (a phrase so prevalent as to become a cliché), "the masses," or "Mr. Average Citizen." Many of them, as we shall see, frankly interpret American history, from colonial days to the present, *as a class struggle.* They charge that America has been "imperialistic." They dismiss attempts to uncover Communist infiltration as a "scare" leading to hysteria. Few of them, in the editions published after the facts were publicly known, even mention traitors in high places: Harold Ware, Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Gregory Silvermaster, or spies and saboteurs like the Rosenbergs, and there is almost no mention of the dangers posed to security by Communist aggression. All these facts will be demonstrated in the course of this book.

In the "reprint of SOCIAL STUDIES SECTION of ANNUAL REPORT, Evanston Township High School, 1954-1955," we are told that all students "must complete U.S. History." The aim is set forth in these words:

> It [U.S. History] emphasizes such topics as the American people; development of the American form of constitutional republican government; development of American nationalism; economic development of the United States; evolution of United States foreign relations and policies; our cultural heritage. As in other history courses, knowledge of the past is brought to bear on a study of current affairs.

This is an excellent summary of a noble ideal. But, as we shall see, the books chosen and used (with the qualified exception of the Bragdon and McCutchen text) do not fulfill this aim. They emphasize not "the American form of constitutional republican government" but a "democracy" that is hardly distinguishable from the modern "people's democracies"; when they discuss the "economic development of the United States," they are critical of free enterprise but laud government planning, intervention, and control; they stress a world superstate as superior to "American nationalism"; and they ignore historians critical of liberal" U.S. foreign policies. *Not one text* even mentions the historians who have given "unpopular" evidence on the true genesis of Pearl Harbor. *Not one text* gives the whole story behind Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam or their consequences. *Not one text* gives the Chinese Nationalist side of the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek by sabotage.

One specific, flagrant instance of misinformation occurs in every one of these texts. It has to do with the blood brotherhood of fascism and communism. Fascism and communism, indeed, are the Siamese twins of politics: the same bloodstream of fraud and force, of mass worship, of state compulsion, of censorship and violence nourishes both.

The true relationship of fascism and communism—which always unite in moments of crisis to oppose their real enemy, free enterprise and the constitutional republic—can be best understood, perhaps, by a realistic study of the Hitler-Stalin pact of collaboration. Yet not one of the texts we examine uses the facts discovered and made public in 1947 by the State Department of the United States in *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941.* Not one of these texts gives a realistic interpretation or even a realistic account of Nazi-Soviet relations. How can they pose as accurate histories if they ignore the facts? If a student is taught that the Soviets made an innocuous "pact of peace" (it is so phrased in these texts) with Hitler, whereas, *it was no* "*pact of peace*" but a cynical pact of collaboration for the loosing of World War II and the loot of Poland, will that student not be, as Major Mayer says he is, "poorly informed

about the politics...of other countries..."? Will he be able to answer the brainwashers' lies with the light of truth? In this most important bit of modern history, do not these texts leave the student unprepared?

Another tendency in most of the books we will examine is to belittle authentic patriotism and to equate it with the lunatic fringe which consists of crackpots and xenophobes. One of the texts, *The United States: Experiment in Democracy,* by Craven and Johnson, says (page 662): "The official [Ku Klux] Klan literature reflected the average middle-class mind in its assertions of '100 per cent Americanism.'" Another, *The American Story,* by Gavian and Hamm, says (page 529): "National feeling was very strong, and it was often shown in undesirable ways. The strong nationalism of the years following the [first world] war was commonly expressed in such slogans as 'America first' and 'One hundred per cent Americanism.'"

Now, any decent American deplores the Ku Klux Klan and other exclusivist cults of national pride. But the two texts quoted, together with others which we will study, shed little light on the real meaning of solid patriotism. Seemingly, patriotism is an eccentricity, a foible, a species of extravagant emotionalism.

But George Washington had a strong national feeling and was one hundred per cent in his patriotism. On a night of desperate crisis he said, "Let none but Americans stand guard tonight."

In the textbooks mentioned above, patriotism and genuine nationalism are seldom if at all mentioned except as they are linked with the excesses of the extremist. This treatment is neither true nor fair; it leads, as Major Mayer found, to the inculcation of "the attitude that we should abandon love of country and patriotic ideals, as being identified with this evil thing called nationalism."

The president of a great university, as reported in *The New York Times* (September 22, 1957), recently said that the students of his university wouldn't "admit to themselves that they have patriotic ideas." And why not? If true love of one's land is equated with embarrassing emotionalism, lack of sophistication, and "foolish flag waving," how can youth be strong and resist the brainwashing of the collectivists?

Undoubtedly, Evanston Township High School felt that its history courses, and especially the texts used, would draw criticism. One section of the booklet cited on page 18 reads: "CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ARE INESCAPABLE." We are told:

> To teach them [the students], then, to deal intelligently with these issues, to form logical opinions based on reliable evidence even though these opinions may differ from our own, is a major responsibility of any school's program of citizenship education.

Well and good! But in these eleven texts the issues are *not truly presented as controversial:* instead, as we shall see, they are presented dogmatically, often without reliable evidence or with evidence only for one side. How, then, can there be "controversy"? If Jefferson is on the side of the angels because he loved "the common people" but Washington is suspect because he belonged to the gentry" and "the colonial aristocrats"; if the Republican party is the party of "the interests" and the Democratic party is the party of "the people"; if "nationalism" and "100 per cent Americanism" are low-brow but "globalism" and the "United Nations" are high-brow, we do not have "controversy," we have doctrine.

We do not wish to imply that these men and women should not be perfectly free to write as they wish: that is a part of the price we have to pay for freedom. But we do exercise the right to protest that if *only* eleven texts are used, and if all but one of these texts urge one interpretation only, there is no true "democracy" or "controversy" or education, but indoctrination.

If *only* a "social" interpretation of history is taught, by monopoly and without the benefit of any Sherman Anti-Trust Act of the mind, a student will not know that another interpretation exists. He will not find clash a stimulating of intellectual competition; he will find only the products that a scholastic cartel wishes to sell him.

Nor do the publishers, the school authorities, or the teachers warn students of the background of any of these authors. For example, Professor Merle Curti, co-author of *Americas History,* upholds the panacea of socialism in all he writes. *The American Legion Magazine* (April 1941) in an article by R. Worth Shumaker, "No 'New Order' for Our Schools," documents the fact that Professor Merle Curti (then of Smith College) was Massachusetts' contribution to the Committee of the Progressive Education Association,

which issued a "Call to the Teachers of the Nation." That "Call" said:

> It [the Association] has entered a revolutionary epoch....If the teachers are to play a positive and creative role...they will have to...take up boldly the challenge of the present...*and will transfer the democratic traditions from individualistic to collectivistic economic foundations....*

One can only assume that a professor who sets his name to such a "Call" is a supporter of collectivism. We are not warned of this in Professor Curti's background as historian.

Dr. Ruth Wood Gavian, co-author of *The American Story*, is also a co-author of *Our Changing Social Order* (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1941). In that volume the authors question private ownership of property (p. 22) and "economic individualism" (p. 684); they uphold government ownership, planning, and control. But we are not warned of the fact that this viewpoint is held by the co-author of *The American Story.*

These texts are competently written. They are often eloquent; they bear the names of reputable and famous scholars and of "big" publishers. They are widely used. Their sales run into the hundreds of thousands; at least one has sold over a million copies.{3} Also their authors refer again and again to *one another,* forming what Upton Sinclair used to call, in his attacks on capitalism, an "interlocking directorate." Now, an "interlocking directorate" does not cease to be a monopoly when it uses the label of "liberal" instead of "conservative." It is a closed corporation, a monopolistic cartel. It leads not to "controversial ideas" but to iron conformity. Or, to turn to biology, these books are *inbred*. Biologists will tell you that perpetual inbreeding tends to concentrate and intensify biological faults in the children. The children tend to be deaf and dumb, or blind, or prone to infection.

The late Representative Paul W. Shafer, in a speech before Congress on March 21, 1952, documented a trend that he found in American education.

Representative Shafer's speech, entitled "Is There a Subversive Movement in the Public Schools? The Documentation of a Call to the Teachers of the Nation to Reach for Power," indicates a movement in American schools which opposes free enterprise and fosters collectivism. He calls this movement "subversive":

Basically, the fact here documented is that a significantly influential segment of public-school leadership in the United States proclaims—as it has been proclaiming for some 20 years—the right and duty of teachers, school administrators, and educational leaders to undertake to remake American society and government through the agency and medium of the public schools.

This movement and trend have found, and continue to find, advocacy, expression and implementation through the policy pronouncements of educational organizations, through professional books and journals, through the counsel and instruction of teachers in colleges of education and at educational conferences and workshops, and through the activities of disciples of the movement in developing curricular content and classroom procedures in elementary and secondary public schools....

Certain basic premises characterize this movement:

First. It proclaims that capitalism in the United States is doomed—that it is dead, or dying—and that its replacement by some form of collectivism, by some form or degree of planned economy, government control, or out-right socialization, essentially new and different in character, is both desirable and inevitable.

Second. This movement and its sponsors hold that the schools should participate actively in building a new social order along these collectivist lines, that this activity should be carried on either through outright indoctrination of these premises and concepts or through processes of guided group study and discussion and uncoerced persuasion within the classroom, and that the schools, through both the content and methods of instruction, should prepare and condition the child for participation in that new social order.

Third. The movement calls for such revision of the educational system, and of its philosophy, procedures, and subject matter, as is necessary to advance and accomplish these purposes.

Fourth. More extreme educational sponsors of this movement also hold that the transition to collectivism will, in all probability, involve class conflict; that the schools, accordingly, should adopt the class approach in their educational activities, align themselves with the worker class, and utilize class consciousness and conflict as a "potential resource."

Representative Shafer continues his listing, nine items in all. The ninth is especially pertinent:

Ninth. A further post-war development in the movement has been the addition *of the goal of world government and a supernational sovereignty to the program of social reconstruction through the schools.*

In the body of his speech he documents his points.

Now we do *not* say that the authors of any of these texts belong to what he calls this "movement and trend." We do not say that they are in any sense, "subversive." It *is* fair to say, however, that this "movement and trend" has created the climate of academic thought today and has furthered a compulsion that affects the thinking of us all. These authors, either because they

consciously agree with it or because they are unconsciously influenced by it, are close to the ideology of which Representative Shafer speaks. And we believe that most of these authors, most of the time, share the thinking of others who *do* "reach out for power" and seek to be "engineers of social change."

Representative Shafer has a startling and persuasive word for the movement of which he speaks. He says:

> I use the term "subversive" in the connotation of "under" mining allegiance and faith." I use the term in the sense in which I assume that it was used by Dean Henry W. Holmes of the graduate school of education of Harvard University....
>
> I am certainly realistic enough to recognize that America is not perfect—neither is its government, nor its economic system, nor its social arrangements. But I believe that it is still "the last, best hope of earth."
>
> America is not perfect—but I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which "accentuates the negative," which minimizes, ignores, or denies the strengths, accomplishments arid potentialities of our government, our economic system and our social arrangements, is subversive.
>
> I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which pits class against class in America, which attributes only evil and viciousness to one class or group of citizens and only virtue to another class or group, and which proposes that the schools teach and promote such a belief and attitude, is subversive.
>
> I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which brands the capitalist or owner as the inevitable and implacable foe of human rights, as incapable of social conscience or responsibility, and as hostile to improvement or opportunities for improvement for his fellow men, is subversive.
>
> I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which insists and would teach in the public school classroom that the only solution—and the desirable solution—of the problems of Americans, of the problems of self-government, economics and social well-being, lies in increasingly bigger government, in increasing concentration of power in centralized government, is subversive.
>
> I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which proposes to convert the public schools into an agency for the promotion of socialism, a planned collectivist economy, government regimentation or the welfare state, is subversive....
>
> I believe that an educational movement which urges the teachers or any other single group in the national life "to reach for power and then make the most of its conquest," and which claims for any single group a freedom from accountability to the public, and an immunity from public criticism, is subversive....

These are Representative Shafer's words. He is giving *his* definition of "subversion." But all the ideas he lists as "subversive" are exactly the ideas that the brainwashers in Korea have used as oil for their lamps of China!

One does not have to be a member of the Communist Party to be

"subversive"—if subversive means "undermining allegiance and faith." Subversion is a subtler and more terrible thing, for it is not political but spiritual. If it exists in the ways that Representative Shafer lists, it is no wonder that today America is losing the cold war and that one third of our prisoners succumbed to the enemy.

Let us see, then, how a group of eleven history textbooks—the *only* ones used in one of America's largest high schools—advance precisely the ideas which Representative Shafer criticizes as subversive, ideas imposed upon the minds of young people by monopolistic control.

3—People's Democracy or Constitutional Republic?

NONE of these eleven textbooks in American history makes it clear that the government of the United States of America is not a democracy—but a republic. Not a single text defines even democracy in its true American sense, enabling students to see how essentially it differs from the contemporary "people's democracies" that disfigure the world.

Our American *form of government* is not a "democracy" at all. The Founding Fathers defined the form of government which they set up as a constitutional republic. The pledge to the flag declares: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, *and to the republic for which it stands*, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." These words do not express allegiance "to the *democracy* for which it stands" or to a nation divisible into factions, pressure groups, and economic classes, nor do they express allegiance to a justice which is *only* for "the common man' or "the underprivileged" or "the masses." They express undivided allegiance to the *republic* to the *nation indivisible*, with liberty and justice for *all*—white or black, poor or rich, Jew or Gentile. Ours is a constitutional republic.

As the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, May 14, 1787 was adjourning, the aged Benjamin Franklin said:

"As I have been sitting here all these weeks, I have often wondered whether yonder sun is rising or setting. But now I know that it is a rising sun." And as Franklin left the building, someone in the waiting crowd asked him what kind of government the delegates had set up. Benjamin Franklin replied: "*A republic—if we can keep it so*."

Our eleven textbooks, on the contrary, do not "keep it so." They *all* fail to clarify the fact that the United States is not a "democracy" but a constitutional republic. Even when they incidentally mention that our country was founded as a republic, they describe it categorically in terms of "democracy." "Democracy" is their catch word, the cliché of their texts.

Not one of these eleven volumes lists the word "republic" in its index. The indices list the various "Republican parties" that have existed in our history;

but the soul of our political being—*the republic*—is not considered important enough to list once. It is mentioned but rarely in the text. And this is all the more startling because *the word* "*democracy*" *is in the index of every volume save one*, with numerous subentries.

Craven and Johnson subtitle their book "Experiment in Democracy." Dumond, Dale, and Wesley say (p. 203): "The United States was the first large-scale *experiment in democracy* in the world." Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill tell us (p. 45), "Americans choose a *democratic* government" and (p. 167) "The common man makes *democracy* more *democratic*." They say (p. 90), "We move by changes in the Constitution toward *a more perfect democracy*" and (p. 132) "Third parties write new programs for democracy" and (p. 149) "*Democratic* government adopts the merit system" and (p. 185) "We, the people, find new interest in the *democratic* way of life" and (p. 141) "The farmers, under the banner of the People's Party, carry on the struggle for *democracy*." Wirth says (p. 119), from an Olympian height, "We in the United States are proud of our form of government. *It is a democracy*..." The kind of "democracy" Wirth has in mind is clear from his praise of the French Revolution: he says:

> This revolution was a struggle between the privileged and the unprivileged classes in France, and many Americans were sympathetic with the social and political reforms that grew out of that revolution. *They considered it a democratic movement similar to that in which they themselves only recently had been engaged*...and it now appeared to them that *Frenchmen were fighting for these same ideals*. (P. 125.)

Actually, the French Revolution set up the state as the mortal god of man's idolatry; the American Revolution subordinated the state to man. The French Revolution was a civil war of classes; the American Revolution was a war to set up a new nation in which all classes should form a united people. The French Revolution, moving through the liquidation of its best sons (such as Danton), ended in the fussy tyranny of Robespierre and the dictatorship of Napoleon; the American Revolution, moving through the co-operation of classes and factions, culminated in a constitutional republic. All this, Wirth never makes clear, and he seems to suggest that both revolutions were one because they both sought "democracy." Harlow says flatly (p. xiii): Our country is a democracy." Even the best of these books, *History of a Free People*, by Bragdon and McCutchen, sees America as a "democracy" rather

than as a constitutional republic. There, E. B. White, of the *New Yorker*, is quoted in the epilogue as expressing the heart of America—and he praises "democracy" as of the American essence. The authors speak (p. 671) of "the characteristics of American democracy." They say, "...democracy is no easy thing to define...Today American democracy faces the greatest challenge in its history...." Todd and Curti say (p. 13): "By democracy we mean *that form of government* in which authority rests with the majority of people, and that way of life which *emphasizes the dignity and equality of all men and women*." Evidently, then, Patrick Henry must have said, "Give me *equality* or give me death," and the Declaration of Independence should have read, "...*life, equality*, and the pursuit of happiness...." Muzzey also stresses "democracy" rather than the constitutional republic. Mowrer and Cummings, even in admitting that the United States is a republic, try to shunt it onto the track called "democracy." They say:

> It [the United States] was founded as a republic *by people many of whom were afraid of full popular rule. In practice it has developed steadily toward ever-greater popular rule exercised by ever-more direct pressure*....In the minds of some of them [the founders], aversion to popular, mass, or "mob" rule was so great that they put the accent upon property. Looking back, we may note that our ancestors frequently put what we should call property rights above human rights. (P. 263.)

These statements italicize "democracy," question the checks and balances of the constitutional republic, and move toward a "social" democracy where "private property" yields to the pressures of the group. The same authors say (*loc. cit.*): "Under other circumstances, at another time, the American Republic might perhaps have developed away from democracy." That, of course, would have been bad! In *The Making of Modern America*, by Canfield and Wilder, the same proclivity for "democracy" rather than "republic" is evident. In the index the word "republic" is not present at all; the word "democracy" is cited five times.

The fact that all these history texts erase the emphasis on the republic and italicize the dynamic and goal of "democracy" might not be so questionable if "democracy" were rightly explained. But these authors do not so explain or define it, or helpfully distinguish between genuine *American* democracy and its opposite, the counterfeit which is known as a "people's democracy."

What is this distinction?

In America we mean by "democracy" a spiritual mood and a political mode that actuates the people *as a whole, the nation as a whole*—including every group, every "class," every individual, whatever his racial or economic status may be: black or white, rich or poor, "kulak" or "proletarian," Jew or Gentile, millionaire or bum. Democracy under the constitutional republic means a government of the people, by the people, and for the people; but "the people" does not mean a segment known as "the masses" set against a segment known as "the classes." It means that all the people—none of them "masses" and none of them "classes"—form (*e pluribus unum*) a united people in a nation indivisible. The democratic mood is politically expressed through a republic, a system of practical governance in which the people act through representatives elected by them periodically on every level, from town to federal government. The Constitution guarantees equal opportunity for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all. In the constitutional republic, checks and balances prevent factions and pressure groups, or parts of the government itself, from obtaining the absolute power that corrupts absolutely. The government is an impartial umpire who has never made a bet on one group of players in the game and who does not shift the rules to allow the weaker side to win.

Under *American* democracy, all men have liberty—intellectual, artistic, religious—to practice individual faith and creation without coercion by a one-party, one-class state. All *collectivist* "democracies," on the other hand, make the state not an umpire but an interested party who plays the game *and always wins*. Our democracy regards the individual as the dynamic and the goal, and society or the group as merely the means to enhance the pearl of great price which is the individual soul. But under collectivist "democracy," as that arch-collectivist, Adolf Hitler, expressed it, *True idealism is to subordinate the life and interests of the individual to the group*."

Unless such distinctions are made clear, it is misleading to use the term "democracy": for the student will never know whether you are talking about American democracy or *collectivist* "people's democracy"; he will never know whether you are referring to American attitudes and moods or to the American form of government.

The authors of the books we are examining make no distinctions. An

example of what they mean when they say "democracy" occurs in Craven and Johnson. Democracy, or, as they phrase it, "the democratic dogma," is this:

> They [the Colonial "democrats"] *made democracy a weapon* which future groups, *disgruntled and oppressed*, could use....During the period of the American Revolution two struggles were taking place: the Revolution, a social and political struggle; and the War of Independence (1775-1783), a fight between the colonies and England. (P. 99.)

No evidence exists that any of the leaders in that struggle, whether Washington or Jefferson, Franklin or Thomas Paine, so divided the Revolution into a schism and duality. Indeed, Robert Brown proves by cumulative evidence in his *Charles Beard and the Constitution* (Princeton University Press, 1956) that from ninety to ninety-five per cent, of the so-called "common people" of the colonies were property holders and regarded themselves not as upsetting the social system of the colonies but as affirming that social system.

Craven and Johnson try to make these colonial freeholders and farmers and workmen *class conscious*: but the whole point of the Revolution was that they did *not* regard themselves as a separate and inferior "class" at all, but as free men in a free republic. Craven and Johnson convert colonial democracy (as a spiritual mood) into a political "weapon," as in contemporary "people's democracies." And they think so well of their conception of "democracy" that they repeat it in almost the same words on page 100: "...a weapon [*sic*] which *neglected and oppressed groups* in every generation have used." Thus democracy, as the mood and spiritual tone of the political republic, is made partial, bitter, and destructive: it is not, to them, what it rightly was to the free and genial spirit of Walt Whitman, a "dear love of comrades," affirmative, wholesome, gracious, unifying: it is, to these authors, "*a weapon*" The term democracy is degraded into a glorification of what Nietzsche, with his keen eye for the faults of democracy, rightly characterized as "*ressentiment*"—a sullen, smoldering hate on the part of the "disgruntled" for a creative order wherein they feel inferior.

Against this ideological and theoretic interpretation of the colonial situation, consider the very different interpretation of Robert Brown:

> That the Constitution did not confer on Congress the power to make direct attacks on property is not to be wondered at (p. 176 [of Beard]). Given the America of 1787, *in which most men owned property*, the reverse would have been the more astonishing. A constitution

which permitted an attack on property would not have received a hearing in a country that had fought a revolution for the preservation of *life, liberty, and property*. One of the colonists' chief complaints against Britain had been that the British, on whom the colonists had no check, were endangering the property rights of colonists. The opponents of the Constitution were not opposed to the protection of property rights. After all, were not the Anti-federalists responsible for the adoption of the first ten amendments, and did not Articles IV, V, and VII provide for *additional protection of property which these Anti-federalists did not think the Constitution provided?* (*Charles Beard and the Constitution, p. 108.*)

The same book shows that Madison so interpreted the Constitution. Brown says:

> Later Madison elaborated even more fully on his views of the suffrage, again without supporting the Beard generalization. He said the right to vote was fundamental in a republican constitution. If this right were confined to property, persons would be oppressed, and if it were confined to persons, property would be oppressed. *Both property and personal rights must be protected*....the United States had a precious advantage *in the actual distribution of property*, especially land, and *in the universal hope of acquiring property, for this created much sympathy in the country for property*. This, it seems to me, comes dangerously close to a political philosophy *based on such old-fashioned principles as justice and right.* (*Ibid.,* p. 102)

But Craven and Johnson in their text do not trouble themselves with such sobering facts and philosophy. Because their theory is lather to their "facts," they divide America into classes in terms of fission and schism. They try their persuasive best to make inexperienced and innocent students understand all colonial America as the mere battlefield of "Social Classes and Conflicts" (subheading, page 60). "The upper class, numerically weak, consisted of those who owned so much wealth that they did not have to engage in manual labor. They generally wore finer clothes to set themselves off from the masses" (*loc. cit*.). "Classes...masses..."—this is the familiar stereotype. Merchants, leading clergymen, wealthy lawyers, owners of large estates—these were the "upper class." Farmers, artisans, apprentices were "the masses." The determining factor is economic status; conflict between classes over economic matters is made a dynamic both of colonial life and of a civil war that these authors believe underlay the American Revolution.

The "upper classes" are never credited with idealism or disinterested love of country; they are always out for what they can get: "....the upper class, *disliking certain English commercial laws and acts, used the middle class* to stir discontent and to try to frighten England into ameliorating oppressive features of her imperial system" (p. 63). That many Americans wished a new

beginning, an original culture, a free and creative society for *all* (even including the "wealthy"), is to these authors incredible. Only "the common man" could act out of idealism. They interpret the American Revolution thus (p. 103): "The rest of the *upper-class people joined in the American cause, but with the full intention of checking later the aspirations of the average citizen for a more democratic way of life.*" This is as unprovable as it is untrue; it is just, phony history. The "upper-class" signers of the Declaration of Independence said:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government...

That these men could have joined "the American cause" and written these words "with the full intention of checking later the aspirations of the average citizen..." does not make sense. The writers of the Declaration, on the evidence of the words themselves, are not mean conspirators of the spirit: they are men whose frank and fiery spirits dare treason to a king out of loyalty to freedom. Yet, most of these signers were "wealthy"; most of them were "upper-class." The President of the Congress, John Hancock, was "wealthy"; so was the banker Robert Morris, tireless in serving his country and its freedom with energy or with dollars. That such men, and many of the other brave signers, wrote with tongue in cheek, awaiting only a favorable time to keep men from being free and equal, is incredible.

A similar interpretation of the United States as a sort of "people's democracy" is startlingly revealed in Todd and Curti. The "democracy" of which they speak is a *social* democracy; the American Revolution they praise is a *social* revolution. They say:

> As we all know, victory [for democracy] *has not yet been completely won.* But the struggle has spread to the Far East [Communist China?] and other parts of the world [Russia, Yugoslavia?], and *democracy remains* one of the driving forces in human history. (P. 13.)

But what species of "democracy" is it that rises in "the Far East" or in "other parts of the world"? Is it the democracy of Thomas Jefferson and of George Washington, generating a constitutional republic, or is it the "people's

democracy" of Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev and Tito? Is it the constitutional republic set up by the people of Russia, after the overthrow of the Czar, and then smashed by the bayonets of Bolshevik reaction? Or is it the totalitarian strait-jacket of communism, with its "people's democracies"? Is it the constitutional republic under Chiang Kai-shek and under Beneš and Masaryk, or is it the sabotage of these, again, by the force and fraud of "people's democracies"? *Which struggle is it* that these authors dignify as "one of the driving forces in human history"? They have a right to choose, but we have a right to know *which is their choice*. And if they mean what they seem to mean, it is not the American Revolution which has spread "to the Far East and other parts of the world" *but the reaction of the omnipotent state* against man's unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

No student studying these eleven texts could gain from them a clear conception of the fundamental truth that the United States of America, governmentally, is not a "democracy" but a republic. It is assumed in all that the American form of government is a "democracy."

In six of the books,{4} going back to colonial times, the nature of genuine American democracy as a spiritual mood and tone expressing itself in the frame of a representative republic, in contrast to the coercive, caste-ridden "people's democracy" of our day, is never explained. In reading these six, a student would be led to believe that, from colonial times on, the individual and social dynamic of America lies in a war between the "classes" and the "masses," between the privileged and the unprivileged, between the "colonial aristocrats" and "the common man." In three others,{5} the theme of class conflict—if not stressed in colonial history—is explicit in the history of more recent days. In Bragdon and McCutchen, and Mowrer and Cummings, the two remaining books, international relationships are more especially treated.

This confusion logically leads, as we shall see in the next chapter, to an emphasis on class war as a dynamic in past and present American history.

4—Nation Indivisible or Class War

THE assumption that our form of government is not a constitutional republic but a "democracy" is the root out of which many of the thistles in these textbooks grow. It leads directly, as we shall see, to an interpretation of American history in terms of a clash of classes, which is actually a sort of civil war.

All, with the exception of *History of a Free People by* Bragdon and McCutchen, in varying degrees and with different emphases regard the clash of classes as a fact and even as a primary dynamic in America history. Six of them: *The United States: Experiment in Democracy* by Craven and Johnson; *History of United States* by Dumond, Dale, and Wesley; *History of the American Way* by Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill; *United States History* by Wirth; *The American Story* by Gavian and Hamm, and *Americas History* by Todd and Curti, interpret colonial and revolutionary history in terms of a class struggle that fissured the indivisible nation into what our Founding Fathers called "factions" and what the Marxians call "classes." All these volumes interpret and motivate colonial history and the American Revolution in terms of a struggle between "colonial aristocrats" and "colonial democrats"; and, to them, this conflict continues into our day and is the very point and counterpoint ("masses" versus "classes") of history today. In this interpretation, these authors are either unaware of—or deliberately ignore—the several sound scholars who deny that American history is founded on class consciousness. Recent scholarship ascribes the very failure of the Socialist party to this lack of class consciousness. *The Age of Reform: from Bryan to Franklin Delano Roosevelt* by Richard Hofstadtter and *The Socialist Party of America: a History* by David A. Shannon are prime examples of this view. These six history texts, on the contrary, follow the theses of the earlier Charles A. Beard, seemingly unaware that he was to declare his earlier work superficial.

The authors of the six histories interpret their conflict of classes primarily as a clash of rich and poor, of have nots and haves, of "privileged" and "unprivileged." They interpret the great American ideals (as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the early documents and

speeches and literature) in terms of economic interests and motivations. They turn intellectual and spiritual realities, as Marxians and even non-Marxian collectivists tend to do, into shadows cast by economic solids. They reduce our Revolution to a "social and economic struggle." To them, it is only *casually* a struggle against British domination, but *causally* a civil war of "colonial aristocrats" against "colonial democrats." And they reduce our form of government—our republic and its Constitution—to a mere compromise, at best, between the "conservatives" who are "well-to-do" and the "liberals" who are "poor." They reduce history to economic determinism, and this is the essence of Marxism.

These six texts extend the momentum of this interpretation into modern days and ways, as we shall see in chapter 7. And four other texts: *Story of America* by Harlow; *A History of Our Country* by Muzzey; *The United States and World Relationships* by Mowrer and Cummings, and *The Making of Modern America* by Canfield and Wilder, in varying degrees, even though they are just to colonial history, still tend to present modern history as a clash of classes or at least a conflict of "conservative" and "liberal."

Let us first examine the six texts that interpret colonial and revolutionary history in these terms.

The word "capitalism"—scarcely in the English language at the time—is injected, evidently as a vice word, into colonial history. "By the time of the War of Independence with England *a distinct capitalistic group had developed in colonial society*. Merchants, master artisans, and landowning farmers *owned capital goods*—land, tools, shops, etc.,—*and, dependent on them, was a group of laborers who did not share in the ownership of the capital goods.*" (Craven and Johnson, p. 59.) To call a farmer's land or an artisan's tools "capital," as if, perhaps, "capital" were an instrument for enslaving the laborers who did not have them, should trouble farmers who love their land and artisans who cherish their tools. The passage drives a wedge into the nation, splitting it into warring "classes." This clash of classes is, to these authors, the primary war; the war with England almost is secondary. They say:

> In the years from 1763 to 1775 the *colonial democracy warned a twofold war: against England and against their own upper class.* They realized that England had to be disposed of *before they could deal with their own aristocrats*. Many of the upper class led in the agitation

against England in order to gain freedom of action from imperial restrictions, *but this group was hardly interested in granting more democracy to the underprivileged.* (P. 86.)

To "deal' with "their own aristocrats": was that, the great meaning of the American Revolution? And the charge that the colonial aristocrats used the Revolution for their own purposes and wished to suppress the "underprivileged" is a serious charge against the Founding Fathers. The "democrats" are more eager to "deal with" their native "aristocrats" than to fight England; the "aristocrats," moreover, fight England only to serve and uphold their own selfish material interests. They wish to sabotage "democracy." Can any other interpretation be given to this than that of "class war"?

The American Revolution is thus regarded as a civil war:

> During the period of the American Revolution two struggles were taking place: the Revolution, a social and political struggle; and the War of Independence (1775-1783), a fight between the colonies and England. (P. 99.)

They say (*loc. cit.*), "The quarrel with England *required the use of the democratic doctrine*"—as if the colonial "aristocrats" made it the cheese of their mousetrap. The authors up-hold "democratic doctrine" as the spirit of America, saying (p. 99) of the "colonial democrats": "They made democracy *a weapon which future groups, disgruntled and oppressed, could use.*" So, in their account of the struggles of yesterday, "democracy" was not a glowing spirit permeating the entire nation (rich as well as poor), crowning their good with brotherhood; democracy was the dynamics of grudge on the part of any segment of the nation that is "disgruntled and oppressed."

That the American Revolution was a "dual revolution," largely a civil war and a *social* revolution, is not supported by the facts. The people themselves were satisfied with its outcome and approved it. They wished no further "social upheaval" by the "disgruntled and oppressed": they had fought the Revolution for goals which they desired, and they established a constitutional republic to secure those ends permanently.

Consider the evidence. John Quincy Adams said that he himself had been "branded...with the name of an *anti-federalist,*" so he cannot have been prejudiced, as a "Federalist," against the popular will (as these authors would put it). Adams wrote of the popular enthusiasm over the acceptance of the

Constitution:

> February 8, 1788. This afternoon the delegates from Newbury and from this town returned home from Convention. A number of very respectable citizens, *and a member who were not very* respectable, went out on horseback to meet the members and escort them into town; as they came along the bells at different churches were set to ringing, and this noisy expression was continued with some intermissions till eight o'clock in the evening. The mob [*sic*] huzza'd, and one would have thought that every man from the adoption of the Constitution had acquired a sure expectancy of an independent fortune. I passed the evening at home in reading and writing. (*The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 2nd Series, XVI, 378-379.)

Here was an *anti-federalist*—that is, one of those whom these six texts applaud as opposing the upper classes—who set down, contrary to his own beliefs, *the popular joy* in the outcome of the Revolution. To make this doubly clear, Adams wrote, on February 7, 1788, a commentary on the way the people—the majority of the people, those whom these texts call "the common man"—received the news that the Constitution (the fruit of the American Revolution) had been adopted. Adams says:

> This day, at about noon, the news arrived in this town [Newburyport, Massachusetts] that the Federal Constitution was yesterday adopted and ratified by a majority of nineteen members in our State Convention. *In this town the satisfaction is almost universal;* for my own part, I have not been pleased with this system, and my acquaintance have long since branded me with the name of an *anti-federalist* [italics in original]. But I am now converted, though not convinced. My feelings upon the occasion have not been passionate nor violent; and, as upon the decision of this question I find myself *on the weaker side*, I think it my duty to submit without murmuring *against what is not to be helped*. In our government, opposition to *the acts of a majority of the people* is rebellion to all intents and purposes; and I should view a man *who would now endeavor to excite commotions against this plan*, as no better than an insurgent who took arms last winter against the Courts of Justice. (*Ibid.*)

Now, if the Revolution had been a "dual revolution"—if it had been a "social upheaval" of the "disgruntled and oppressed"—and if the Constitution had been the final victory of the rich and upper-class people—such rejoicing by the people themselves over the adoption of the Constitution would have been ludicrous.

That the authors of these six texts, notably Craven and Johnson, flavor history with ideology is further solidified by this fact: The Shaysites, who were the government of Massachusetts after the election of 1787, did *not* recall the Massachusetts delegates from the Constitutional Convention, and they later ratified the Constitution. The Shaysites were, of course, the *radicals*

of Massachusetts and came as near to being the pure and essential "disgruntled" of the earth as any men of the time could be. Yet they upheld the Constitution, evidently regarding the outcome of the Revolution as being satisfactory to them, on matter what incidental reforms they might desire. Is this evidence for a "dual revolution"? The war with England was over. Were these radicals still seeking to "deal...with their own aristocrats"?{6}

The Assuring of the American Revolution into a "dual revolution"—rebellion against England and civil war between "colonial aristocrats" and "colonial democrats"—is not the fallacy of Craven and Johnson only. Todd and Curti share the same view. For example, they write (p. 83) of the "conflict between the well-to-do and the plain folk" (a favorite cliché, like "the common man") as the basic and essential dynamic of colonial history. One major subheading (p. 84) is "The Struggle Between the Plain Folk and the Colonial Aristocrats." They quote the earlier Charles Beard approvingly (p. 136): "...the American Revolution was more than a war on England. It was in truth an economic, social, and intellectual transformation..." But neither they nor Beard shows that, this was *not* a "transformation" brought about by class war and ending in class rule, but an affirmative, cultural, creative upsurge of a whole people into new terms of government under the Constitution. The authors say (*loc. cit.*): "...the conflict was merely one of the opening blows in the struggle for democracy." The later blows in this struggle show what they have in mind—*social revolution*, largely in economic terms. They say:

> ...in recent years the fires of democracy and nationalism have continued to burn throughout the world, bringing unrest and a changing way of life to the Arabic peoples of the Near East and the Asiatic peoples of India, Java, and China....(Pp. 147-148.)

Now, the fires of which they speak have brought *socialism* to India, a reasonable facsimile of collectivism to Indonesia, and *communism* to China. Do the authors intend to equate all these with 'democracy'? If so, they do not mean the mood of American democracy but the grim, monolithic dictatorship of "people's democracies."

(It is an interesting fact that "liberal" authors praise nationalism passionately everywhere in the world except at home. For India, Indonesia, China to be "nationalistic" is right and idealistic, but for America to be "nationalistic" is selfish and sordid.)

Todd and Curti, too, present the Constitution of the United States of America as a class-ruled document. They say:

> They [the Founding Fathers] were determined to keep the control of the government in the hands of the well-to-do, whom they considered more stable, more judicious, and more temperate than the poorer and less educated people. (P. 173.)

Actually, as Robert E. Brown shows, it was a majority of the poorer people who upheld the Constitution, because they saw in it the checks and balances which would keep the government from again rising to tax and oppress all men and from again curtailing their freedom to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

But these authors have not delved into the evidence: they follow the early Charles Beard as the blind sheep follow the Judas goat into the pen. They assume that the core of our government, the guardian of our liberty, the Constitution, was selfishly fashioned by designing parties and pressure groups to serve the "well-to-do" and to check the "underprivileged"!

Craven and Johnson quote with glee John C. Miller, who says:

> They [the Colonial aristocrats] were not making war upon the principle of *aristocracy and they had no more intention than had the Tories* of destroying the tradition of upper-class leadership in the colonies. Although they hoped to turn the Tories out of office, they did not propose to *open these lush pastures to the common herd* [*sic!*]. They did believe, however, that the common people, *if properly bridled and reined*, might be made allies in the work of freeing the colonies from British rule and that they—*the gentry*—might reap the benefits without interference. They expected, in other words, to achieve a "safe and sane" *revolution of gentlemen, by gentlemen, and for gentlemen.*{7}

In the same vein, we are told by Gavian and Hamm:

> Those who *received the news of the Declaration* [*of Independence*] *with rejoicing came mostly from the underprivileged classes*—frontiersmen, small farmers, small tradesmen, wage earners. They hoped that the Revolution would bring them political *and economic* freedom.
>
> *Many others, choosing the American side now that they had to make a choice, were saddened at the cutting of the ties with the mother country. In this group were some members of the privileged class who threw in their lot with the patriots.* (P. 66.)

This is demagoguery—and historical nonsense. The use of the modern terms "privileged" and "underprivileged" would puzzle both the rich and the poor of the saner colonial times. If a man, by his skill and work, succeeded, he would not have considered the result a "privilege" at all but a natural *consequence*. Most of the leaders of the Revolution were "privileged"—and

yet *rejoiced* most of all at the Declaration of Independence and, instead of being saddened at the break with England, tried to hasten it. George Washington, Israel Putnam, Alexander Hamilton, Generals Greene and Knox, and tough old Green Mountain Stark were property owners and well-to-do and therefore "privileged." *So was Thomas Jefferson*. Yet no member of the "underprivileged" classes received the news of the Declaration of Independence with more "rejoicing." To suggest that only "some members"—a scant few, as it were—of "the privileged class" threw in their lot with the "patriots" is nonsense. It is the old idea of the "poor but honest," with its corollary of the rich but rascally. It does not fit the facts of life.

Gavian and Hamm, again with class bias, say (p. 86), "The control of America had passed from the hands of the colonial aristocracy into the hands of the farmers and middle-class people." The legitimate emphasis would be to say that a former "aristocracy" (which should be defined and its virtues granted) had now fused with the farmers and the middle class into an indivisible nation where all classes formed a single people. But the authors so phrase it as to make it seem a clash of classes, in which now one class and now another was seizing "control" (a favorite word of theirs) of the government. They say of the Federalists:

> *...they lost control of the government* [*sic*] because they *did not sympathize with the common people.* They followed policies which *benefited special interests* [a modern, Marxian phrase]—*the commercial, investing, and manufacturing classes—and they kept the government in the hands of men of wealth.* The common people wanted a greater voice in the government. They looked to the Republican party and its leader, Jefferson, to give it to them. (P. 137.)

This is a curious interpretation, which wholly misrepresents the nature of the constitutional republic. To speak of keeping or losing "control of the government" or of keeping "the government in the hands of" any one party or policy falsifies the American concept of government. In a total state, under one-party rule, one can rightly say that a party "kept control of the government" or "kept the government in the hands of" that one party. But in *our* government, the majority votes a party or policy into power, and that party or policy *represents the will of the voters; not any* "*control of*" *government*. If the majority decides, as it indubitably will, that it wishes a change of emphasis and a shift in policy or party, it will vote another party

into power. Probably well over half the adult males of the late eighteenth century were eligible to vote. If they had voted the Federalists into power (as they had) was it the "Federalists" who "controlled the government" or the people that wished the Federalists to represent them? When the people decided that the Federalists had made mistakes and no longer represented what the people desired, they voted them out of office. In both instances, it was the people who decided the government they wished, not the Federalists who "controlled" the government and the people.

Gavian and Hamm regard Jefferson and Jackson as champions of "the common people." They tell us (p. 125) that Jefferson "...stood, in short, for the ideals known as the American dream.'" Since the electorate (ninety-five per cent of adult males) had even wished Washington to have a third term, there must have been *something* about Washington that represented "the American dream." The people had made a myth of Washington even while he was alive —and they do not make a myth of figures whom they regard as unpopular or alien. It is wrong to focus on one part of the American philosophy, no matter how high and noble that may be (and Jefferson *was* both high and noble), and to omit the parts that are equally high and noble. It is like saying that Walt Whitman represents "American poetry"—as if Edgar Allan Poe and Emily Dickinson did not also represent "American poetry." America fulfills herself in many ways, lest one good leader should corrupt us all. Washington is a part of "the American dream." John Marshall is a part of "the American dream." Even Alexander Hamilton—that whipping-boy of the "liberals"—stood for a part of "the American dream." The dream of America is orbed and catholic; it is not a partial or a partisan thing.

We shall see more of this partiality and intolerance; but we have to notice this, even here, if only in passing.

Gavian and Hamm's interpretation of American history as the clash of classes leads them into strange comments on the French Revolution. They say, for example (p. 128): "The king and queen and thousands of nobles went to the guillotine. Conservative Americans, including Hamilton and his followers, were terribly shocked." Apparently they should not have been "shocked." Jefferson was made of sterner stuff—at least according to these authors. "This was not true of Jefferson and his followers. They felt that the

sacrifice of a few thousand lives was not too high a price to pay for French liberty."

If the authors saw history steadily and whole, and not in terms of a social revolution and a class war, they might realize that not only a king and queen and a few thousand nobles went to the guillotine but many thousands of Girondins (more eager than the Jacobins for "French Liberty") and such a girl as Charlotte Corday. They might even tell us that our own Tom Paine escaped the guillotine only by Providence. And they might themselves question whether "the sacrifice of a few thousand lives" (it is easy to be generous with other people's lives!) was not "too high a price to pay" for Robespierre and Napoleon!

But other texts take the same direction. Thus Dumond, Dale, and Wesley say:

> The wealthy traders of the Northern cities, the professional classes everywhere, and the planters of the South tended to be aristocratic....Feeling that there was some relationship between intelligence and wealth, *they insisted that some men were born to rule and others to serve and obey. As men of property and standing they did not want to risk the uncertainties of change.* To them a stable, even a stern, government was a good government, and the surest way to maintain it, they felt, *was to keep power in the hands of wealthy, cultured, intelligent people....By electing Washington and then John Adams to the presidency, the wealthy aristocratic group gained and kept control* [*sic*] *of the government for twelve years.* (Pp. 167-168.)

Two things are worth comment. First, these men who did not "want to risk the uncertainties of change" had just risked their lives and their property to bring about the greatest change the new continent had ever known: the American Revolution. Second, the male white electorate consisted of ninety-five per cent of the adult population: *they* (and not a "wealthy aristocratic minority) had elected "Washington and then John Adams to the presidency." How, then, had the "wealthy aristocratic group" been so able to gain and keep "control of the government for twelve years"? Do you gain and keep control of the government when you have been elected by a popular majority: If so, what is wrong with it? It is the very elective method itself.

To make such a baseless charge is to make it seem that a conspiracy of wealth, at the expense of "the plain people," finagled or forced the election of Washington and "kept control of the government for twelve years." If students believe that the Father of His Country was a party to a sordid conspiracy of

pelf and power, they will believe the very sources and fountainhead of the United States to be tainted. There is, of course, no evidence that this was so. Many of the so-called "common people" would have made Washington king: he refused it. Many of the people believed that he should be president for more than two terms; that the safety of the country demanded it. Washington refused such prolonged power.

Wirth, in his *United States History*, follows the same line:

> The issues [of the American Revolution] were confused by the fact that there were two outstanding groups in the colonies. One, the wealthier or conservative group, was moderate in its quarrel with the mother country. The second group, made up of poorer people, including the shopkeepers, the small farmers, and the frontiersmen, strongly opposed British rule....In fact, John Adams wrote that perhaps one third of the people were violently opposed to British rule and were eager to bring about separation, while about one third were more conservative people, who have been referred to as Tories, or Loyalists, because they were loyal to the British government, (p. 71.)

The fallacy of this is a reliance on economic determinism. It is simply not true that the rich, as a group, were for England or that those not rich were as a group against England. Some rich men and some poor men were for the war; some poor men and some rich men were against the war. Certainly some "rich" or "upper-class" men were as resolutely against England as any of the "poor" or "lower-class" people. Israel Putnam was well-to-do. He had made a fortune in various ways, from soldiering in Cuba to running an inn; he owned land, the best stock in Connecticut, and houses and barns. Yet he was one of the most fiery of radicals among the Sons of Liberty. His voice was a trumpet for war. He left his plow in the field, when he was over 55, and rode all night to join the embattled farmers of Concord and Lexington. While others—some rich, some poor—were crying that the colonies had only a "moderate" quarrel with England and that a "moderate" use of force could bring about a profitable reconciliation, Israel Putnam said, from first to last, that the colonies must fight not for reconciliation with profit but for independence with freedom. He fought the timid Artemus Ward day and night around Boston till he finally was authorized to precipitate the battle of Bunker Hill and thus launch the Revolution.

Among the staunchest fighters of the American Revolution were Generals Henry Knox, Nathanael Greene, and Philip John Schuyler. Every one of them was well-to-do and of the "upper class." Schuyler was a very wealthy

landowner and patroon: yet, in the dark days of Burgoyne's advance, Schuyler was both arm and soul of the army, pouring out his wealth to equip and feed the impoverished, unequipped, starving army of the North. Knox, Greene, and Schuyler were none of them "moderate" in their "quarrel with the mother country."

Quite naturally, the strong minds and spirits of that time, as of any time, were bolder and freer in accepting new ideas. Many of those of bold spirit were wealthy. The "wealthier" or at least "wealthy" people of the time—Jefferson, Washington, Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, Philip Schuyler, and many others—were among the most resolute in breaking with England; and, even more, in fashioning a new nation conceived in liberty and based on the consent of the governed for its just powers. Jefferson, as all these authors admit, was an "upper-class" aristocrat; yet he was the will and the mind of the Revolution. It was with proud love for the humble and faithful among his countrymen that Washington said, on a fateful evening, "Let none but Americans stand guard tonight." To him, the nation indivisible was a shrine of devotion. He considered *all* the people and did not serve the "factions" (or, as we would say, "interests" or "pressure groups" or "parties"), which was to him a word of deepest distaste.

The effect upon unseasoned young people of slanting the facts about colonial America is to make them sentimentally cynical about the Founding Fathers. A student once told me that a recent picture of George Washington had been discovered and that it *must* be authentic. Why, I asked, *must* it be authentic? "Because it is ugly and does not idealize him!" Thus students' minds are conditioned. The mischief lies in the degradation of a great national experiment into a mere social and economic upheaval. This bias is apparent when, for example, Wirth says (p. 87) that the American Revolution was "a *social* movement which tended toward democracy." It was, rather, a great movement of *individual men,* united in a common desire to be free to reap the fruits of their own initiative, which tended toward and fructified in a constitutional republic.

It is bad history to read contemporary slogans, motivations, and catchwords into different and always unique dramas of the past. It is impossible to understand the American Revolution—which was a will-to-a-

nation free and indivisible—if you torture it into a social revolution to establish a popular democracy. You have only to *read* the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers, the speeches of Washington. All these have a certain tone, like that of the early Christians, of men lifted above themselves into a high vision of human nobility. To degrade all this into a "weapon" of "the disgruntled and op-pressed" is to degrade the symphonies of Beethoven into rock 'n' roll.

Even the more subtly veiled volumes tend to make the class war implicit. Thus Canfield and Wilder (The Making of Modern America), under a section entitled "Questions to Discuss" (p. 144), present this as a major question:

> 1. It has been said that the American Revolution was concerned not only with "home rule" but with "who should rule at home." Explain. In what respects was the Revolution more than just a separation from the British Empire?

Here, once more, is the now familiar interpretation of the American Revolution as most importantly *a civil war.*

Other texts see early American history as a clash of classes. Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill tell us (p. 71), in relation to the Constitutional Convention, "...the delegates *were conservative or slow to change.*" These men had just pledged their "Lives, their Fortunes, and their sacred Honor" to the colossal change of a war with England and the creation of a new nation! But our authors toss that fact aside and call them "conservative or slow to change," and add:

> And that is easy to understand. *They were the property-holding class....*Two important groups were not well represented....*First, the common man was not represented by any delegate who was a mechanic or small farmer or the like. Secondly, most of the Revolutionary* "*radicals*" *were absent.* (P. 71.)

The authors do not tell the unsuspecting student that the delegates were praised by Benjamin Franklin (whom they hasten to make their own champion and call a "radical") or that Thomas Jefferson (a "radical") called it a convention of demigods.

Two of the texts we are discussing, as a natural result of their emphasis on the social, the economic, and the collectivized in terms of class war attack the concept of "private property." The attack is not a direct frontal one but an

indirect, flanking operation. Thus Craven and Johnson say (p. 102): "Jefferson gave his fellow patriots the goal of placing human rights above privilege and property rights." Jefferson, of course, like all the statesmen and soldiers of the American Revolution, believed in "human rights." That was why he and they fought the American Revolution. But they knew and they said that one of the deepest of human rights—for the poor just as surely as for the rich, and indeed with even more passion and necessity—is the right to property. Jefferson in his first inaugural address said that we must "entertain" a "due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of our own industry...." A better statement of individual initiative, free enterprise, and private property has never been made. Our authors err in assigning to Jefferson a belief that "human rights" stand in antithesis to "property rights"; rather they stand in synthesis—for "property rights" are very deeply "human rights." As the Hebrew prophet said, every man shall dwell "under *his own* vine and fig tree."

Craven and Johnson, in an unguarded moment, even admit and affirm this. "Jefferson," they say (p. 183), believed that "*liberty, security in the possession of material goods* and freedom from arbitrary coercion by others were essentials to a happy life." "Security in the possession of material goods" is their paraphrase for "private property."

Yet these authors write as if Jefferson were *against* instead of *for* private property; and they make "private property" a vice term and "human rights" a virtue term. As a result, a generous, idealistic, but inexperienced youth is conditioned to believe that his natural desire to own a bicycle, a ball bat, a share of stock bought with his own money is selfish and evil. Initiative and the natural desire to own one's own home or business are undermined and subverted, and the way is made straight into the collectivist prison where every man toils under *the state's* vines and fig trees. Young people are led to suppose it is "idealism" to desire bread and circuses at the hand of Caesar.

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley stress the same dogma. They say:

> *The rights of the public* had emerged as superior to *the rights of private property*...and Congress could no longer endure the force of public opinion. (P. 607.)

The slightest effort at thought would suggest that a farmer's five acres and independence, or the right to the castle of one's own home, or the student's

jalopy, is Mr. Everyman's by a very *human right.* "The rights of the public," very often, are a bulldozer to raze or crush the rights *either* of property or of life: the champion of abstract mass is always saying of concrete man, "It is expedient that one man should die for the people." Or that is expedient that the kulak's acres be expropriated for the collectivized and dehumanized commune.

One text out of the list—*History of a Free People* by Bragdon and McCutchen—is fair about colonial and Revolutionary history; it is admirable, too, in its characterizations of Jefferson and Hamilton. Alone of all the texts, it acknowledges the almost never spoken fact that (in terms of modern ideologies) Hamilton was the radical and Jefferson was the conservative!—

> Jefferson, defender of human *liberty* [italics in original], believed in a minimum of government, with that minimum as close to the people as possible. He therefore favored local government over national, and Congress over the other branches of the federal government because he thought it best reflected the popular will. He was much opposed to standing armies because he feared that a military leader might seize control of the government. (P. 156.)

How true! Indeed, if Jefferson were alive today, he would be a J. Bracken Lee opposing income taxes because he would seek (as he did in his first inaugural address):

> ...a wise and frugal government which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvements, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.

He would warn (as he did in his address) against foreign commitments, saying: "...honest friendship with all nations, *entangling alliances with none*". He would be today what he was then: *the great conservator*.

Bragdon and McCutchen observe, on the other hand, that by today's standards Hamilton would be the modernist and radical:

> Hamilton was considered a conservative, yet his policies looked forward to the time when the United States should become a great industrial nation. (P. 156.)

And:

> This in Hamilton's opinion meant strengthening the federal government and reducing the power of the states. It also meant a strong executive department, strong courts, and a standing army. (*Ibid.*)

In short (though the authors do not say this), Hamilton was an advocate of our "modern Republicanism," which contemporary "liberals" acclaim. Jefferson, on the contrary, was for states' rights, a distrust of augmented federal power, and low taxes. He said (in his first inaugural address) that we should have "economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burdened." He foresaw the avid profiteering of big government.

This volume even says:

> As was shown earlier, colonial society was already relatively democratic. The Revolution simply hastened the progress toward democracy that had begun long before, (p. 64.)

And this volume is speaking of *the mood of American democracy*...not of collectivist "people's democracies." Why do the other volumes not state the same obvious fact?

The Bragdon and McCutchen book is an oasis in a desert. Even the relatively mild *Story of America* by Harlow explains much of our early history in terms of the clash of economic classes. Thus, he dismisses the Federalists in the way common to the economic interpreters, as men who had "little confidence in the common man"—another instance of the "liberal" use of an undefined virtue term. The Federalists made too much of central government by those whom we would call "planners"—but that is exactly what we fear in socialism today! At least the Federalists, unlike the Socialists, *did* put America first. It is bad history to split the nation into "classes" and "masses" and to idolize the undefined abstraction "common man."

(In the interests of chronological development, we reserve for chapters 7 and 9 a full discussion of the class issue as it enters modern times. So that issue, in the six volumes under present discussion and in four others, will be for the moment postponed. But it is there.)

Texts which interpret American history as motivated primarily by *class war*—which emphasize *masses* and forget *men*—which make the *economic* primary and the *spiritual* secondary—will never embarrass the Communist brainwashers in Korea yesterday or where-you-will tomorrow. The Communist brainwashers need to do nothing but underline the teaching of these texts and then add, "*See, what did we tell you?*"

5—What They Do to the Constitution

MEN who present America as a popular democracy and a major battlefield of the class war cannot be expected to interpret the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the deeds and writings of the Founding Fathers in terms of American principles. They represent the Declaration of Independence as a 'weapon" in a class war; the Constitution as a triumph of the "gentry" over the "colonial democrats"; the Founding Fathers as partly "gentry" (who are reactionary) and partly "colonial democrats" (who are liberal). This, we will now fully document.

Craven and Johnson hold (p. 100) that the Declaration of Independence "presented the principles of democracy and equality." They do not mention "liberty." 'I hey say (p. 102), "The new order that was to be achieved was to benefit the common man." The Declaration, then, is not a trumpet call for the whole nation indivisible but a "weapon" (p. 100) for "neglected and oppressed groups" to use. They say (p. 112), "the Declaration of Independence, with its democratic ideology, seemed to the loyalists to be the first step toward 'mob rule.' "And the authors seem to suggest that the "conservatives who took the American side *shared this view*, because they were "gentry." They reiterate (as again on page 139) that "The Declaration of Independence magnificently expressed *the aspirations of the common man.*" They never realize, apparently, that it expressed even more truly the "aspirations" of the uncommon man, such as Israel Putnam, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington.

Todd and Curti (p. 133) regard the Declaration of Independence as "propaganda"—"an attempt to win public support." The word is an unfortunate degradation of a great document, as "propaganda" today has connotations of special and often specious pleading designed not to realize truth but to obtain an objective. The "propaganda" "has lived because it summarized a *revolutionary theory of government.*" This "revolutionary theory" seems to be the substance of Rousseau's Social Contract; its essence is expressed clumsily (p. 134): "The men who govern are appointed by the people to *carry out the people's orders, in the same way that workers are hired by employers to carry out the employers' orders.*" It is doubtful that this

is *quite* what the Founding Fathers meant to bring about by the Declaration. Todd and Curti regard it (p. 135) as fusing "European theory and American practice into that theory of government that today we call democracy." They do not mention the constitutional republic.

Gavian and Hamm also make the Declaration of Independence a class document, asserting (p. 66) that those who received it "with rejoicing came mostly from the under-privileged classes," because they hoped that it would bring them "political and economic" freedom. It was a bugle blown to awaken only the "disgruntled and oppressed" division, not the whole army of the nation.

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley think the Declaration of Independence was a document that (p. 108) "awakened a sense of dignity in the masses" and enthusiasm in all "*classes.*" They do not say that it was a document that *served the nation,* though it would have been much simpler so to state it.

More significant is what many of the texts do to the Constitution, the very soul of our Republic, our chief safeguard against a coercive, monolithic, dictatorial state, against the pressures of factions and special interests. Because it is a safe-guard, social democrats of all kinds—from the dove-gentle Fabians to the serpent-wise Communists—dislike the Constitution as an obstacle to their aims. Thus, a "liberal:' with Socialist sympathies, Professor William G. Carleton, says today: "The stock in trade of the political conservative consists of moth-eaten stereotypes like...the sanctity of the Constitution."{8} So long as the Constitution stands, the total state or the social state is impossible—as collectivists well know. That is why they dislike the Constitution (except for its fifth amendment). Therefore it is peculiarly important that students should know what the Constitution is; how sacred and central it is; and how inviolate it must be kept. But various of these texts tend to explain it away as a class document or to urge its amendment in the interest of class pressures.

Charles A. Beard, in 1913, began the assault on the Constitution with an attempt to interpret it as a document designed to protect the economic interests of the "upper classes." He lived to repent of this and stated that his interpretation in such terms had been partisan and misleading. It is legitimate and even necessary that students should know that such an interpretation has

been made. But it is not legitimate, and it is pernicious, to present that one interpretation, without criticism, as the *only* interpretation, as seven of these texts do.

Ever since Charles Beard wrote *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution in* 1913, his thesis that the Constitution was a rich man's plot has been *the orthodox and prevailing thesis.* It has been the thesis officially accepted and taught *ex cathedra* by all right-thinking conformists in our schools and colleges. It has dominated the colleges, the schools, the teachers, the texts: to question it has been heresy.

Beard's book has made economic determinism a *must* in colleges and universities and has conditioned the conforming minds of generations of students toward Marxism. It has been the most pernicious influence—except, perhaps, for John Dewey's—in modern American thought.

A stealthy Nemesis has at last caught up with Beard. Professor Robert E. Brown, of Michigan State University, was brought up, like the authors of these texts, to conform to Beard. But Brown is a natural rebel, and in his *Charles Beard and the Constitution* (Princeton University Press, 1956) he tells of his own early experience:

> My own interest in the Beard interpretation of the Constitution grew out of a seminar study of Massachusetts during the Confederation period. As a graduate student I naturally started with the almost universally accepted view that colonial society was undemocratic and that the Revolution was a dual revolution for independence from England and for democracy for the lower classes within the colonies. I had also accepted the Beard interpretation that the Constitution represented a conservative counter-revolution on the part of the upper classes to protect their property, and the general view that democracy did not really arrive in this country until the rise of the common man under Andrew Jackson.
>
> My study of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 brought a rather rude awakening. (P. 19.)

Brown explains how and why:

> In my work on Massachusetts the seeming contradiction of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 was resolved. Instead of a colonial society of upper and lower classes, rich and poor, enfranchised and unenfranchised, I found a predominantly middle-class society in which most men owned property, most men were farmers, and most men could vote. There was little class conflict in the colony, and naturally the Revolution there was not a "dual revolution." Having a democratic society in which property ownership was widespread, and emphasizing time and again that they were trying to keep what they had, it was not surprising that the people of Massachusetts incorporated their ideas in the constitution of 1780. Given the middle-class society which existed before the Revolution, it would have been surprising if they

had done otherwise. And since most of the people owned property, naturally they would adopt a government which had as one of its functions the protection of property. After all, they had fought the Revolution with the slogan "life, liberty, and property." In the course of my research I found many references to other colonies indicating that Massachusetts was not unique in its possession of a democratic middle-class society. (Pp. 20-21.)

Thus the theory that a "rich" and "upper-class" minority finagled or forced an undemocratic richman's Constitution upon the "poor" and "lower-class" many is simply untrue to the facts.

Brown shows, from the evidence of the colonial records, that in 1778, "by a vote of all men regardless of property qualifications," the whole people of Massachusetts rejected a constitution that had appeared to be more "democratic" (in the sense the word' has in these texts) than the old charter. Two years later, by full male suffrage (women, of course, did not then vote), they adopted by popular will a constitution even less "democratic" than the colonial charter had been. The people as a whole chose to do this.

Fascinated by these facts, Brown continued his studies into the other colonics. He found facts that controvert Beard and that demolish the class-based theories of the texts we are studying; he found, for example:

1. Property was widely diffused throughout the people at large in all the colonies that became states.

2. Probably most free adult men had the vote. (Thus, to talk—as these texts often do—of the "people" not speaking until Jefferson and Jackson were elected is erroneous.)

3. Ninety-seven per cent of the people lived in the country: freehold qualifications admitted small farmers and debtors to the vote.

4. Ninety per cent of the people owned land.

5. Among the three per cent of city dwellers, propertyless mechanics in most places had the vote.

If all these things were true—and Brown found that they were—what became of the theory of the rich man's plot and the economic bias of the Constitution? The Constitution expressed the will of *the body of the people*—ninety to ninety-five per cent of them—and it was adopted because it expressed their popular will.

Brown examined the property qualifications of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Beard had made much of the importance of those who supported the Constitution, because they had government securities which would be worth more if the Constitution were adopted. Brown found that many of the delegates had *real estate*—plantations and farms—and neither much money nor any securities. Many whom Beard said had securities bought them *after*, not before, the Constitution was adopted. And, as Brown compared the property owned and the vote cast, by delegate after delegate, he found that *no economic correlation could be established* between possessing property and supporting the Constitution. With man after man, delegate after delegate, Brown shows that economic interests did not jibe with being for or against the Constitution.

In the ratification of the Constitution, Brown shows, Great Barrington and the town of Sheffield, far off in the Berkshire wilderness, in the center of *agrarian radicalism,* voted *for* the Constitution—and actually got the vote in sooner than "commercial" Boston! Always, one must remember that ninety-seven per cent of the people lived in rural areas, and most of them voted to ratify the Constitution and to choose delegates to the Constitutional Convention. What, then, becomes of the theory of the rich man's plot?

Brown's carefully constructed book, solidly based on primary research, is a brilliant rebuttal of the early Beard—and of the authors who here accept and parrot their conformity to the orthodox Beard theory. The book is symptomatic, one hopes, of a rebellion against conformity, against a following of the line of least resistance, against the vogue of economic determinism.

One cannot read Brown's book without being convinced that the people of the United States—not the "rich" and not the "poor," not the "classes" and not the "masses," but the people in the indivisible nation—were solidly behind the Constitution. It expressed their will, their desire, their philosophy. The delegates knew this and did what the people wanted done. The people know that their will had been done well, so they ratified the Constitution. The people in 1787 got the Constitution that *they* wanted: a document to protect life and liberty *and property too—not* because "rich men" wanted it that way, but because a farmer with three acres wanted them to remain *his*, and an

artisan wanted his tools and his gains to remain *his*, and because all the people were tired of a government (like Great Britain's) that would tax and tax and spend and spend. They wanted freedom from big government. They wanted security, each under *his own* vine and fig tree, which was the ideal of the great Hebrew prophet also.

But let us see what *these texts* say about the Constitution.

Craven and Johnson present *only* Beard's interpretation. Bias against the "upper classes" and favoritism toward the "masses" pervade their account of the Constitutional Convention. They say that the Constitution was drafted by a "minority group"; that this minority group sought only "to defend private property"; and that the Constitution was designed to "check popular rule." They do *not* make it clear that the Convention was representative; that the "common people" who sent the representatives wished them to see that the private property of, each man was secure; and that the people (including Thomas Jefferson) wished checks and balances to keep the government under the feet of individual men and not to have it rest on their necks.

Of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Craven and Johnson say (p. 128): "The dynamic element in the movement for a new constitution was the propertied group, who feared that their stake in society was endangered..." They tell us (loc. cit.), "In the formation of the Constitution the landed group worked with the merchant-capitalist group to obtain a strong central government." "Eastern conservatives," they tell us (p. 131), feared "the liberalism of the West..." They tell us (p. 138) that "the movement for the Constitutional Convention was inspired by the desire to check popular rule..." Their quibbles and qualifications only italicize their leaning; they say (pp. 138-139), "Since there was no such thing as a popular will in 1787, it *is difficult to say convincingly* that the Constitution was made against the wishes of the people. The term *popular will* [italics in original] had little real significance until the time of Andrew Jackson." The innuendo is perfectly clear: that, the Constitution *was* "made against the wishes of the people." If not, why do they even say that it is difficult to say convincingly" that it is so? Why even raise the question? The fact is that the majority of all free males could vote.

The authors' attitude shows up in the comment (p. 138), "If the framers

had had complete faith in the people, this clumsy electoral mechanism probably would not have been set up." The "framers" were "gentry."

A commentary on this view—which the authors carefully omit—is that of Thomas Jefferson, who called the delegates "an assembly of demigods."

Craven and Johnson consider the greatest virtue in the Constitution the fact that—it can be amended! They say (p. 139), "By incorporating a method of amending the Constitution, unwieldy as it proved to be, the framers gave the future an opportunity to alter the document to fit a changing society." They do not seem to realize that a particular virtue of the "unwieldy" method of changing the Constitution is that it *keeps* us from making fickle and alien changes.

These authors dislike certain checks and balances in the Constitution. They especially dislike the Supreme Court, which they attack throughout their book. They say (p. 134), "Every great leader of American democracy—Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt—has charged that the courts have been biased against measures designed to aid the common man." Not content with their own authoritativeness, they quote Henry Steele Commager's criticism of the Court; he claims, among other things, that "judicial review has been a drag upon democracy..." In quoting Commager, of course, they differ fundamentally from the purpose of the Founding Fathers, which was to put this brake upon impetuous and hastily considered lawmaking.

While *History of United States* by Dumond, Dale, and Wesley does not so drastically present the thesis that the Constitution was designed to check "democracy," it moves in much the same direction. On page 201, a leading question is slipped in for students' discussion:

> 9. What provisions of the Constitution show that the men who wrote it did not wholly trust the ability of the people to govern themselves?

And, under "Suggested Activities":

> 2. Debate the subject: "*Resolved*, That the Electoral College should be abolished."

The authors state that a great virtue of the Constitution is that it is "flexible": "...by the addition of amendments from time to time, [the Constitution] has served our country well for over one hundred fifty years (p.

183).” So their approval is more for the amendments which change the Constitution than it is for the Constitution itself, which holds the country on a steady course. In general, the authors believe that the champions of “democracy,” against the class interests of the “gentry” (of whom George Washington was one), were responsible for whatever good there is in the Constitution. They say (p. 168), “They [Jefferson, Madison, Monroe] knew that the honesty of the masses of the people would provide better government than would the superior wisdom claimed by the aristocratic class.” It is a nice question whether Washington, Hamilton, and John Marshall did not also possess “honesty,” and whether they claimed “a superior wisdom” in any snobbish sense.

Class interpretation of our Constitution, in terms of what one must call economic determinism, is continued in *History of the American Way* by Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill. They tell us (p. 71) that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were “slow to change”—the reason being that they belonged to “the property-holding class.” A footnote completes the thought: “*A radical* has been defined as one who goes too fast, *a conservative* as one who goes too slow. (Italics in original.) Of the Convention, they tell us, “Agreements are Also Made to Regulate Democracy” (subheading, p. 74). “Fearing democracy and feeling that the interests of the well-to-do would be safer...” the delegates, we are told, did this and that—always in the interests of “property” and “the upper class.” In “Information, Please!”, which suggests topics for students at the end of each chapter, we are asked (p. 87): “Why did the members of the Constitutional Convention turn out to be *mostly conservative?*” All the delegates had just been engaged in the most radical proceedings in human history—the American Revolution, the one revolution of them all which sought to subordinate the government to all the people and not just to set up a strong government for a fragment of the people (as did the French Revolution). Yet they turned out “to be mostly conservative.” The authors stick this loaded question in, as a subheading (p. 75): “Did ‘We the People of the UNITED STATES’ REALLY ACCEPT THE NEW CONSTITUTION?” Since they leave the question unanswered, they implicitly answer it in the negative; they throw a needless shadow over students’ faith in the Constitution. Surely, radical Great Barrington and Sheffield, hurrying their vote of ratification in even before the city of Boston,

would indicate that "We the People of the United States" *did* "really accept the new Constitution." But these authors will not be deflected by facts; they assure us:

> ....many believed [who were the "many"?] that too much attention had been given to the protection of the rights of property...the centering of power in the hands of "aristocrats" or wealthy property holders would develop a government with little sympathy for the "low-born." In short, not only was little democracy provided for in the Constitution but there was danger that the common man might become the "forgotten man." (P. 75.)

This misconstrues the mood of our Revolution and the statements of the Constitution itself, which makes no mention of "property" or "property rights." As we shall see a little later, when the amendments called, collectively, the Bill of Rights were added, there was in them more safeguarding (specifically, in the wording itself) of "property" and "property rights" than in all the rest of the Constitution. The authors sum up the struggle thus:

> Because the new Constitution failed to emphasize democracy, it was accepted only after a bitter fight. (P. 70.)

This is misleading. The Constitution fully supplied a republican form of government, *on a democratic fooling,* and while there were differences of opinion, careful consideration, and long debate, who would have it otherwise? Is this not the procedure of true American democracy in the town meeting or the forum?

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill are peculiarly interested in *amending* the Constitution. They offer a major subheading (p. 84) which reads, "THROUGH AMENDMENTS AND LAWS THE CONSTITUTIONS CHANGES WITH THE TIMES." They do not understand that the greatness of: the Constitution is not that it can change with the times but that it stands with Eternity. The authors seem eager to "change with the times," for again (on page 86) they speak wistfully of "keeping the Constitution up to the times." The difficulty, of course, is to keep the times up to the Constitution! The Constitution is patronizingly described as a document that, of course, was made in "the 'horse and buggy' age of 1787" (p. 87). They add: "That it [the Constitution] has worked so well in the streamlined Machine Age is due in large part to the fact that most Americans have believed with Jefferson that the Constitution can and must 'keep pace with the times.'" (*Ibid.*) The authors

stress its relativism, not its absolute principles. The truth that our Constitution is our mightiest fortress against follies and aberrations, because it embodies our central and profoundest political wisdom, is not made clear.

Moreover, they misread Jefferson. Jefferson revered the Constitution as the guardian of our liberties. He said, in his first inaugural address, that all questions must be "decided by the voice of the nation, *announced according to the rules of the Constitution.*" And he showed his sense of constitutional principles by going on to say:

> All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression.

Jefferson foresees and forewarns against the totalitarian state and its "people's democracy." He says:

> And let us reflect that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions.

Against such "political intolerance," he knew our Constitution is our best defense.

But Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill consider that the good of America lies not so much in the essential truth of the Constitution as in the changes—some good, some bad—which have been made in it. They entitle chapter 5 "WE MOVE BY CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION TOWARD A MORE PERFECT DEMOCRACY." Under this heading, they say:

> The Constitution as made by the Fathers *provided for a limited democracy only. Immediately the people demanded a written guarantee of their rights.* The Bill of Rights was added at once to protect these rights—usually called civil liberties. (P. 90.)

Several corrections are needed. If the Constitution "provided for a limited democracy only," it was done deliberately and wisely, as Jefferson suggests, to provide for that "equal law" which "must protect" the "equal rights" which a minority possesses. Also, what do these authors mean by "the people" who immediately "demanded a written guarantee of their rights"? The truth is that most of the delegates, and especially a few keen intellectuals like Jefferson, realized that the Constitution was unfinished. To add particular items was a natural outgrowth of the Constitution itself. To describe the Bill of Rights as a

"popular" uprising against an antidemocratic document is false. If you simply *read* the provisions of the Bill of Rights, you will see that they—even more specifically than anything in the Constitution itself—*uphold the right of private property.* Thus the *Fifth Amendment*—that last refuge of desperate men—is seldom or never quoted to the end. If you look at it, you find this:

> ...nor shall any person...be deprived of life, liberty, or *property*, without due process of law...

To reinforce this, the Amendment concludes:

> ...nor shall *private property* be taken *for public use,* without just compensation.

Now, here is a peculiar thing, never mentioned before, to my knowledge, in any discussion of the Constitution; certainly it is never mentioned or noticed by any of these textbook authors. The Constitution proper is supposed to have been fashioned by the "rich" to uphold the rights of property; the Bill of Rights is supposed to have been fashioned by the "poor" to protect themselves against the rich. Yet the Constitution itself nowhere mentions the rights of property; the Bill of Rights specifically upholds the rights of property. The Bill or Rights is thus quite clearly concerned with economics—and, particularly, with the rights of "private property." Why do none of these texts state that fact?

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill go on to say:

> As the idea of democracy grew, increased political rights were granted *by changes in the Constitution.* Finally, certain amendments were added which aimed directly at *promoting the general welfare. And so the Constitution has gradually been made more democratic.* (P. 90.)

This assumes that the Constitution, in itself, was not "democratic" enough; it assumes, also, that all changes meant "increased political rights." This is not so. Did the Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment bring "increased political rights"—or increased personal rights? It was so bad an invasion of personal liberties that it had to be repealed. Did the Income lax Amendment bring "increased political rights"?—or even increased economic rights? It has been extended and ramified until it is a millstone around the neck of the American people, and already there is agitation for its repeal as well as for its limitation. Finally, the authors insinuate into their statements of approval of amendments to the Constitution and distrust of the Constitution itself a sly bit of

propaganda for the welfare state. Amendments always (to them) have been "aimed directly at promoting the general welfare." But the Constitution itself, and especially the Bill of Rights, which they specifically praise, were aimed primarily at promoting *individual freedom* first, in the belief that "the general welfare" follows freedom. The Bill of Rights was aimed primarily against Big Government, against the danger of Uncle Sam's becoming Uncle Caesar. Each of the ten items of the Bill of Rights is aimed against swollen prerogatives of *government*. Not one of them, to promote the "general welfare," tells government that it shall do something to bring bread and circuses to the people. Each of them is a warning to the government *to keep hands off the people* and to let them *work out their own* life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, *in their own way and through their own initiative.* If the authors are right in saying that the American people (and, they should but do not add, the Founding Fathers) fashioned the Bill of Rights by spontaneous combustion, then they should add that in the Bill of Rights the people put *liberty first;* that they approved free enterprise; and that they rightly regarded government (as both Washington and Jefferson did) as the greatest potential danger to individual liberty. But the authors, contrary to fact, declare that the Constitution has "gradually been made more democratic" as it appears to them *to approach the welfare state.*

Gavian and Hamm, in *The American Story,* also interpret the Constitution in terms of the clash of classes and rich versus poor. They say:

> The majority of the fifty-five delegates were lawyers, most of them with considerable experience in public life. There were also *wealthy landowners, planters, money-lenders, and merchants,* and a sprinkling of college professors, physicians, and retired ministers. *The delegates represented the conservative, propertied class.* (P. 103.)

A commentary on this is unnecessary if one will *read* the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. To a sound critic of the arts, Vincent van Gogh's brush strokes are his own best signature; Shakespeare's style and Marlowe's style are the best proof that one man did not write the work of both; and Beethoven's spiritual power is authenticated by the crashing chords of his symphonies. When a nation had risen to the white heat of the Declaration of Independence or the grave integrity of the Constitution, any cynical degradation of motive and mood into a conspiracy of materialists to consolidate their selfish gains is simply bad criticism. Here is the Preamble to

the Constitution:

> We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

If this is the voice of "the conservative, propertied classes," what better statement of objectives could the "disgruntled and oppressed" have fashioned? If this be "conservatism," make the most of it—for it is a statement that seeks *justice*, *the common defense,* the *general welfare,* and the *blessings of liberty.* If it is "conservative," it is conservative in the same sense as Aeschylus' *The Persians* or Beethoven's Eroica Symphony are. After the Preamble, one may read the Constitution itself, section by section, item by item: no section and no item seeks to make the powerful of the earth more powerful; every section and every item is sensitive to human rights and valiant to defend them. Men do not gather figs from thistles nor create a Constitution like that of the United States from the minds and pens of petty, sordid, and selfish men.

The Declaration of Independence was the seed, the Constitution of the United States was the flower, the republic and the people's freedom and opportunity are the fruit of the American Revolution, which was itself a thing of flux and freedom. These men were conservatives in the root sense; they were *conservationists* who sought to conserve the spiritual resources and vital meaning of the Revolution in a document which should perpetuate that Revolution. To attack them as men of "the conservative, propertied classes" and the Constitution as a class document is to attack the goal and culmination of the American Revolution itself.

Wirth adds a curious justification of the Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights. He does not so much stress the economic determinism alleged to be behind its framers as he justifies it by its amendments, emendations, and changes. And he views its importance as lying in the fact that it fused the individual states into a federal union—which, to him, is a prototype of the United Nations. He discusses all this at great length (p. 107). He seems to regard the Constitution and the Bill or Rights as being less important for what they are in themselves and for America than because they were a preview of, or a pacemaker for, the United Nations and the World State. They were

important, in his view, because they foreshadowed the "four freedoms" of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He says:

> In his message to the Seventy-seventh Congress on January 6, 1942, President Roosevelt, emphasized the four freedoms, asserting that the first of these four essential human freedoms is freedom of speech and expression; the second is freedom for every person to worship God in his own way. *It is evident that, the first amendment to our Constitution dealt with fundamental human freedoms which are still important in our present-day world.* (P. 110.)

A curios justification! To many of us, the Bill of Rights is "important" not for what it may have hinted of the "four freedoms" but because of what it was in itself and what it said for America. To us, it is important not for its parallelism to grandiose schemes for a world state but for its intrinsic worth and its pertinence to the American dream. And the Bill of Rights would be just as "important in our present-day world" if the "four freedoms" had never been enunciated. But, to Wirth, our Bill of Rights is proved to be "*still* important" because it prepared a way for the "four freedoms." Such judgments make a classic American document important because of its relation to a later, political pronouncement.

Evaluations like this can hardly build up in students' minds the proper proportions of history or help them to understand the American classic or strengthen them against the brainwashers in Korea.

Todd and Curti join in the anvil chorus. They are cautious and circumspect in their interpretation of the Constitutional Convention, but they make their bias clear. They speak of the delegates as "men of property and position"—as if that made them conspirators against the common welfare—who held "outstanding bonds of the state and Confederation government." (This is pure Beard.) Think of this quietly for a moment. Suppose I hold bonds of the United States government; does that mean that any desire I have to strengthen the United States is motivated by a selfish wish to obtain my interest and to cash my bonds? These authors say that among the delegates were "merchants or spokesmen for merchants," or "large planters," and that only one delegate represented "the small farmers and debtors." The latest scholarship proves, with a wealth of evidence, that this is a superficial interpretation, not supported by the facts.{9} It has already been pointed out (page 67) that many of the delegates to the Convention did not own securities until after the

Constitution was adopted. But even if it were true that all the delegates held "outstanding bonds," there is no reason to suppose that "merchants" or "planters" are motivated *only* by materialistic selfishness, or that "the small farmers and debtors" are the *only* pure patriots.{10}

The authors go on to speak (p. 173) of the Constitution's "elaborate provisions to safeguard property holders." They say of the delegates that they were "determined to keep the control of the government in the hands of the well-to-do...They say (p. 174), with evident disrelish, that "the founders of the nation made it clear that they were not trying to establish what we call democracy—government of and by all the people." They make their position clear when, in the *index* of the book (p. 852), they list as a subentry under "Constitution" its "anti-democratic aspects."

The complete rebuttal of what they say of the Constitution's "elaborate provisions to safeguard property holders" exists in the crystal integrity of the Constitution itself. Now, consider the Constitution's statement as to who may be senators. The Senate, supposedly, is more removed from the people themselves than the House of Representatives is; yet the sole qualifications for senator are these:

> No person shall be senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

Do these constitute "elaborate provisions to safeguard property holders"?

Are there such elaborate provisions in the parts of the Constitution concerning the Judiciary? Article III, on the Judicial Department of the United States Constitution, is in no sense "elaborate" nor does it make "elaborate provisions" for anything except a final court before which great questions may come. There is not a word, or a veiled hint, that such a court was designed to "safeguard property holders." Rather, in full harmony with the love of liberty, the trust in American citizens, and the desire for individual justice which were the very soul of the American Revolution, Article III says:

> The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

If this amounts to "elaborate provisions to safeguard property holders," it is like the provisions made by a footpad that all streets shall be lighted and that a guard of neighbors shall gather to protect each victim. For, a trial by jury means that twelve ordinary men from the street—some rich, perhaps, but some also poor—will be your arbiters or mine. Trial by jury, from the beginnings of our struggle for liberty, has been the safeguard of the ordinary man; and trial by jury is made mandatory in the Constitution of the United States.

In relation to the Executive, the third powerful directive force in our government, there still are no "elaborate provisions to safeguard property holders." In Article II, Section 1, item d, we have this:

> No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.

Nothing here seems designed to "keep the control of the government in the hands of the well-to-do."

There is no item in the whole Constitution that seeks to "keep the control of the government in the hands of the well-to-do"; and the Constitution, as a whole, if one *reads* it, is clearly a design to keep *government* as a road for the people to walk on but never a parasitic Old Man of the Sea on the people's shoulders. The entire Constitution, with simple integrity, seeks to fulfil its Preamble—"to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity..." What more can the wise and the just desire? The wise and the just do not wish a one-class dictatorship of the "disgruntled and oppressed" but liberty and justice for *all*, which is exactly what these authors' darling, Andrew Jackson, specifically said!

It is obvious that Todd and Curti know, but quail from the fact, that the Founding Fathers meant to establish not a "democracy" but a republic. They say (p. 173), "It is...clear that they did not intend to establish immediately what we today call a democracy...." (Italics in original.) The key word, which is a weasel word, is "*immediately*." One can only infer that even the Founding

Fathers desired, after a pause for probation, that the republic should evolve into a "democracy." The father to this thought is the *wish* that the Founding Fathers had been adherents of a class democracy," in which the "disgruntled and oppressed" should pay the piper and call the tune.

Todd and Curti say (*loc. cit.*) that "only a minority of men were eligible" for participation in the government. Yet the qualifications for a representative, a senator, or the president himself were not property qualifications (*turn to the Constitution and see that this is so*); and, for that time, they were not "conservative" but distinctly radical qualifications. Todd and Curti go on (*loc. cit.*): "Nevertheless, the founders of the nation feared even this relatively small group of the people." What bounders our Founding Fathers were! The truth is that the Founding Fathers were not distrustful of the people, but they were expressing *the people's distrust* of an entrenched central government. Not Hamilton but Jefferson is the true spokesman of the Constitution: its checks and balances are not to coerce us, the people, but to safeguard us, the people, by devising checks and balances *to curtail the powers of government.*

Todd and Curti suggest that this conspiracy of the men of property was especially sly in fashioning the Supreme Court. ("The Supreme Court is the dragon.) They say (pp. 173174): "Many people expected the Supreme Court to restrain the popular will and to protect property rights." A cardinal sin, of course, to "protect property rights"! Now, we have just seen that, whether or not these anonymous "many" *thought* that the Supreme Court was designed to "protect property," American courts were specifically bound (item 3) by the basic human right of *a trial by jury.* Trial by jury has always been, by popular demand, a means of countering arbitrary power.

Todd and Curti say, also, that the President's power to veto acts of Congress was designed to weaken "popular influence still further." They do not seem to understand that our Founding Fathers, after the taxes and tyranny of England, were resolved to set up three divisions of government which, by their mutual interferences, would see to it that no one part of government should become dictatorial. The Constitution was not designed to coerce the people; it was designed to keep the government from coercing the people. Simply read the Constitution and see.

Canfield and Wilder are relatively milder about the Constitution. They do

say (p. 133), however, that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention represented "the conservative wing of the old Revolutionary party. The more liberal Revolutionary leaders were not there." But *all* the delegates who *were* there had just come through the purifying flame of the American Revolution and were imbued with its spirit. This could hardly be called (in any narrow sense) "conservative." Jefferson himself, looking back, had no such criticism of the Constitution or of the forces that fashioned it or of preceding administrations. He said in his first inaugural address:

> But every difference of opinion is not difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. *We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.* If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union or to change its Republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it....

And he said that he sought "the preservation of the General Government in *its whole constitutional vigor,* as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad...." Jefferson must be thinking especially of the judicial aspects of the Constitution (criticized by "liberals" today), because he mentions "trial by juries impartially selected." Surely the man who so spoke of the constitutional republic did not, in looking back toward its inception, question the integrity and justice of its founders or attack the Constitutional Convention because "the more liberal Revolutionary leaders were not there." He wished, on the contrary, to preserve the government "*in its whole constitutional vigor*" And Jefferson, certainly, is not one whom even the "liberals" will discredit as a man who desired to safeguard the "wealthy."

Canfield and Wilder's analysis of the forces that opposed ratification of the Constitution stresses class distinctions—in terms of economic status. They say:

> Those who wanted it [the Constitution] adopted called themselves Federalists. Those who opposed it were called Anti-Federalists. The Federalist group was made up of *conservative property owners and businessmen.* Among them were owners of government bonds, the commercial and manufacturing interests, the planter class, lawyers, and officers of the late army....
>
> Most of the Anti-Federalists were *people who did not own extensive property.* Among them were the small farmers, the laborers in the cities, *people who owed money, people who believed in issuing plenty of paper money,* those who wanted a more democratic form of government....(P. 137.)

This is a queer melange. Owners of government bonds are lumped with the antidemocratic; so are businessmen, simply because of their guilt by association with "commercial and manufacturing interests," planters, and officers "of the late army." (The "late army"—including, one must suppose, its officers—had just fought the Revolution!) Also, those who sought inflation ("people who believed in issuing plenty of paper money") are approved of as virtuous worthies "who wanted a more democratic form of government." But the best answer to the fissioning of Americans into battling economic classes lies in Jefferson's own words already quoted: "But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle." This setting of Federalist against anti-Federalist is the sort of thing that Jefferson deplored: "We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists."

Yet, to Canfield and Wilder—although not to Thomas Jefferson—the Constitution seems a class document, which the "Federalists" favored but which the "Anti-Federalists" opposed. The authors set the people who owned property against the people who did not own property. And, symptomatically, those who *opposed the Constitution* are uncritically assumed to be *those* "*who wanted a more democratic form of government*" Have the authors ever read the Preamble, which begins: "We the people of the United States"?

It is an ironic fact, seldom noticed by today's "liberals," that they, the "liberals," are closest to the Federalists. For it is today's "liberals" who regard "government" as the chief agent of human progress. Today's "liberals" chronically oppose states' rights and stubbornly seek ever-greater federal control. They are the Federalists of today. Thomas Jefferson, on the contrary, would today be opposing excessive taxation, the crushing of states' rights, the growing federal control of once-free men.

Only one of these texts—*History of a Free People* by Bragdon and McCutchen—makes a firm and explicit rebuttal of a class interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. This volume says unequivocally:

> Because the propertied classes wanted a stronger union and would benefit from it, the work of the Philadelphia Convention has sometimes been portrayed as a sort of plot whereby the wealthy created a government for their own selfish purposes. This "rich man's plot" theory of the Constitutional Convention overlooks the fact that the Constitution benefited the poor as well as the rich and that if a stronger government had not been created, the United States

might have broken up. A new government could be formed *only* [italics in original] by the well-to-do, since at the time the Constitution was created, they alone had the necessary education, political experience, and ability to see the needs of the whole country.

Human motives are always mixed. The men who spent all of a long, hot summer at Philadelphia were certainly aware that a stronger central government would benefit most of them personally. They were also performing, at some cost to themselves, what they believed to be their public duty. (P. 89.)

This is finely said. Students reading such words will understand the theory of the "rich man's plot" and see that it has its aspects of fact, yet they will discern also that it is inadequate and partial as to truth and that the delegates to the Convention were "performing, at some cost to themselves, what they believed to be their public duty."

This is the interpretation that all the texts should make. But only one out of eleven does articulately make it. This is the interpretation which all the other volumes should have recorded, even if they disagreed with it. But none of the other ten even suggest it. Seven of the texts—as we have seen—tend to portray the Philadelphia Convention "as a sort of plot whereby the wealthy created a government for their own selfish purposes." Granting that three volumes are relatively lair about the making of the Constitution, and that one volume is explicit as to the truth, the seven that are explicitly and implicitly on the other side hardly contribute to a proper proportion for strengthening students against the brainwashers. One out of eleven is not enough to establish the truth.

Students are led by these books to believe that, at the root—the very taproot—of American history, the men who founded the nation and gave it its organic form and spiritual tone were selfish, property-bound, materialistic conspirators bent on "controlling" the government in the interests of wealth...men who engineered a "plot whereby the wealthy created a government for their own selfish purposes." Now, if students are presented with this as the one, prevailing view of American history, and if they are not shown realistically the foresight, unselfishness, and great-hearted wisdom of the Founding Fathers, who desired one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for *all*, American history is a shoddy fabric. The truth is that, if the facts are given in the framework of the whole, the Constitutional Convention was one of the purest episodes in human history. James Madison, whom the "liberals" themselves praise, said of this Convention:

....there never was an assembly of men, charged with a great and obvious trust, *who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively and anxiously devoted to the object committed to them than were the members of the Federal Convention of 1787.*

Madison was closer than these modern historians to the Convention, and they themselves admit him to the ranks of the "democrats"; his words, therefore, are a rebuttal to any slander that the Constitutional Convention was a "rich man's plot."

6—What They Do to the Founding Fathers

THE theory of the "rich man's plot" extends into further areas of unfairness. George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, and many others of the "gentry" had radically broken with the past—with monarchy, with aristocracy, with outmoded forms; they had offered their lives as a willing sacrifice. Benjamin Franklin's pithy words applied to them just as fully as to Jefferson and to himself: "If we do not all hang together, we shall all hang separately." To impute sordid motives and materialistic selfishness to George Washington because he owned land and belonged to the "gentry" is a misreading of good and evil terms of a categorical economic determinism. Washington—in no narrow sense a "conservative"—had boldly, in late middle age, broken with every past tie and pledged his fortune and his life to every new hope for his country.

To say that John Marshall was "antidemocratic" because he was a member of the "gentry" is, again, assumption of guilt by association. John Marshall may have been rich; but he was a man whose principle raised him above riches. It was he who made the objective and humane decision that the Cherokee nation had a right to its own land. It was Andrew Jackson, on the other hand, the darling of the "liberals," who turned the military power of the United States unjustly against the Cherokee people. The rich "conservative" upheld impartial right; the rich "radical" said cynically: "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it."

At this point let us examine and compare the relative space devoted in the indices of these volumes to the "conservative" George Washington and to the "liberal" Thomas Jefferson. Here it is:

Craven and Johnson:—Washington 17 lines—Jefferson 25 lines
Dumond, Dale, Wesley:—Washington 4—Jefferson 9
Faulkner, Kepner, Merrill:—Washington 4—Jefferson 5
Gavian and Hamm:—Washington 13—Jefferson 13
Wirth:—Washington 4—Jefferson 9
Todd and Curti:—Washington 10—Jefferson 19
Harlow:—Washington 2—Jefferson 10
Muzzey:—Washington 15—Jefferson 17
Canfield and Wilder:—Washington 13—Jefferson 15

Mowrer and Cummings:—Washington 2—Jefferson 2
Bragdon and McCutchen:—Washington 25—Jefferson 31

A total of only 109 lines is allocated to Washington, while 155 are allocated to Jefferson. Jefferson, to these authors, thus rates an excess of more than forty per cent. Such is the proportion of interest that these authors have in a supposed "liberal" and in a labeled "conservative."

Hilaire Belloc, the British historian, in a lecture at Ford-ham University in 1937, said that the truth of history resides in *proper proportioning*. Is it proper proportioning to give Jefferson more than forty per cent greater attention than Washington? Or should Washington not command *more* space? His picturesque and dramatic life was vividly involved in the French and Indian War, in Braddock's defeat, in his own capture, finally, of Fort Duquesne. Jefferson had no such dramatic background. Washington abandoned more and risked more than Jefferson in espousing the Revolution; he not only upheld that Revolution intellectually, as Jefferson did, but he fought for that Revolution with his sword, often risking his life in the front line. He was one of the world's great generals, whose strategy is still studied by military men; his statesmanlike conception of the whole war in relation to the individual battles was a model of true balance. He was our first, and perhaps greatest, president. His refusal to be made king, his refusal to be president beyond a second term, set a pattern of propriety. His presidential speeches on domestic and foreign policy are models of firm eloquence and profound wisdom. As man, as general, as president, he is indeed the father of his country—an authentic origin and fountain for the best in American life.

Jefferson, for all his intellect, integrity, wide interests, and picturesque attributes, is not a figure that intrinsically is *more* interesting, *more* dramatic, *more* central, or *more* significant than Washington. Some reason other than the natures of the two men, therefore, must explain the exorbitant proportion in favor of Thomas Jefferson. The evident reason is that these texts on the whole devaluate Washington as a "conservative" and overvaluate Jefferson as a "liberal."

Washington was a bold radical—and was so regarded in his own day. He was a revolutionist in arms, who staked his life for freedom. Too, Thomas Jefferson's greatness lies in the fact that he was one of our great conservators,

who wisely foresaw the dangers of the future—a too-great centralization of government, a crushing taxation that would restore the evils against which the colonies had revolted, a loss of private property to government, an urbanization which would weaken what he wished to be a nation of free men on their own land. A tragic irony of these texts is that, in their adulation of Jefferson for the wrong things, they diminish his stature and destroy his philosophy. If they only had used their space to recreate the true Jefferson, we would not be so dismayed by their overpraise. They dilute and diminish the true Washington, but they also dilute by wrong emphasis *the true Jefferson*.

The bias against Washington and for Jefferson is obvious when we study the portraits of the two men as some of these authors paint them in human detail. Craven and Johnson, for example, say this:

> Opposed to the colonial democrats was the conservative, upper-class group, led by men like Edmund Randolph, George Washington, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and John Dickinson. These conservatively minded people were determined to prevent the war with England from resulting in a social upheaval in the colonies. Although they were radical in their attitude toward England, they were not interested in establishing democracy at home....These gentry denied that the common man was virtuous and rational. They held, instead, that he was ignorant, incompetent, and violent. As a result, the rich and the well-born should rule, all offices should be reserved for the upper class, and the constitutions of government should contain restrictions on majority rule. (Pp. 111-112.)

First, notice that these authors clearly *oppose* these "conservatively minded people" *because* they were "determined to prevent the war with England from resulting in a *social upheaval* in the colonies." Why was that wrong? And how did it differ from the determined ends of the American people? The French Revolution, unlike the American, did result in "a social upheaval." That "social upheaval" sent the noblest of her sons, like Danton, to the guillotine; it fossilized into the fantastic despotism of Robespierre; it exploded into the advent of the Napoleonic man-on-horseback. Why was it a crime to believe that America could attain freedom and justice for all without the furor of "a social upheaval"?

Second, notice that these authors are not giving the whole picture. Take one chief villain from their catalogue of "conservatively minded people": Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. Though he first upheld election of the House of Representatives by state legislatures, he changed his mind *and advocated*

election by the people directly.[11] This hardly indicates that he believed that "the constitutions of government should contain restrictions on majority rule."

In similar vein, these authors present George Washington as a conspirator for wealth, greedy and selfish, who put the interests of his "class" before the good of the nation as a whole. Washington, in a sense, was rich, but in land, not money. His real estate was valued at $266,919 (all of which he had risked totally by upholding the American Revolution), his personal property at $25,212. He knew the vicissitudes of life as well as any of his poorest farmer-soldiers: at one time he was in *arrears for back taxes for two years;* he had been *forced to sell his government securities at the rate of twenty to one*. Charles Beard, on page 38 of *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, cites (as a popular attack on the "rich") some complaint that the "Society of the Cincinnati" (which represented officers of the late army who possessed considerable means) had not been forced to sacrifice their certificates as had the poor private soldiers. But Washington, supposedly one of the "rich," had been forced to sell his like any "poor" soldier. King Lear's advice to the great of the earth, "Take physic, pomp!" and "Off, off, you lendings!" had already affected Washington, showing him—as he had long known—the natural democracy of human need.

On the spiritual level, to say that Washington, who had shared the rigors of the icy Delaware and the privations of Valley Forge with the humblest of his men—who had seen that a bullet knows no distinctions of rank in the front lines—who had watched with grim approbation his Old Continentals in their ragged regimentals cross bayonets with the resplendent Red Coats of King George—to say that such a man ever "denied that the common man was virtuous and rational" is to misconstrue the character of the man.

Specifically, Washington opposed a seven-year term for a president; voted to have the House of Representatives (the most popularly founded division of Congress) originate all bills on money; and upheld freeholders (mostly small farmers) against urban (and commercial) interests. Of the Constitution he said:

> [It was] the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation, and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy. (Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, p.* 215.)

If the author of those words was a conspirator of wealth, speaking with tongue in cheek, then life is a perpetual melodrama of villains who hiss and heroes who smirk.

Gouverneur Morris wished voting to be restricted to "freeholders." This may sound antidemocratic until one reads the rest of what he said—that the doctrine would be a popular one because *nine tenths of the people were freeholders!* This is a strange basis for a conspiracy against democracy, or for a desire that "the constitutions of government should contain restrictions of majority rule." "Nine tenths" is a fairly respectable majority! Morris also said: "Within the state itself...the majority must rule regardless of the mischief done." (As paraphrased by Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution*, p. 128.)

Edmund Randolph said that Virginia had fought the Revolution "under a democracy almost as pure as representation would admit." (*Records*, III, p. 307.) He was against a single executive because he thought the people should rule, and because he himself wanted nothing like the autocracy of a monarch. (*Ibid*., I, p. go.) This is a singular way of being "opposed to the colonial democrats."

John Dickinson wished suffrage to be restricted to freeholders—he said this would be "popular" since "the great mass of citizens were freeholders." (*Ibid*., II, p. 202.) But notice even more carefully his exact words: he was against

> ...any recital of qualifications [for election] in the Constitution....The best defense lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature....*He doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards.* (*Records,* II, p. 123.)

This seems a strange way of discouraging "democracy at home." It is also odd to impute merit to men irrespective of station or wealth if, in belonging to a "gentry," you "denied that the common man was virtuous and rational."

As a clincher, take the words of James Madison (whom Craven and Johnson praise as a "liberal"). He said of the Constitution:

> ...it was politic as well as just that *the interests & rights of every class* should be duly represented & understood in the public Councils. It was a provision everywhere established that the Country should be divided into districts & representatives taken from each, in order

that the Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathize *with the rights of the people* in every part of the Community. It was not less proper that *every class of Citizens* should have an opportunity of making their rights be felt & understood in the public Councils. (*Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.)

John Jay was so free from economic and class bias that even Charles Beard could not quote him from the *Federalist Papers* to support a hypothesis of economic determinism. Beard, indeed, bases his theory almost entirely on a part—and only a part—of Madison's article No. 10 in the *Federalist Papers*.

Alexander Hamilton will be treated at greater length in later pages. But it must be said, in passing, that he is misrepresented by Craven and Johnson. Hamilton "wanted the House of Representatives laid on a broad foundation *to protect the liberties of the people.*" (Brown, p. 121.) This hardly is evidence to support the claim that he "denied that the common man was virtuous and rational" or that he believed the common man "was ignorant, incompetent, and violent." Hamilton was not a thinker, he was not consistent in his philosophy, he went off at tangents, and he can be quoted for divers aims. But it is just as fair to quote him to his merit as it is to quote him to his abuse: he fought nobly for the American Revolution, he supported the Republic unflinchingly, and in many statements he clearly is well disposed toward the American people. He can hardly have been the melodramatic villain of these authors.

An impartial weighing of the evidence will prove that the blanket charge which Craven and Johnson make against these patriots, whom they lump together as a "conservative, upper-class group" and "these conservatively minded people," is an improvisation.

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley, as we have seen, charge that Washington and Adams were elected to the presidency only by "the wealthy, aristocratic group" and helped them to keep "control of the government for twelve years." This can only mean that Washington was elected by but a segment of the people; that, by a kind of conspiracy, he kept "control of the government" in the interests of predatory wealth. What sort of history is this? Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill are more indirect: they cite Washington as a prominent asset of the "Federalists" (p. 75), but their statement follows a major section entitled "*Agreements Are Also Made to Regulate Democracy*." They go on to say (pp. 75-76), "In general, the Federalists represented the conservative

business interests of the country....They do not even hint that Washington is to be considered an exception to this general statement. Washington never had anything to do with business and was not particularly fond of commerce; he loved the *land*; he loved the people of the United States and not "factions, To imply that Washington was one of those who "represented the conservative *business interests* of the country" is most unjust to the tone of his life and to that of the landed "gentry."

These authors' sympathy seems on the side of the Anti-Federalists; they say (p. 76), "The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, were made up largely of the common man." They cannot understand that in the American philosophy, there is no such creature as "the common man"—because *each man is uncommon*. They divide the indivisible nation into classes and masses. They emphasize economic status and the class war. And they regard the triumph of one class over other classes as progress "toward a more perfect democracy"—provided that it is "the common man" who wins out over the "gentry."

The emphasis on class conflict based on economic status and the technique of attacking Washington indirectly through a direct attack on the Federalists is found in The *American Story by* Gavian and Hamm. They tell us that the Federalists lost "control of the government" (a phrase which is pandemic in these texts) because they "did not sympathize with the common people." The Federalists "followed policies which benefited special interests—the commercial, investing, and manufacturing classes—and they kept the government in the hands of men of wealth." As these authors see it, the Federalists wrapped the country up like a gift package for the wealthy to open at Christmas. Washington, being a Federalist, suffers from guilt by association. It is refreshing and tonic to hear Jefferson, who was of course an Anti-Federalist, say, "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists." Jefferson, like Washington, repudiated classes and upheld the nation indivisible, in which those who differed were still "brethren of the same principle."

Todd and Curti, who allot to Washington ten lines in the index and Jefferson nineteen, do paint a full-length portrait of Washington. It is, however, with all its lip service of praise, distant and cold. Compare the firm but chill picture of Washington (pp. 184-185) with the incandescent eulogy

and panegyric of Jefferson (pp. 199-203). Characteristic is this excerpt:

> Outwardly Washington seemed to most people somewhat cold and overdignified. After his death *American patriots* [*sic*] *developed a myth of his godlike qualities*, and his impersonal virtues were magnified.

Yet the authors, as "liberals" in the modern vogue, develop a *mystique* of Jefferson's qualities as demigod and magnify his impersonal virtues. They give lip service to Washington; they give heart service to Jefferson. One reason is that they think Jefferson was an internationalist, and Washington they know was a nationalist. They say (p. 201), "Jefferson's interests were as wide as the world." They do not know that Jefferson, despite his interests "as wide as the world," *put America first*. Did he not say (in his first inaugural address):

> Let us then, with courage and confidence pursue our own Federal Republican principles, our attachment to union and representative government. *Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the degradations of the others; possessing a chosen country...*; *entertaining a due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties...*

No finer statement of the principles of national sovereignty could be given. Jefferson said also:

> That government is best which governs least.
>
> The policy of the American government is to *leave its citizens free*, neither restraining them *nor aiding them* in their lawful pursuits.
>
> *If we can prevent the government from wasting the labors of the people under the pretense of taking care of them*, they must become happy.
>
> Men should be restrained from injuring one another, otherwise free.

Clearly, Jefferson was in no sense one of the modern "liberal" idolaters of Big Government; he was, rather, on the side of the radical conservatives of today.

Thomas James Norton, in his book *Undermining the Constitution*, has this to say of Jefferson:

> "The Executive of our Government is not the sole—it is scarcely the principal—object of my jealousy," wrote Jefferson from Paris, urging upon Madison the need of amendments making a Bill of Rights additional to the twelve provisions already in the Constitution; "the tyranny of the Legislature is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years. That of the Executive will come in turn, but it will be at a remote period."

What wise prescience! Notice, too, that Jefferson wishes to *curb and*

curtail government as such: his great fear, quite rightly, is of Big Government. His central wisdom is, "That government is best which governs least." How, then, can the modern "liberal," who makes his fetish of the state, believe that Thomas Jefferson was on his side?

Alexander Hamilton (a lesser figure than Washington or Jefferson) also is manhandled. Supposedly a "conservative," Hamilton at his worst was a prototype of the "modern Republican"—a modern "liberal" under wraps. His federalism was simply the "modern Republicanism" of that day—a belief in the Executive and in an overriding federal government, a distrust of states' rights. All this, Todd and Curti do not indicate.

Craven and Johnson assert (p. 139) that Hamilton was "cynical about man" and that he considered man to be "depraved." This is unfair to a man scrupulous in honor, who fired into the air in his duel with Aaron Burr rather than shed his blood, who fought gallantly for his countrymen and for the principles of the American republic and the American Revolution. His statement that America is "the last, best hope of earth" seems hardly a "cynical" one. Or consider these wise and humane statements about the Supreme Court—which the authors consider the darling of the "conservatives." Hamilton said:

> ...the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature....If they should be disposed to exercise *will* instead of *judgment*, the consequence would...be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body...occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party of the community.

Here Hamilton is in the great tradition of the Revolution and the republic. He wishes to defend freedom—*not* the freedom of the wealthy and the privileged, but the freedom of any "minor party" in the republic. That was exactly what Jefferson and Washington also wished; it was the whole purpose of the Constitution, that brake on the momentum of the juggernaut of Big Government.

Hamilton also defended *trial by jury*, which has always been a defense of the people themselves and a prime objective in the quest of freedom. Hamilton said of this:

> ...encroachments [on trial by jury] have generally originated with the men who endeavor to persuade the people they are the warmest defenders of popular liberty.

How humane in the interests of human freedom! Yet this is the man whom Craven and Johnson call "cynical" and who, they say, scorned man as "depraved." His noble words could have been spoken by Thomas Jefferson.

And so, both in his worst and in his best, Craven and Johnson present an unjust view of Alexander Hamilton. They do not tell us that, at his worst, he was a modern "liberal" and, to that extent, closer to their own position than Jefferson ever was. They do not tell us that, at his best, he was a humane defender of liberty, and of trial by jury, and of the always endangered rights of a "minor party." That, as Corporal Nym used to say, is "the humor on it."

To exemplify even more impressively the authors' unfair treatment of the supposedly "conservative" Alexander Hamilton, let us compare it with their unproportioned and confusing treatment of a supposed "radical," Tom Paine. They praise Thomas Paine for the wrong things and gloss over the right things. He is "Citizen Tom Paine" (a title taken from the designations of the French Revolution and close to the "comrade" or "tovarisch" of the Communists). *Citizen Tom Paine* is, of course, the title of a modern novel by Howard Fast, who is one of the favorite historical references of most of these texts.{12}"Citizen Tom Paine" is a reasonable facsimile of the modern social democrat, not an American Revolutionist for *liberty*. Craven and Johnson—to illustrate this—tell us (p. 98) that Paine went to France and joined the revolutionists; they do not tell us that Paine was not a Jacobin but a Girondin; that he was sentenced to the guillotine and imprisoned under threat of death; that he escaped by a minor miracle. They say:

> *Hating tyranny in all forms*, he published *The Age of Reason* (1793-1795), *an attack on organized religion as a fetter on mankind's progress*. (P. 98.)

The authors ought to but do not tell the inexperienced student that Paine was a devout Deist, who believed in personal immortality; or that Paine distrusted *government* and said, of even the shadow of the total state, "so unlimited a power can belong only to God." They praise Paine not for his flaming trumpet call to freedom (*Commonsense*) but for his theories about "social security." They say:

> [He] published also an advanced scheme of social-security legislation, which in many ways was far beyond what was achieved [*sic*] under the New Deal, a century and a half later. (*Ibid.*)

They do not know, as any reader of Paine can find for himself, that his great writing was not about social theories but about fighting for individual liberty. He was not a textbook on sociology—but a trumpet.

It is when these texts reach Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson that they inflate these "liberal" idols to the bursting point, like toy balloons.

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill set the key:

> Jefferson's chief contribution is "the American dream," and it will not die so long as democracy lives. (P. 125.)

Now, Thomas Jefferson's contribution to America is heroic and priceless. Radical conservatives understand and value it far more than the "liberals" ever can. But to isolate it from the rest of American history, to set it above the equally valid contributions to our idealism that Washington made, is to sentimentalize and falsify the meaning of Jefferson. But Craven and Johnson do this again and again. They say:

> JEFFERSON DREAMS OF LIFE, LIBERTY, PEACE AND HAPPINESS FOR ALL....Under this *greatest of presidential dreamers*, the American people were to hitch their wagon to the star of a simple faith in democracy. What was Jefferson's dream, *or the American dream*, as it has since been called? It was, according to one writer, "the belief in the common man and the insistence upon his having, as far as possible, equal opportunity in every way with the rich one." In this belief, Jefferson, the aristocrat but believer in democracy, could see farther into the American future than any man of his times. (P. 120)

It is a disservice to Jefferson to call him a "dreamer." He was a shrewd, canny man, practical in his ideas of architecture, practical in his ideas of education, practical in keeping America out of what he called "entangling alliances" and sentimental involvement with the destiny of revolutionary France. His faith was far from a "simple faith in democracy"—it was rather a tough and sophisticated faith, and it did not separate certain vague characters known as "the common man" from the drama of man as a whole. He believed that, given opportunity, which was largely a matter of liberty, men would by their own initiative create their own good. Let government keep men from interfering with each other, and then keep its own hands off men! Anyway, it is as limiting to select Jefferson's emphasis *alone* and ignore Washington's contribution as it would be to select a single color out of the spectrum and label it "light."

Both Washington and Jefferson were men of a deep wisdom that continues

to illuminate our present as it will illuminate all the American future. They both were devoted to opportunity and not mere security; they both believed that America must refrain from "entangling alliances"; they both distrusted the encroachment of government upon the private man. They both were devoted patriots., in whose eyes America (in Jefferson's words) was blessed by "an overruling Providence, which by all its dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness of man here and his greater happiness hereafter...."

Jefferson would be the first to agree that "the American dream" is wider than the vision of one man will compass and that the true motto of America is *E pluribus unum*—out of many, one.

Why, then, do Craven and Johnson and other authors oversimplify the issues and overpraise Jefferson for the wrong reasons? It is because they read into Jefferson their own doctrine of "the common man," their own theories of "social democracy," their own emphasis on the conflict of classes. They select Thomas Jefferson as the great "democrat" and champion of the people. They say that Jefferson "could see farther into the American future than any man," because, perhaps, they wish to believe that he saw the "liberal" functionaries of today's swollen government.

Jefferson, on the contrary, was dubious about the future of America only when he *did* foresee such men—men who believe in overstrong central government, men who put security before opportunity, men who wish the state to lay its hands upon the initiative that belongs to private man. Jefferson held the opposite of all that the modern "liberal" believes as his most sacred dogma. The wrong in these texts is not only that they overpraise Jefferson but that they misrepresent Jefferson. He needs to be rescued, as prophets generally do, from his idolaters.

The catch phrase of the liberal" creed, "the American dream," is repeated in The *American Story* by Gavian and Hamm. They say (p. 125), "He [Jefferson] stood, in short, for the ideals known as 'the American dream.'" By this, they mean that Jefferson was "the spokesman of the masses" (*ibid.*); that he feared "the power possessed by men of wealth"; that "the common people learned to regard him as their spokesman, while they regarded Hamilton as the spokesman of the rich."

Two shortcomings in these interpretations are obvious: (1) Jefferson is

made, quite falsely, into a demagogue like the late Huey Long, with his idea of "Every man a king"; (2) *his* ideas *alone* are presented as "the American dream." But George Washington's ideas of the constitutional republic, John Marshall's concepts of impartial justice, and even Alexander Hamilton's often debatable ideas are, just as truly, a part of the total greatness which we may call "the American dream." Jefferson was not the only great American, nor does he have a monopoly on America's meaning.

In all these volumes except Bragdon and McCutchen's *History of a Free People*, Jefferson and Jackson are inflated as major champions of "democracy" and, as such, of the United States. Craven and Johnson refer to Jefferson as the "champion of democratic dogma" (index, p. 876) and *therefore* (not for better reasons) one of the "patriots" and "fighters for democracy." (See p. 112.) They declare (p. 111) that he "assumed that man was a dignified, rational being capable of governing himself." Mowrer and Cummings say (pp. 276-277): "It can safely be said that never did any country produce statesmen more imbued with the finest ideas of their times than those Americans who turned the thirteen colonies into the United States..." But the only one of these "statesmen" mentioned by name is Jefferson, and his picture, alone, is on page 276.

To Craven and Johnson, Jefferson is the symbol of social revolution. They say (p. 181):

> True democrats from Jackson to Lincoln to Wilson have viewed him as the great spokesman of their faith. Men who have called themselves liberals throughout the years have turned to him for support. On the other hand, those who have not quite trusted the masses have always feared and resented his power.

They too ignore Jefferson as the great conservator who foresaw and warned against the centralization of power in the federal government; who believed in private property as the true bulwark of free men; who distrusted the diffusion of men in great cities where they were divorced from the life-giving land. Instead, these authors praise him—or think they are praising him—because he "organized the first American rabble" (p. 181)!

Todd and Curti have a section (p. 246) entitled: "WHY DEMOCRACY GREW SO RAPIDLY IN THE UNITED STATES." It grew so rapidly, of course, because of Jefferson. The only flaw in Jefferson, to them, was that he

distrusted "the mechanics and artisans of the cities" (p. 246), who, to these authors, are the salt of the earth...and the pepper too. Aside from this, he is their total hero; for, thanks to him alone (p. 247), "the people were on the march."

In similar vein, Dumond, Dale, and Wesley tell us (p. 168):

> The faith which such men as Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe had in the creative ability of each new generation has made America what it is today.

Apparently Washington had nothing to do with making "America what it is today." The same authors tell us (*ibid.*), "Jefferson was the leader of those who had unlimited faith in the possibilities of the average man." They misunderstand Jefferson's whole philosophy—which was that there are *men*, not "average man." Men, to him, are *created* "free and equal," and he did not stoop down in patronage to "lift" the "disgruntled and oppressed": he wanted them to lift themselves. We are assured (p. 169) that "Jefferson's face was always turned toward the future." Washington's face was also turned toward the future—even when, to make it so, he had to turn his face toward a hedge of British bayonets. We are told (p. 169), "The roots of Jeffersonian democracy were growing deep in American soil." We are not told that the roots of Washington's republicanism were growing deep in American soil.

The same praise of one aspect of Jefferson as if this were the whole man pervades *The American Story* by Gavian and Hamm. Apparently Jefferson alone understood the French Revolution and boldly upheld it *as being the same as ours*, contrary to such finicky spinsters of "conservatism" as Alexander Hamilton (p. 128). Jefferson's chief virtue is said to be (p. 146) that "He made the national government more democratic."

The truth is, Jefferson's greatness lay in the fact that he distrusted government and trusted men. Writing to his friend Edward Carrington (January 1787), he said:

> Cherish therefore the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention. Do not be too severe upon their errors but reclaim them by enlightening them. If once they become inattentive to public affairs, you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, judges and governors *shall all become wolves.*

Jefferson is not here talking of the "upper classes" or "the rich" or "conservatives"; he is talking about men, even radical men, solidified into that

dangerous instrument called a *government*. He includes *himself* and all his own ideas among the dangers.

Men (not just "average man," but *men*) must remain alert and constantly scrutinize government and the Big Shots of government. Otherwise, government will solidify into the fossil caricature of revolution—as it did in France under Robespierre, in Russia under the Bolsheviks—and become a wolf. To think that Jefferson was dull enough to suppose that a radical ideology become a new status quo would solve the problem of freedom is to degrade Jefferson into a nonentity. Today Jefferson would be a rebel against the "liberal" orthodoxy of our idolatry of the state.

Jefferson did not divide men into radical and conservative; he divided men into "wolves" and sheep (his letter to Carrington). He wanted men to stay awake and aware and to be neither "wolves" nor sheep—but men.

In some of these history texts Jefferson is represented as if he were the only president the country had known. Says Wirth (p. 118): "With the opening of the nineteenth century, Thomas Jefferson, the third President, pronounced democratic principles as the guiding faith for the new nation." We are told (p. 137): "He emphasized the ideals of equality, liberty, and justice." Since, just a line before, we were told that he "pointed the way to a new philosophy in government," it seems that there must have been no "equality, liberty, and justice" under Washington. Jefferson is grudgingly admitted to be an apostle of free enterprise; but students are quickly told that free enterprise is no longer possible in the less simple economic organization of today. We are assured (by this time *ad nauseam*) that "Jefferson, above all else, had faith in the common man" (p. 139); that "Jefferson was fundamentally a liberal" (p. 140). But we are not told that, unlike the modern "liberal," he did not trust government to lift man into heaven, saying, rather, that the danger is that "judges and governors shall all become wolves."

The greatest explosion of demagoguery is touched off in these texts by Andrew Jackson. It is, perhaps, because Jefferson was a man of liberal culture and poise, not a man of drastic action, that some of these academic authors suffer from a compulsive adulation of Jackson, the rough and tough, the Big Bad Wolf of "democracy." This goes to such extremes that volume after

volume defends even such naked looting of prerogatives as "the spoils system."

Craven and Johnson say (p. 288), "Andrew Jackson was the first President who came out of the heart of the continent and from the ranks of common men..." (Old Hickory would have winced to hear himself called a "common man"!) They say of his inauguration (p. 291), "The people had truly taken charge of their government." Apparently, in making their Revolution and setting up their constitutional republic, the people had never acted or spoken! Dumond, Dale, and Wesley praise Jackson (p. 286) as the "candidate of the common people" and speak of his design to establish "the rule of the people." They praise his efforts (p. 287) to "arouse *the masses* to an interest in politics." Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill say, in a major subheading (p. 126), "JACKSON CREATES A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE, AND BY THE PEOPLE" and in a secondary subheading (p. 126) "*The Common Man Looks to Andrew Jackson for Leadership.*" They add, "*...democracy*, as we know it today, began with Andrew Jackson." They quote with approval a comment of the time: "...it was the people's day, the people's President, and the people would rule." The authors' comment is: "He was opposed to the greed and the power of the few, and the privileged classes soon discovered where Jackson stood. When the common man looked to Jackson for leadership, he looked to the right man." The authors, indeed, deflate him from the great rough, tough, rude American patriot he was, into a demagogue like a bigger Huey Long, "Jackson," they say, "made it clear to all that the common people also have rights"—as if the Revolution and George Washington had not made it clear. We are told (p. 128), "The people's President puts new life into Jefferson's dream," and (p. 129) "*It was not, therefore, until Jackson's time that the people really ruled.*" The authors continue: "Jefferson dreamed of democracy for America. Jackson made a reasonable part of the dream come true." To these authors, Jackson could do no wrong—social utility, as usually with collectivists, justifies any means. So they say of the spoils system (p. 128), "As Jackson saw it, it was one way of ending the 'aristocracy' of office holding. *After all, did not the government belong to 'the people'?*"

Gavian and Hamm say (p. 203), "He [Jackson] was one of the plain people, and the plain people throughout the nation wanted him for President." "His

heart was completely with the common people (p. 206)." These authors, also, defend the spoils system, saying (p. 207), "*These opinions were shared by most of the common people.*" *Vox populi, vox Dei!*

Wirth says (pp. 171-172): "He [Jackson] believed in the rights of the common man everywhere and sought to extend democracy even beyond Jefferson's ideals. He was greatly interested in the welfare [*sic*] of the laboring man and held anti-monopolistic views [before there were monopolies!]." He was "a man of the people." The people attending the inauguration "...considered that it was held at *their* White House, that Jackson was *their* President, and that now the people ruled. Jackson really was the President of the *people* of the United States." (Italics in original.) This seems to suggest that George Washington had *not* been "the President of the *people* of the United States." Even Jackson's arbitrary and evil removal of the Cherokee people from lands solemnly covenanted to them is praised; whereas, the just and humane decision of John Marshall that this was unconstitutional is brushed cavalierly aside, with evident approval of Jackson's authoritarian words: "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." Jackson is praised, as these volumes like to praise a "democratic" leader, as a "strong" President; there is the usual "liberal" acclaim of "the rise of the executive authority" (p. 173).

Muzzey equals these authors in his adulation of Jackson. He speaks (p. 222) of Jackson's reign as marking "'the rise of the common man' in politics and industry *and social planning* (Here, Muzzey is a bit anticipatory and headlong.) He praises Jackson (p. 223) *because he* "*had little regard for Congress*" *and did not respect the* "*checks and balances*" *of the Constitution.* He gloats over the fact that Jackson defied John Marshall and the Supreme Court—never telling students that it was Marshall who was on the side of humanity to the Cherokees, and Jackson (the Indian hater) on the side of brute power. Muzzey praises Jackson because the latter liked to think of himself as "the officer elected by the masses of plebeians to sit by the door of the aristocratic Senate and shout his veto of laws injurious to the interests of the commoners" (*ibid.*). It seems to Muzzey that here, for the first time, American history has become real. He says (p. 234) that this was "perhaps the period of all our history most fruitful in democratic changes." This is probably a fact; but it raises the question of values, which Muzzey takes for granted. The point

is, were these "democratic changes"—without question—good? One was the spoils system. Was that "good"? Certainly Emerson's words, "If Jackson is elected, we shall all feel dirty," suggest that the means used, if not the ends sought, were in large measure questionable to a free and noble spirit.

Muzzey reads into Jackson's reforms a modern collectivist vocabulary. All fair minds admit that the early years of the factory system, in England as well as in America, were too often iron years. About that there is no question. Abuses existed and were rightly attacked by sensitive and humane spirits. But to lay the abuses of a system upon the essential system itself and not upon the men who abused it is an error made by too many critics of American free enterprise. Into this quicksand Muzzey stumbles. He rightly lists abuses of the factory system—women and children underpaid, work that took fifteen hours a day out of workers' lives, children who worked and missed out on an education, so that they grew up "as ignorant as Arabs of the desert." These facts are correct. But Muzzey, in attacking these *abuses*, falls into Marxian terms that attack the *nature* of the free-enterprise system. He imports the Marxian term (quite fallaciously) "wage slaves" into the Jacksonian era; he attacks the "expensive tools owned by the *capitalists*" (p. 219), as if it were essentially wrong that capital should provide such tools. He does not even suggest that the use of such "expensive tools" made possible our present high standards of living. He does not even suggest that free enterprise itself increasingly corrected its own abuses (as running water clears itself of mud). He identifies by implication the abuses of the system with the system itself. Thus, while the abuses he deplores existed and should be deplored, he distorts the nature of the essential system, and he distorts the design of Jackson. Jackson was no Marxian, no collectivist. Jackson rightly wished to amend the evils and the abuses; but Jackson believed in free enterprise, in competition, in profit as an incentive and loss as a corrective.

The panegyric of Jackson (in the wrong terms) continues. Todd and Curti (p. 249) say, "On March 4, 1829, political democracy celebrated its greatest victory. All over the land men and women rejoiced at the inauguration of Andrew Jackson....Jackson was in many ways representative of the people." They do not say that, in Concord, a very representative American felt "dirty" that Jackson had been elected. Instead, they gloat over the contrast between Jackson's inauguration and Washington's: Washington's (p. 250) had been

"dignified and aristocratic"; he had held "formal court for his friends." Such men as Washington had been able leaders, but "they had not been chosen by the people." Jackson had been "chosen by the people." "He believed that the government belonged to all the people, and he was determined that the people should rule" (p. 251). Even Jackson's specious reason for inaugurating the spoils system are speciously acclaimed: "Jackson's policies in regard to public offices *did bring politics down to the level of the people*" (p. 252). Did not Jackson speak "for the people" and fight "the money power" (p. 253)?

To set the proportion of history right, one may set against these vulgar eulogies the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Emerson was not "rich" or "conservative" in a reactionary sense; he was a free spirit of the first order. Yet he wrote in his *Journals* that, if Jackson was elected, "*we shall all feel dirty*" He said that, if he were too eager for longevity, he need only attend a Jackson caucus: "I doubt not the unmixed malignity, the withering selfishness, the impudent vulgarity, that mark these meetings would speedily cure me of my appetite for longevity." Yet he wrote with full sympathy for all generous aims:

> The philosopher, the poet, or the religious man will, of course, wish to cast his vote with the democrat, for free trade, for wide suffrage, for the abolition of legal cruelties in the penal code, and for facilitating in every manner the access of the young and the poor to the sources of wealth and power. But he can rarely accept the persons whom *the so-called popular party proposes* to him as representatives of these liberalities. *They have not at heart the ends which give to the name of democracy what hope and virtue are in it.* (*Journals*, 1833-1835.)

Here, Emerson states a truth, and in so doing he conveys the philosophy of the American dream—as Washington would have seen it, as Jefferson saw it and declared it. Why cannot the authors of these texts see it too? Why cannot they too admire many of Jackson's aims and deplore many of his means?

The authors continue on their way:

> Jackson was more than a symbol. During his administration he applied his beliefs in ways that did much to make the government more democratic. He brought the people into the government by means of the spoils system [!] and the policy of rotation in office. In what he considered a democratic struggle against well-to-do bankers and financiers, he destroyed the United States bank....
>
> *Jackson's belief in democracy and nationalism places him in the stream of Western civilization.* (P. 258.)

Never an echo of Emerson's "We shall all feel dirty." We may grant, in a

sense, that these actions of Jackson do place him in "the stream of Western civilization"—in the stream that was to flow to the social democracy and socialistic nationalism of Huey Long, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini. Jackson was to that extent a "symbol" of many of the things that have since muddied "the stream of Western civilization." But the authors do not do justice to the true, the great Jackson: they do not appear to understand that Old Hickory's native American decency, his tang and humor, his deep faith in the republic and its destiny, his essentially integral and noble nature, his belief in initiative and free enterprise preserved him from the sickness of such "symbols" as Long and Hitler and Mussolini.

Only Bragdon and McCutchen explain this. By the others, Jackson is made a symbol, and "more than a symbol," of democracy become demagoguery—its "unmixed malignity, [its] withering selfishness, [its] impudent vulgarity." For the authors are fonder of Jackson's aberrations, it seems, than of his conception of a classless people united in a nation indivisible.

The adulation of Jackson as the champion of "the common man" goes on and on, like Tennyson's brook, "forever." Canfield and Wilder write (p. 202):

> The spread of democracy in the United States is closely linked with the name of Andrew Jackson, vigorous American *champion of the common man*.

They say (p. 206):

> Jackson had a firm faith in the principles of democracy. When he became President, political power passed from the few to the many.

Jackson's inauguration was "the day of the people." Now, it is true that Jackson's presidency was both *popular* and (in the American sense) *democratic*. The error in these authors is to use the terms "people" and "democracy" in the modern, *social* sense, making Jackson into a twentieth-century economic and social radical who inaugurated a modern popular democracy.

Andrew Jackson, for example, believed, with all true Americans, that the government should largely leave the people's affairs alone—only seeing to it that the people kept hands off one another. Thomas James Norton, in *Undermining the Constitution*, writes:

> On the proper and only place of Government in the affairs of men, President Andrew

Jackson said more than a century and a decade ago: "The duty of Government is *to leave Commerce to its own capital and credit, as well as other branches of business, protecting all in their legal rights, giving exclusive privilege to none*" (P. 156.)

Here, Andrew Jackson specifically denies that he seeks a "people's democracy" in which a single class shall dictate to all the other groups. If he upholds "democracy," it is the American republican expression of democracy, aimed toward "protecting *all* in their legal right"—and in that "all" he includes "Commerce" and "business." He says, like any independent radical conservative of today, that the government's "duty" is to leave the people (which includes businessmen) alone. He gave little comfort to the modern idolaters of the state, the contemporary fanciers of "people's democracies." An American in the basic tradition of freedom for personal enterprise, he gave "exclusive privilege to none."

Andrew Jackson was proud to be an American. He was a passionate patriot, a racy personality, a self-made man and a well-to-do man, a landowner and one who believed in the rights of private property. The fact that he fought *formal duels* is evidence that he regarded himself as belonging not to the hack-and-thrust roustabouts who drew knife on the passion of the moment but to the "gentry." His whole life was an example of initiative, competition, and free enterprise. Too many present-day "historians," with the social view, have stolen Andrew Jackson from America and made him a sort of tub-mounting Führer of Marxian "people's democracies.

7—How They Exploit the Gilded Age

THE interpretation of America as a perpetual battlefield of rich and poor, of evil "conservatives" warring against heart-of-gold "liberals" is increasingly obvious as these texts move into recent history. With the full exception of Bragdon and McCutchen and the partial exception of Cummings and Mowrer, they present American history, from the Civil War to the present time, as a clash of economic and social "classes"—of the "privileged" against the "underprivileged." The Republican Party is the tool of "the interests," the disciple of Mammon; the Democratic Party (except when it became "almost as conservative as the Republican Party"), an angelic host. America is made to seem utterly corrupt during the Gilded Age: the Senate was a "millionaire's club," and "invisible government" spun its web like a calamitous spider. History is interpreted almost wholly in terms of economic determinism, and America is made to seem a social wasteland, except when it was redeemed from "waste and wreckage" by "progressives," "reformers," and "muckrakers."

Here is a characteristic summary of the Gilded Age, taken from Craven and Johnson:

> Some men struck sharply at *the inequalities that were developing between rich and poor and at the power which corporations exercised over the lives of lesser people*....but underneath was *the constant thought of the rich arrayed against the poor* as a denial of the true intent of the democratic dogma....Miss Wright [a young socialist from England] spoke of this struggle as "*a war of class*" in which "the ridden people of the earth" were "struggling to throw from their backs 'the booted and spurred' riders whose legitimate title to starve as well as to work them to death will no longer pass current." (p. 320.)

And:

> A moneyed aristocracy was about to end men's freedom and their equality. Democracy was not functioning well in America. Perhaps Christianity was not serving the practical ends that it should....Democracy was endangered by the growth of wealth and power in the hands of the few. The well-being of common men—workers and farmers—was becoming less secure. (P. 319.)

This is an excellent statement of the dogma of the class war.

For another example, we are told by Gavian and Hamm:

> The period was one of great discontent—discontent because the common man felt that

the American dream of freedom and equal opportunity was not being fulfilled. All around them the people saw poverty, injustice, and political dishonesty. They wanted to know why these conditions had come about and what could be done to remedy them. (P. 417.)

The Gilded Age was, indeed, imperfect. But it is misleading and unfair to present the evils of the age without at the same time affirming that America, even so, was a shining dream that called millions from a poor life in Europe to a better life here. It is unfair to present America and the corruption of the times without affirming with equal ardor the quiet forces of honor and justice that were at work even in the Senate and the Republican Party; the advance in manufacture and invention that was revolutionizing the material standard of living even then; the noble literature of Mark Twain and William Vaughn Moody. It is not true that everywhere around them the people saw only "*poverty, injustice, and political dishonesty.*"

But the authors of these texts have eyes only for corruption, greed, exploitation, poverty, and injustice. Big business is, to them, the cause of this and is the enemy of the people. "Corporate industry" (which means, in simple words, Big Business) "represented a greater investment of capital and, consequently, a greater concentration of power in politics and economic life than the slave-holders had ever dreamed of possessing" (Craven and Johnson, p. 422). Capitalism, incarnate in Big Business, *thus constitutes the new—and worse—slavery*. The authors quote approvingly the words of Lincoln Steffens (p. 516): "'Big Business' was, and it still is, the current name of the devil, the root of all evil, political and economic."

We are told that, in 1902:

> The rights of the public had emerged as superior to the rights of private property. *Businessmen could no longer ignore the force of public opinion.* (Dumond, Dale, and Wesley, p. 607.)

Notice the assumptions that are here presented as axioms. The rights of the public are taken to be different from the rights of private property: but just try to take a farmer's acres, a worker's house, a businessman's store, or John Doe's automobile, and see whether "the rights of property" are not "public rights." Again, all businessmen are assumed to be pirates of exploitation, who ignore the public interest except at the point of Caesar's streamlined sword. Finally, it is assumed that the Congress of the United States was so utterly

corrupt that it was an enemy of the people.

Says Muzzey:

> Big business, then, just grew, and its swelling wealth was regarded as the natural reward of "rugged individualism." [Notice the hostility to individualism.] But if the government did not interfere with business, business soon began to interfere with the government. (P. 349.)

And Gavian and Hamm:

> A revolution had taken place—*a new class had come to power. Manufacturers and bankers had control of the reins of government.* (P. 345.)

And Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill:

> THE NATION FINDS IT NECESSARY TO CONTROL MORE AND MORE BUSINESSES WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE PUBLIC WELFARE. (Major subheading, p. 411.)

The period is interpreted as "a new struggle by the common people—*a struggle to regain control of their government, to bring business under control, and to obtain a better life.*" Inventions, efficient mass production, investment of capital which meant expanding production and distribution were lifting the standard for all steadily toward an increasing plenty. To the authors, however, the bringing of business "under control" is equivalent with obtaining "a better life." The cliché tags—"steel 'kings'...oil and coal 'barons'...merchant 'princes'...railroad 'magnates'...'Napoleons of finance'"—are quoted gleefully and with no qualification by Wirth (p. 272). And he says, of the group cited above, "Many of them [not 'some' but 'many'] abused their power, resorting to graft and corruption which endangered our social, economic, and political ideals." Like all economic determinists, he lays this condition to a class tendency rather than to what theologians have called "the Old Adam." A student reading Wirth's arraignment of the railroads and of Big Business in general (pp. 276-277) would come away with the impression that America, from the Civil War through the late 1890s, was a foul stew of greed and corruption, a continental slum of the spirit.

Todd and Curti characterize Big Business with even greater furor: they say (p. 546) of the late 1800s and the early 1900s that it was a time of "*the nations indignation against the money-mad activities of businessmen and their utter indifference to public health.*" Again a justified exposure of some is

universalized into a blanket indictment of all. And they tell us (p. 561) that it was "an age of graft and corruption that infected the high and the low alike." The crux of the class struggle is thus stated by Dumond, Dale, and Wesley (p. 525): "The real issue was whether the government would once again serve the needs of the toiling masses rather than the interests of special groups." Here, in the words of Lincoln Steffens, "Big Business was, and it still is, the current name of the devil..."

It is no accident, then, but by design, that the group known as "muckrakers" is made the hero of the period. They are discussed fully in every text, with no qualification but with much adulation. They are upheld as the leaven in the lump. Gavian and Hamm say:

> A wave of reform like that in the time of Andrew Jackson swept over the country. Just as in his day, the common people were calling for a greater share in the government....They...demanded that business be regulated in the public interest. (P. 415).

The muckrakers were the yeast that effervesced and created much of this demand. Frank Norris, Upton Sinclair, Ida M. Tarbell, and (above all) Lincoln Steffens are upheld in these texts as fundamental critics and are uncritically eulogized. Lincoln Steffens, called the "dean of the muckrakers," is treated throughout the texts with an almost hushed laudation, as if to mention him were to tread on holy ground. Several texts laud his *Autobiography*—Craven and Johnson rating it as "one of the great books on American life produced in the last forty years." Todd and Curti refer to Steffens as "a brilliant journalist" and say that he showed that "business interests" were as responsible as political rings for the prevailing corruption. His picture is shown in several texts; in Gavian and Hamm he has a full-page portrait, which is more than the authors give to General Daniel Morgan. In *United States History,* by Wirth, not only is he pictured but, in the caption beneath the picture (p. 410), we are assured that he exposed "the graft and corruption of American city government. His autobiography is considered one of the best ever written."

In none of these volumes are we told that Upton Sinclair was a confirmed blower of Socialist bubbles, or that Lincoln Steffens, this "dean of the muckrakers," in his progressive fervor once sent this appeal to the American Communist Party:

> Communism can solve our problem....That is my muckraker's proclamation: that the American Communist Party program meets our American capitalist situation precisely, and it is

Steffens, in his acclaimed *Autobiography*, praised Anna Louise Strong's "*progress from our old Christian-Greek culture to the Communist culture which will prevail for the next two thousand years*"

A historian is obliged to include Steffens and the other muckrakers in any history of the period; he must also point out the abuses and evils which the muckrakers so diligently unearthed; but he should do so with discrimination, not with boundless praise of the muckrakers. Nor should he permit it to appear that the evils of some great industrialists and politicians were evils of the American system itself.

As the muckrakers are made the hero, the Republican Party is made the villain, of the melodrama. Invariably the Republican Party is made the ally of "Big Business," the pal of "the interests," the servant of Mammon. This quotation from Muzzey (p. 393) is characteristic: "But most important of all, the election of McKinley marked the victory of the party of 'Big Business,' which was destined to control the government for a dozen years. *The Republicans were guided by men whose God was Mammon...*" As if this were not etched deeply enough, more acid is added: Muzzey speaks (p. 506) of "...the 'good old days' of McKinley and Hanna, when the big-business interests of the country were unhampered by government interference, labor was kept in its place, and prosperity was measured by the abundance of crumbs which dropped from the rich men's tables." Is this the writing of history—or a political polemic?

To Muzzey, as to most of these authors, Republicans can do no right. Of McKinley's administration he says (p. 415), "There was no disposition on the part of President McKinley to interfere with what John Hay called 'the insolent prosperity' of the United States." Apparently, the act of a champion of the people would be to "interfere" with "prosperity," which was "insolent prosperity."

This emphasis is prevalent. In Dumond, Dale, and Wesley (pp. 525-526) "The campaign of 1896 established the Republican Party as the party of conservatism and the Democratic Party as the party appealing to groups that were filled with unrest and discontent." They speak (p. 525) of the "close alliance" between Big Business and the Republican Party. "William

McKinley," we are told by Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill (p. 408), "was the candidate of big business." Gavian and Hamm also refer (p. 441) to the Republican Party as the party of "big business." Craven and Johnson charge (p. 422) that the Republican Party had allied itself with forces which represented a greater concentration of power "than the slaveholders had ever dreamed of possessing." To them, the battle of the modern age is a "struggle between democrats and aristocrats of the new industrial age" (p. 512). In that struggle, the Republican Party is the chief enemy.

Todd and Curti go so far (but in this they are not alone, for it occurs in several of these texts) as to charge that Big Business forced, by bribes and intimidation, the defeat of Bryan and the election of McKinley upon the American people! And even the more suave Canfield and Wilder say of McKinley's election that it was a victory for the people who owned property and for the doctrine of *laissez faire.* 'Big business, including the railroads, now had nothing to fear..." (P. 470.)

Only two volumes—Cummings and Mowrer on America's global relations, and *History of a Free People* by Bragdon and McCutchen—fail to stress an alliance of Big Business and the Republican Party.

Some of these texts make unqualified charges of corruption against the Congress of the United States. They make much of an "invisible government," the secret control of government by "the interests" which pull the strings to which senators dance. Thus Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill:

> A good example of such faithlessness is found in the United States Senate in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
>
> Writing in the 1880's an Englishman said that "some, an increasing number, are senators because they are rich; a few are rich because they are senators." Somebody called the Senate of this period a "Rich Man's Club."...How did "invisible government" work, and what were its goals? First, we should note that at this time the "special interests" controlled directly about two-thirds of the Senate. (Pp. 167-168.)

This is a serious charge: one would at least expect documentation. There is none, however. The authors continue:

> By controlling the Senate, the "special interests" either-got the legislation they wanted or prevented the passage of laws to which they were opposed...."invisible government" obeyed the master's voice. Like a disease, the "treason" of the Senate was eating away at democracy. (P. 168.)

The attack on the Senate occurs again. Dumond, Dale, and Wesley tell us:

> The United States Senate, to which many industrialists and financiers were elected, eventually came to be called a "millionaires' club." *They believed firmly in individual initiative and free enterprise.* [Notice the innuendo.]...They were opposed to experimental and reform legislation and listened to the demands of the farmers and of labor only when compelled to listen by fear of losing elections to the Democrats. (P. 510.)

What student, nourished on such curdled milk of human error, could escape the conclusion that the Senate of the United States, then and perhaps since, has been essentially venal and corrupt and that the government has been prostituted to the service of a predatory group?

The authors seem to look upon the American dream of individual initiative and individual opportunity as done with, for they say (p. 493), cryptically, "Most people in the latter part of the nineteenth century still thought of the United States as the land of opportunity." To these authors, the supposition seems unsophisticated.

The Supreme Court, too—in these texts, generally, a bugaboo—comes in for criticism. In this period, it invalidated the first income-tax law as unconstitutional. We are told by Harlow:

> Once again the cry went up that the big business interests of the East controlled the national government and defeated the will of the people....Some said that the Court took the side of big business and wealth against the common man. But in this matter of an income tax the people eventually won, though it took them 18 years. (Pp. 474-475.)

Harlow says the "interests" opposed it and "the people" wanted it—and eventually, "the people won." He may consider it a victory, but today the people must wonder, as they see the take-home and keep-home pay that remains after their tax is extracted. The predatory profits of Big Government or the abuses of Big Labor, however, do not worry Harlow: only Big Business worries him.

Most of the texts exude sympathy for third parties. Those they uphold are slanted toward the political left; the parties always criticize business, usually distrust free initiative and yearn for government hand-outs and controls, and would substitute the bread and circuses of Caesar for Emerson's self-reliance. The Populist Party, the extreme Democrats under Bryan (not under Cleveland, who believed in the gold standard!), the Progressive Party of Theodore Roosevelt and later of Robert La Follette can do no wrong and would have

done much right if it had not been for coercion or cajolery by the "interests" that stymied "the common man."

A characteristic attitude is the major subheading in Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill (p. 143): "*The Defeat of the People's Party in 1896 Is a Blow to Democracy.*" This party, "growing more rapidly than a pup," seemed to have a chance to win—and, these authors think, ought to have won. They regret (p. 146) the defeat of Bryan: "Although Bryan, the 'Demopop' with only a handful of money to spend in the campaign, lost the election, everything was not lost." The authors seem to shout, with Vachel Lindsay, "Bryan, Bryan, Bryan!" His political body lay a-moldering in the grave, but (they rejoice to think) his ideas go marching on.

The authors approve every "Progressive Party." They say of Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moosing:

> Here was a platform that read very much like the old Populist demands. Indeed, this is what happened: [Theodore] Roosevelt looked into the old populist platform *as well as into the Socialist,* and took some of their planks or ideas. He put "T.R." on these "radical" planks (*or so they had been labeled by conservative people in the 1890's*), and more than 4,000,000 Americans accepted them when they voted for Roosevelt in 1912. (P. 171.)

This is a prime example of facts so presented as to make the implications of these facts serve as political propaganda. True, the unphilosophical and politically opportunist Teddy—a great American, but not a great political thinker—*did* dip out of Populist and perhaps even Socialist brews a mélange of ideas that he made his own by right of style. The error of these historians lies not in their facts, however, but in the use they make of the facts. No one can read the statement just quoted without sensing that these ideas must have been good; that only the old fogies—the "conservatives"—had "labeled" them "radical," and with no real justification; and that the American people panted for "radical" ideas because "4,000,000 Americans accepted them." (Four million Americans can't be wrong!) The authors confuse Theodore Roosevelt's vibrant *American* radicalism with the "Socialist" platform (which leads toward a very different political end).

The student subjected to these texts is confused—without realizing it. Expressions of social amelioration are common both to Socialist platforms and to the constitutional republic. But the means of bringing these about are diametrically opposed. Socialism is a theory and a system in which the

government takes over private initiative and supersedes private ownership. The authors should have made clear that, no matter what incidental and casual demands Theodore Roosevelt may have filched from the Socialist "platform," he always was adamant in opposing the Socialist vision of a State-owned and State-controlled economy and society. But this they do not do, and in consequence they leave the student with a grave misconception.

The authors, Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill, prove their bias further by their censored and perfumed account of a later Progressive Party—that of Henry A. Wallace. Of this they say:

> The other party, the Progressive party, *was composed mostly of left wing* (*rather radical*) *Democrats who had rebelled at Truman's* "*get tough with Russia*" *policy.* (P. 188.)

Omission is commission. To characterize the Progressive Party of Wallace as a mere schism of "left wing (rather radical) Democrats" is commission of error by omission of salient facts. The authors are right in saying that many who flocked to Wallace were "left wing Democrats"; but the more dynamic forces that used them and steered them were by no means "left wing Democrats." Wallace was a sentimental humanitarian—a Republican in flight into the Democratic party, then a Democrat in flight to stranger areas that he never consciously charted. He seemingly never knew, as many of his followers never knew, that he was being used by more sinister forces in the shadows,{13} as we shall see in a moment.

Other texts fall into the same tendentious confusion. None of them, except Bragdon and McCutchen, and Mowrer and Cummings (who have other international fish to fry), criticizes the Populists or the Progressives firmly. They seem to regard the party as a lost yet lingering hope of "democracy," When the Populists, then Bryan, were defeated, Gavian and Hamm's characteristic comment (p. 410) is: "The reform movement did not die....*Even in our own day the fight is still going on.*" If this means anything, it logically must mean that the authors regard the Populists as having been right; that the "liberals" of today are waging the same battle for the same (or similar) admirable ends.

Todd and Curti echo, and almost repeat, the same words to clothe the same idea. They say:

> But the issue was not dead. The Progressive movement, successor to the Populist party,

was a political force to be reckoned with during the years before World War I. And when the great depression hit the country in the 1930's, the liberal wing of the Democratic party *finally won control of the government*{14} and launched the nation upon the "new Deal" program. (P. 532.)

These authors, too, are lenient, uncritical, and lacking in realism about the latest Progressive party, that of Henry A. Wallace. They say, in seeming innocence, merely this:

> Former Vice-President Henry A. Wallace also left the Democrats. His Progressive party *criticized the Truman policy toward the Soviet Union.* It tried to win the support of labor and many liberal Democrats *by adopting planks reminiscent of the more extreme aspects of the New Deal.* (P. 796.)

This is the familiar technique of commission by omission. What it says is so true, in part, that it cannot be controverted: but it is so wrong as a whole that it cannot be credited. It is like saying that Red Riding Hood had a caller who wore her grandmother's dress and spectacles. The moderate New York Times goes into the creation and control of the Progressive Party in a number of news, stories.{15} If the *Times* goes deeper, why should *these authors* withhold the facts? The Progressive Party also is cited {16} as Communist created and Communist controlled. Why do Todd and Curti fail to probe into the roots of the situation—are they ignorant of the facts? Are they unwilling to disclose the facts? It is a part of education to know the facts of life. Virgil elegantly puts it, *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.* It is the plain duty of historians to reveal, behind the benign face of Henry Wallace, and behind the often innocent humanitarians who flocked around him, the tough and sinister forces that planned and used him.

Muzzey, also, favors the Populists, the extreme "liberals" like Bryan, the Progressives of various brands. He charges that McKinley won the election because the Republicans indulged in bribes and threats, a charge which, if he only knew it, is more cynical about the independence of the American voter than it is about the chicanery of the Republican Party. He sums up McKinley's victory in the sad, familiar clichés that run through all these texts:

> But most important of all, the election marked *the victory of the party of* "*big business* "*which was destined to control the government* [*sic!*] for a dozen years. (P. 393.)

And he tacks on a moral diatribe: "The Republicans were guided by men whose god was Mammon."

But, lest one suppose that the authors are uncritical of the Democratic Party when it was "conservative," one should note what Todd and Curti say of the Populists versus the Democrats:

> The Populists and many wage earners were convinced that President Cleveland *was on the side of big business. There was ample justification for this feeling.* (P. 528.)

Part of the justification—God save us!—was that Cleveland "showed himself to be a 'hard money' man, opposed to the cheap money which the Populists demanded." A president is on the side of "big business" if he believes in sound money and distrusts inflation! Cleveland was one of the great American Presidents: but he would not use the presses to print greenbacks as the Populists "demanded." So Todd and Curti oppose him.

Muzzey's point of view is revealed in his almost lyrical adulation of the Populist and Progressive movements. They can do no wrong. He endorses them in a whole chapter (Chapter Twenty-three), which he heads (p. 438): "*The People Seek and Find Greater Power.*"

Harlow comments approvingly on the Populists (p. 477):

> They did make a valuable contribution to the history of the campaign by pointing out once more the economic character of the contest: "*There are but two sides in the conflict that is being waged in this country today.* On the one side are the allied hosts of monopolies, the money power, great trusts and railroad corporations, who seek the enactment of laws to benefit them and impoverish the people. On the other side are the farmers, laborers, merchants, and all others who produce wealth and bear the burden of taxation." (P. 477.)

This is a legitimate quotation from the Populists. It is not legitimate, however, to quote it in such a way as to make it seem that it defined the "economic character of the contest" in the United States—a contest between the evil "interests" and the noble "people." It leaves a student with the impression that class war was the essence of American history then and is so now. It leaves a student with the impression that the class war, based on economic interests, *does* divide the indivisible nation into warring factions. It leaves a student with a hatred for "the allied hosts of monopolies, the money power, great trusts and railroad corporations," without realizing that, often then and generally now, these factors have raised the American standard of living steadily and served the public faithfully. Then, as always, there were great abuses in the system of free enterprise, as there have been abuses in every human system we know. But also, and more importantly, there were

vital *uses*—the laying of railroads, the development of mines, the creation of factories, the organization of industry—which were designed not to "impoverish the people" but to enrich them. It is spiritually pernicious so to stress the abuses that a wedge is driven into American society and a false antithesis made between industry and men.

What is needed, but what Harlow fails to supply, is a clarifying of the synthesis: that, today, these forces which in lusty youth sowed wild oats of power and expansion co-operate now with the general welfare and serve the people. To state the conflict in Harlow's terms is to falsify the basic unity of American society, and to be unfair to the creative initiative of free enterprise.

No matter how great the abuses have been, the political genius of the constitutional republic makes possible their correction. But a one-party, monolithic, social planners's state does not allow correction of evils. In Russia, labor unions cannot rise at all—except as the one "company union" subservient to the state. In America, labor unions had their difficulties, but they steadily rose in power—until, today, they are so great a power themselves that they in turn, like big business before them, fall into abuses. But the genius of the constitutional republic will, in time, correct them. The one hopeless situation occurs when, as these authors oddly phrase it, one party "controls" the government. They do not see abuses and uses steadily and whole. They do not fit the correction of wrongs into the American—as against the social-democratic—pattern.

Worst of all, none of these texts—not one of them!—cites or quotes the writers who understand and uphold the system and philosophy of free enterprise.

For, to the anti-capitalistic warping of truth, there is a full and easy answer. One of the most original and trenchant of modern minds—unorthodox, to be sure—is that of Ludwig von Mises. He is, as too many do not know, one of the most realistic and sound of economic writers and a teacher of profound and growing influence. Von Mises now teaches in New York University. His most recent book is *The Anti-capitalistic Mentality*{17} In that book von Mises analyzes modern capitalism. He writes:

> Its characteristic feature is mass production for consumption by the masses...and the result is a *continuous improvement in the average standard of living, a progressing enrichment*

of the Many....Big business always serves, directly or indirectly, the masses. It is this ascension of the multitude in which the radical social change brought about by the Industrial Revolution consists. It is the multitude who have the power to make poor suppliers rich, and rich suppliers poor. The profit system makes those men prosper who have succeeded in filling the wants of the people in the best possible and cheapest way. *Wealth can be acquired only by serving the customers.*

This analysis is the answer to the sentimental, anti-capitalistic mentality of these texts.

Von Mises knows well the anti-capitalistic mentality. He says that the intellectuals' tendency to hate capitalism results largely from envy, in that scholars do not make a great deal of money. Von Mises depicts the belief of the anti-capitalistic mentality in this way:

> Men were once happy and prosperous in the good old days preceding the Industrial Revolution. Now under capitalism the immense majority are starving paupers ruthlessly exploited by rugged individualists, with whom nothing counts but their moneyed interests. They do not produce good and really useful things but only what will yield the highest profits.

No statement of the anti-capitalistic bias of the history texts we are examining could be better.

Von Mises answers the anti-capitalist:

> The rest of mankind profit from the activities of these three classes of pioneers [in industrialism]....Capital accumulation exceeding the increase in population raises on the one hand, the marginal productivity of labor and, on the other hand, cheapens the products. The market process provides the "common man" with the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of other people's achievements. It forces the three progressive classes to serve the non-progressive majority in the best possible way....The worst exploitation, say professors, labor leaders and politicians, is effected by big business. They fail to realize that the characteristic mark of big business is mass production for the satisfaction of the needs of the masses....

Again:

> The truth is that the accumulation of capital and its investment in machines, the source of the comparatively greater wealth of the Western peoples are due exclusively to...laissez-faire capitalism...

The authors of these texts do not seem to have heard of von Mises or to have pondered the issues deeply. They illustrate to perfection the anti-capitalist mentality.

Harlow exemplifies this mentality. Though he has to admit that the American people prospered greatly under McKinley, he is disturbed by the

thought that big business profited at all. He seems to view the prosperity of the American people as a natural phenomenon which had nothing to do with the prosperity of business; but he does not view equally as a natural phenomenon the depression that fell upon America when Herbert Hoover was President. He makes this somewhat snide comment:

> Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Republican party won *the reputation of having a monopoly on good times*. That reputation lasted until 1929. (P. 481.)

If bad times fall upon a Republican administration, they are caused by that administration; but if good times occur under a Republican administration, they merely win that administration "the reputation of having a monopoly on good times."

Canfield and Wilder, more modest about the Populists, let themselves go on Bryan:

> His appeal to the common people aroused the forces of social unrest, and no one could tell how deeply this might affect the final vote in November. (P. 469.)

They, too, credit the pressures of big business with McKinley's victory.

> Powerful interests gave liberally to the Republican campaign fund, and money was spent lavishly to instruct the voters on the subject of the currency. In the closing days of the campaign, economic pressure was added to persuasion. Contracts and orders for the delivery of goods were made dependent upon the election of McKinley. Farmers were warned that if Bryan were elected, their mortgages would not be renewed. Workingmen were paid off before the election and told not to return to work in the event of Bryan's election. (*Ibid.*)

The Republicans did spend money to elect McKinley; and there were attempts to intimidate voters. That is the way of all political flesh; as such, it is always to be deplored by the free spirit. But it is unfortunate to intimate that this was the error only of "conservatives." The authors virtually paraphrase a famous verse in the Gospels to read "the *Re*publicans and the sinners." Do they ever say that *labor*, grown big *also*, spends money (contributed by the mass of union members for other purposes) to elect the political favorites of the union bosses? That, through union ideologues, it tries to organize and deliver the vote of the union membership to a Truman or an Adlai Stevenson? That union officials, too, use threats to establish labor's political will? The genius of the American spirit is that it distrusts *all* organizations that grow too big—big business, big labor, big *government*. Canfield and Wilder show

awareness of the danger of "big business" but never the equal dangers of big labor and never the even greater dangers of big government. They say:

> BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IS TRIUMPHANT. This election of 1896 was a *victory for people who owned property* and for the doctrine of *laissez faire* in business. Big business, including the railroads, now had nothing to fear in the way of unfriendly legislation. (P. 470.)

Granted! Yet, to present the whole truth one must add two things: the American people had voted that way; and the results were advantageous to the general welfare. No matter what bribery or threats may have been employed, the bulk of the American people were not *forced* into electing McKinley by "7 million votes, a plurality of more than 600,000 in the largest vote that had ever been cast" (p. 469). The authors admit the facts, grudgingly; but they assert that big business won, bitterly.

On the other hand, the authors (p. 732) christen "the Progressive movement" a "*crusade* for reform." "Crusade" is a word that should be reserved only for holy things; and for all their fervor, the Progressives were hardly holy. Canfield and Wilder tell us that the Progressive movement arose because:

> Many felt that the United States had been converted into a government of, by, and for the large corporations. They believed that the professional politicians were the willing tools of the money class. (P. 732.)

Big business at the time had indeed grown too big and needed pruning. Also, "professional politicians" in all times tend to become "the willing tools" of any powerful group—including big business and not excluding big labor. But the authors lapse into one-sidedness in regarding business not as an erring friend but as an essential enemy. Business, rather, was a helpful but adolescent giant, full of lusty capers, full of heady selfishness, and greatly in need of growing up to its responsibilities. To the authors, business is essentially a *bad* giant—the Philistine Goliath, to be slain by the David of the Progressives.

Canfield and Wilder make their anti-capitalistic bias clearer by adding (p. 748): "A CONSERVATIVE REACTION FOLLOWS THE ERA OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM." This is a *chapter heading*. To pinpoint their philosophy, we need only read their summary of this period:

> From 1921 to 1933 the Republicans were *again in control* [*Sic*] of the national

administration....During the first 20 years of the century, as we have seen, Theodore Roosevelt and then Woodrow Wilson had led the country toward *political and social reform.* World War I followed, and the American people were lifted to great heights of patriotism and idealism. The reaction which followed the war was entirely natural. For a while the American people seemed to have *no further desire for reform measures, no interest in making further sacrifices for the welfare of mankind. This change in public sentiment was largely responsible for the triumph of the Republicans...*(P. 748.)

Several assumptions need to be lifted from Canfield and Wilder's subconscious into the publicity of the light. One is that only as you tinker with "political and social *reform*" are you idealistic. The other is that World War I, with all its disruptions, dislocations, loss of life and national energy, and world chaos, was good, idealistic, and right. Because the American people were fed up with that war, its horrors, and its failure to establish a good world, they therefore "had no interest in making further sacrifices for the welfare of mankind." Their philosophy is as clear as day! The Progressives are all right and the Conservatives are all wrong. Note the words in the chapter heading, "CONSERVATIVE REACTION..." The authors must know that certain words have developed certain connotations. "Reaction" is one of those words. It has developed the connotation of something narrow and nasty. It was, too, a favorite word of brainwashers in Korea. Among the loyal Americans who were made prisoner, the term "progressive" came to mean a traitor to America who had gone over to the Communists, while "reactionary" came to mean a patriot who stood staunchly against the Communists. It is manifestly unfair and a violation of proportion to devote a whole chapter to a partisan commendation of "the era of progressive reform" as contrasted with an era of "A conservative reaction."

The authors, also, gloss over the sinister aspects of the latest Progressive party. They simply say (p. 776) that President Truman "had lost the support of the *left wing Democrats*, who now formed a third party." They do not analyze that party; they content themselves with the superficial fact (p. 777) that this party "nominated Henry Wallace for President and Glen Taylor of Idaho as his running mate."

In these texts the struggle of "progressives" and "reactionaries" is a class war. That is made very clear. Gavian and Hamm quote approvingly the words of Mary Lease, a fiery socialist from England who became a leader of American Populism:

> "Wall Street owns the country. It is no longer a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but a government of Wall Street, by Wall Street, and for Wall Street. The parties lie to us...The people are at bay; let the bloodhounds of money who have dogged us thus far beware!" (P. 401.)

Concerning this language of melodrama, the authors confine themselves to the comment, "She expressed the feelings of a multitude of plain people, and they flocked to hear her." To be fair and realistic, they should have told their readers that the genius of free enterprise under the Constitution and the republic took care of all this—not in Mary Lease's way but in the American way; not by "social upheaval" but by a steady advance under our checks and balances. We smile at her language of melodrama as we do at "Murder in the Old Red Barn." These authors, meanwhile, omit telling us—by oversight or by desire to suppress it—that more and more millions of men and women today own more and more stock in more and more free enterprises. Popular capitalism, or progressive free enterprise, developing in the American way, has made millions of little people the actual owners of hundreds of big businesses. Since 1946, American stockholders have increased in numbers from three to eight million. Today, it is not Wall Street that controls Main Street but Main Street that controls Wall Street. Main Street has supplied its own quiet answer to the melodrama of the Populists and is the economic bulwark that makes millions of Americans hostile to the Socialist way. The authors do not tell us that.

Gavian and Hamm proceed in the same mood. They regard the struggle of the Populists and Progressives as good soldiering in the class war. They quote "a modern historian": "...the battle" (notice the words) was "between the Western plow-holder and the Eastern bond-holder." To them, when the "progressives" were defeated:

> A revolution had taken place—a new class had come to power. Manufacturers and bankers *had control* [*sic*] of the reins of government. (P. 345.)

The authors lump together, in one package of approval (p. 441), "Progressives, Democrats, and Socialists," simply because the programs of all three "*called for sweeping reforms.*" And they utter the perpetual cliché that, at the end of the era, as at its beginning, "*the people were deeply* discontented with the party of big business."

Any system that is for "sweeping reforms" is good: what means are taken to attain the "sweeping reforms" does not matter to them. "Socialism" may urge some of the "reforms" that non-Socialistic parties do; but that incidental fact is not what makes socialism the thing it is. These texts should make this clear but they do not. They do not define socialism in itself or as opposed to free enterprise. They are content to assume that such good aims as accompany its promises, rather than its basic bad principles, are its essence. What is socialism? *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (1949) defines it:

> A political and economic theory of social organization based on collective or *governmental ownership and democratic management of the essential means for the production and distribution of goods*; also a policy or practice based on this theory.

Capitalism, in the same dictionary, is defined:

> An economic system...in which the ownership of land and natural wealth, the production, distribution, and exchange of goods, and the operation of the system itself, are effected by *private enterprise and control under competitive conditions.*

Now, anyone who studies the American Revolution, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the American genius as expressed in the will of the people will know that the things which Americans most disliked and against which they had launched their Revolution was *government control*. Jefferson's words, "That government is best which governs least," define essentially the American spirit. The purport of the American Revolution was that "private enterprise and control under competitive conditions" should be free of excessive taxes, hampering laws, governmental control. "Reforms," to be sure, would be needed, as they are in all human affairs and institutions: but they were to be reforms of a kind that would make free enterprise freer, not curb and curtail it and bring the individual and his affairs under "collective or governmental ownership." The genius of the American Revolution, therefore, is essentially a genius that says *Yes* to free enterprise and that says *No* to socialism. To approve of socialism because of its incidental and minor parallels to reforms needed in free enterprise, but to ignore its fundamental and essential tyranny of government ownership and control, arises either from ignorance or dishonesty.

To discuss socialism without definition and usually in words that suggest its excellences but never its evils is to leave students ignorant of its nature.

Socialism, in a school textbook, should be carefully defined; its hostility to and difference from the American way should be made clear; its monolithic and politically puritanical nature should be exposed. These texts do not do that.

Their characteristic attitude toward socialism is expressed by Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill:

> Every President has been called names. The term "Socialist" is used to suggest a "radical." Socialism is sometimes loosely used to label all radical movements. Perhaps a few brief definitions will give meaning to certain terms in use today. *Socialism* is government ownership and operation of what today is called big business...(P. 170. Italics in original.)

Notice the superficiality and the slanted semantics of the "definition." Socialism is first glossed over as mere name calling: it is treated as if it were merely a convenient brick that old fogies toss against *anything* that is "radical." Then socialism is "defined"—shades of Webster!—as government ownership and control of *big business*! "Big business," of course, means something evil and even devilish. What student would not suppose it to be an advance when angelic "government" take over diabolic "big business"? But, as we have seen from Webster, socialism is not a taking over "of what today is called big business"; socialism is "governmental ownership...*of the essential means for the production and distribution of goods.*" These authors, being hostile to "big business," make it a red rag to incite a charge; and they hope to give, like a good matador, a final stroke which will end big business and replace it by government ownership. They do not say that, in the process, private property of little as well as big business, and the land and mines and factories and businesses *of us all*, would be in the giant hands of the state become *Divus Caesar*.

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley declare (p. 699), "Most socialists were pacifists." Socialists have often been "pacifists" in relation to international war but quite militant in relation to *class* war. They are not, then, by nature "pacifists." Only they are choosy about their militancy. Some non-Moscow Socialists have, at times, been pacifists, but most Socialists (and *all* Socialists owing allegiance to Moscow) have been militant. To say blithely that "most socialists" are "pacifists" is to delude students about the facts of life.

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill, too, are superficial and partial in their

interpretation of socialism. They say:

> To a considerable extent the Socialist party platforms have combined *the ideas of humanitarian reform and the needs* [*sic*] *of the farmer and laborer.* Hoping to *substitute for the so-called capitalist system the ownership of* "*big business*" *by the federal government,* the Socialists *have demanded an end to* "*wage slavery.*" (Pp. 140-141.)

This is the same dubious line we have already encountered. The "federal government" is to take over and own "big business"—but that is not a true statement of the Socialist goal or of the scope of the Socialist confiscation. To insinuate that socialism is a thing only of "*humanitarian reform*" and that it answers "the *needs* of the farmer and laborer" is to load the intellectual dice. Nor should the term "wage slavery"—a Marxian fallacy—be used without definition and evaluation. The authors continue:

> According to their views, the government-owned businesses would produce commodities and provide services for the *use* of the people rather than for *profit.* Most laborers would, therefore, work for the government. Even before the First World War the Socialists stood for the five-and-one-half day working week and minimum wages. They were opposed to child labor...
>
> That mankind might live with less fear of the future, the Socialists demanded (again before the First World War) old-age pensions and unemployment insurance—ideas today called social security. On the political side they favored woman suffrage and direct election of Senators. (*Ibid.* Italics in original.)

Here, the *incidental designs of social welfare* are played up as shining goals—*but the essential nature of socialism,* "to subordinate the life and interests of the individual to the community," as Hitler stated it, and to make a god of the state is never made clear. What student, so instructed, could fail to regard Socialists as apostles of light? Who would know that they had embarked on the road that can end only in George Orwell's *1984?*

The preponderant emphasis of text after text is upon an America that is a sordid record written on soiled pages: of greed, exploitation, monopoly, corruption, and the service of "Mammon." The history of America is presented as a class war, of "rich" against "poor," of "the interests" against "the common man," of the "privileged" against the "underprivileged." In this war, only the "Progressives," the "muckrakers," tie "liberals," and the "Socialists" are the true "democrats." Even so acceptable a member of the Democratic Party (usually regarded as on the side of "the common man") as Grover Cleveland is, according to Craven and Johnson (p. 498), "a rank

individualist," who "revealed a basically conservative temper." And anyone who reveals "a basically conservative temper" is a prince of darkness.

In relation to the exploitation of the Gilded Age, it is pertinent to quote Representative Shafer again:

> America is not perfect—but I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which "accentuates the negative," which minimizes, ignores, or denies the strengths, accomplishments and potentialities of our government, our economic system and our social arrangements, is subversive.

Accentuation of the negative was meat and drink to the brainwashers in Korea.

8—The Seamy Side of American Life

THERE are seams and shadows in American life, as there are in all human societies: the evils of the way of all flesh, the sins of the Old Adam in all men; and we should never deny that they are there. The brainwashers in Korea played these up until, in the minds of their victims, *only* the shadows existed, and the good was forgotten in their contemplation of the evil.

The history texts we are examining are prone, in general, to do the same. The summation of America's flaws and faults—"America's waste and wreckage and failure to be interested in social welfare," as it is phrased in Graven and Johnson (p. 557)—is a characteristic emphasis. The student learns about America in terms of wreck and ruin, lack and failure, for it "accentuates the negative": by disproportionate "facts," this kind of summation hinders the synthesis of all the facts into the reality which is truth.

Notice, for example, that the Ku Klux Klan is presented not as an ugly excrescence, like the infection that becomes the boil, but as a constant poison in the American bloodstream. Good Americans know that the sporadic rebirths of the Klan are as silly as they are malignant. Wise Americans, knowing that the South as a whole repudiates the Klan, regard it as a dirty minor nuisance like barber's itch, which requires hygiene rather than surgery. But these texts present it as a major infection caused by, and inseparable from, patriotism. The Klan is often equated with patriotism and is presented as a reason for despising patriotism. Craven and Johnson say:

> Its [the Klan's] strength was that it was all things to all men. In its membership there were a few alarmed patriots, some fanatics, some political schemers; *but the rank and file were just average Americans who would join any patriotic secret society*....The official Klan literature [*sic*] reflected the average middle-class mind in its assertions of "100 per cent Americanism." (P. 662.)

This passage begins by making several true statements; but then comes the anti-American bias. As so often occurs, these professional lovers of "the common man" in the abstract are very scornful of "the common man" in the concrete. The "average American," one infers, will join anything if it is "patriotic" and "secret"; "the average middle-class mind" is reflected in the Klan, and its "100 per cent Americanism" is made to seem as absurd as the Klan. Lincoln had a different opinion of the "average middle-class mind" and

"just average Americans."

The authors continue:

> ...it [the Klan] *offered relief from the deadly monotony of small-town life. The need of an escape from the drabness of much of rural life played no small part in the appeal of the Klan. Its cheap moral idealism filled a need not met by the business, social, or civic life of Main Street America.* (P. 663.)

The Klan, then, offers a convenient peg on which to hang cynical remarks about "small-town life," "the drabness of much of rural life," and the tone of "Main Street *America*" But probably the tone of Main Street even in Moscow has its dull moments. Balzac and Flaubert found "deadly monotony" in some of the small towns of France. Monotony is experienced by people everywhere, not by Americans only; and the way out is the way that America has been taking—much excellent painting, much excellent music, a number of excellent civic theaters, along with good reading and wholesome civic life. But students who read these authors would suppose that *all* average and middle-class Americans turn inevitably to evil and boredom; that the lives of Americans are inescapably cheap, sordid, shoddy, drab.

The authors, professing a theoretical and abstract love of "the common man" and the average man, do not like the "business, social, or civic life of Main Street America." And so the "cheap moral idealism" of the Klan "filled a need" that American life does not otherwise meet. A good answer to this snide cynicism is supplied by *Our Town by Thornton Wilder, The Human Comedy* by William Saroyan, North of Boston by Robert Frost, and the novels of Willa Cather.

We have already seen in the previous chapter that the texts we are examining present a whole great period in American history in such a way that corruption, exploitation, greed, and moral evil are made to seem the hallmarks of American politics. Even worse, in text after text, *American life* is pared down to lowest terms—in cartoons and pictures even more than in the textual commentary. Such, for example, are the cartoons on pages 497-498 of *History of United States* by Dumond, Dale, and Wesley. Here, Coxey's Army is presented as an indictment of a supposedly omnipresent unemployment, and "National Guardsmen" are shown shooting down strikers "over the protests of Governor Altgeld of Illinois." To point the moral and adorn the

tale, the authors tell us:

> The distress of the average workingman during periods of unemployment *was nothing compared to the everyday wretchedness of life in city slums. Hundreds of thousands of people in such cities as New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago lived in tenements, in dark cellars, in attics, or in shacks unfit for human habitation. Deprived of light and ventilation, of privacy, and of sanitary facilities, these people were easy victims of disease, crime, and vice. Their standard of living was far below that of the pre-war slaves, their privations greater than those of the Western pioneers.* (Pp. 496-498.)

Incidental and admitted evils, which needed and which found correction, are exaggerated by sheer force of overemphasis into something endemic and universal: America is pictured as a foul continental slum where the "standard of living was *far below that of the pre-war slaves*." Why, then, did eager millions—if their lives in Europe were so superior—crowd the steerages of ships bound for America, the land of light? On page 576 there is a picture of an old-fashioned flatiron: the caption reads, "In spite of modern improvements in irons and mangles this type of iron is still used in some homes." The suggestion seems to be that it is used in some homes *only* because of poverty. It would be interesting to ask the authors to hunt up such an iron used *because* the owner could not afford an electric iron.

In this text we are often presented with pictures of "slums"; in the caption of one*, the present tense is used*:

> Poverty and unsanitary conditions *prevail in many towns*. These children *do* not have the advantages of an attractive neighborhood. (P. 585.)

But why are we not also shown pictures of the new architecture in America; the modern housing developments and apartments; the new schools, auditoriums, parks? On page 591 a cartoon and a picture make drastic the evils of "child labor." The best the caption can find to say is: "Child labor...has been greatly lessened within recent years."

A contemporary newspaper clipping tells of a teen-age boy who ran amok because his "allowance" of $40 a month could not "keep him in cigarettes"; another in the same paper tells of a teen-age boy who hanged himself because he was "asked" to mow his own lawn! But, to these authors, the problem is still "child labor." They don't even know where the contemporary problem lies or what it is!

All the American schools pictured by Dumond, Dale, and Wesley are

grubby, poor, foul. Not one of our great modern schools is shown. The authors have dredged up some antediluvian monstrosity and captioned it:

> Poorly equipped country school. Compare the benches and blackboards in this nineteenth century school with those of today. *Many schools are even yet poorly equipped* with maps, globes, and books, but few of them *are* so *forlorn looking* as the one shown in this picture. (P. 501.)

Why, then, exhume this unrepresentative caricature? And why fail to mention the excellent teaching, the far finer texts, the less ideological teaching of American history, the discipline and attention in those old country schools? Or the great interest in, and sacrifice for, education which led to their creation? The American dream is again whittled down by the picture and caption of a "sod schoolhouse."

> Sod schoolhouses were sometimes quite attractive inside in spite of their somewhat forlorn appearance outside. (p. 465.)

The authors miss the point: even in the rude, crude life of American pioneers upon desolate prairies, the American spirit concentrated, with the best of its resources, upon education and the care of children. It should be made a glory; it is made to seem a shame.

Pictures on pages 669 and 684 make American "poverty" clear. Why not suggest, as proportion requires, the flowing and generous wealth of America that goes so splendidly into homes, schools, public buildings? Why are we not shown that, thanks to free enterprise, America is the greatest workshop of industrial know-how and the greatest storehouse of vital plenty in the history of the world?

The strange malice against the American way seems proved on page 707 of this text. Here we see a smashed automobile, with the caption:

> Accident caused by speed and drink. The picture shows *not all unusual, but a typical, scene on American high-ways.*

We have all seen, we all deplore, drinking, speed, wrecks; but to caption *one wreck as* "*not an unusual, but a typical, scene on American highways*" is to say that this is the *norm* of driving in America. It is to suggest that our highways *on the whole* are characterized by wrecks caused by drunken sots driving at crazy speed. The scattered conditions, to an extent, exist; they should be noticed, criticized, and changed, where they still need correction;

but disproportionate accentuation of the negative destroys the truth of the criticism.

In *I Drive the Turnpikes...and Survive*, by Paul W. Kearney,{18} published in 1956 we read:

> And when all is said and done, *the American driver is the finest in the world* in view of what he is up against.
>
> The best evidence of this fact is contained in an annual tabulation made by the National Safety Council under the heading "Motor Vehicle Deaths and Rates by Nations." This comparison is made on the basis of the number of deaths per 10,000 motor vehicles, *the only universal yardstick there is at present*. The most recent calculation gives the traffic death ratio for the United States at 7.2. *The only country with a lower figure is New Zealand with 6.7*. How the rest rank is indicated by these extracts from the table:
>
> Country—Deaths per 10,000 motor vehicles
> Canada—9.3
> Great Britain—11.6
> Mexico—13.6
> Sweden—14.1
> Denmark—15.5
> France—15.7
> Germany (West Zone)—23.6
> Spain—29.1
> Ceylon—35.5
> Puerto Rico—38.5
> Italy—49.2
> Japan—70.0
> Egypt—158.6
>
> We can pinpoint it even more closely by the record of the renowned Hollywood Boulevard, about ten miles long, which handled a traffic volume of 112,300 vehicles *per day* for the entire year of 1954 with only *three* fatalities. This daily traffic represents about 25 per cent more cars than exist in all of Egypt, the nation with the most horrible record of all. [Italics in original of this paragraph.]
>
> *It is hardly necessary to labor the point that the average American driver is tops....*

These being the true facts concerning American highways, how is one to explain the picture given in the text, and the petulant comment: "The picture shows not an unusual, but a typical, scene on American highways"?

The same slant and the same emphasis occur again and again in these texts. Thus Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill (page 495) offer a chapter heading that is as incredible as it is unjust and untrue: "SLOWLY THE WORKERS MOVE UP THE ECONOMIC LADDER." Reading it, one would naturally infer that American workers began far down in economic status, like Egyptian fellaheen, and slowly, very, very slowly, inched their precarious way up a

precipice, with enemies to oppose them on their arduous climb. To be sure, the best is always too slow in coming...or so it seems in our human impatience. But to emphasize the word "*slowly*," in a chapter heading, seems a perverse emphasis. Compare the climb of the workers in France, Germany, Italy, or England—or in Soviet Russia—"up the economic ladder."

The same authors present (p. 434) a picture of the results of "a depression...in America," as if depressions were always just around the corner. A wintry street, bleak with scattered snow, an ugly façade or two, closed doors and obvious depletion all picture the winter of American discontent. The caption reads (notice the present tense):

> The closed store and moving picture theater illustrate very clearly just what a depression means to the people of America. When they *have* no money to buy goods or go to the movies, the storekeeper and theater owner *must close* their businesses. Trade *comes* to a standstill.

This, supposedly, is a reference to the great depression; it is so phrased, however, as to make depressions of this intensity seem a recurring blight.

Most of these texts, believing at least subconsciously in the welfare state, emphasize the economic, political, and social *illfare* of the system of free enterprise. Gavian and Hamm, for example, sum up President Franklin D. Roosevelt's second inaugural address approvingly (p. 551):

> ...the United States had means to provide a comfortable living for all, yet one third of the people were ill-housed, ill-fed, and ill-clad. He ¡ Roosevelt] pledged himself to go on *fighting for reform.*

Justice to America would at least suggest that this accusation be tied up with the temporary conditions of a great depression. Fair play would even suggest that this, like so many of Franklin Roosevelt's statements, was the mere popularization of the pronouncements of sociologists who leaned toward the welfare state. The authors might well have added the fact that, at this time in Soviet Russia, audiences would not believe the truth of a movie like "The Grapes of Wrath" because "poor" people like the Okies could not possibly own their own fine cars! This text, however, merely paraphrases Franklin Roosevelt as if he were speaking the law and the Gospels.

The same inaugural statement is quoted in other texts and. in Todd and Curti, made more impressive by the accompanying picture (p. 720) of a shack in one of the poorest sections of the old South. In this volume a miserable

youngster, slumped over a park bench, is presented (p. 692) as one of the young men who "failed to find jobs." Bread lines (p. 691), child labor (p. 511), idle freight cars (p. 690), slums and crowded schools (pp. 558, 559), The Homestead Strike (p. 504) are offered as characteristic views of the American scene. On the other hand, the pictures which glorify America are so chosen as to idealize the good of the welfare state under the New Deal. America is whittled down with bitter realism; the New Deal is ballooned up with uncritical idealism.

Cartoons in several of these texts splash the ills of American life across the pages. The craze for gambling in stocks in the late 1920s is made graphic, and we are told by Gavian and Hamm (p. 528): "*The whole nation seemed to be living in a fool's paradise.*" This general statement represents a partial truth; the full truth needs also to be told—that we were in a period of such great expansion of our free economy (good in itself) that we lost perspective and balance and yielded to the greed of the Old Adam. One cartoon stresses child labor (p. 450); another revels in an industrial slump (p. 446); other pictures gloat over "a typical tenement" (p. 426), the corruption of the Republican Party (p. 409), the Senate of the United States as subservient to "the trusts" (p. 402). One picture reiterates an industrial slump (P. 403), another plays up the Homestead Strike luridly (p. 375), another the Pullman Strike (p. 376)....

The point is not that the dark areas of American history should be hidden but that the undoubted excellences of America *are* hidden. It is not truthful to exploit even the Gilded Age and to censor its good. The authors, as we have seen, make vivid much of the real or fancied evil of the American story, but one wonders why the story is not balanced with its glory, as historical proportion requires. *The authors can illustrate virtues when they want to. Every picture in this volume which deals with the United Nations is vividly idealistic!* The U.S. is played down, the U.N. is invariably played up.

It is an incredible and amazing experience to leaf through these volumes and find the number of pictures and cartoons that deal with corruption in politics, exploitation by "big business," sharecroppers' shacks, migrant workers treading the grapes of wrath, child labor, imperialism, slums: the pictorial impact makes America seem a slough of despond. See the cartoons and illustrations in Todd and Curti: on page 574 Teddy Roosevelt is

tightening the screws of some medieval instrument of torture to squeeze the "profits" out of the "trusts"; on page 575 we are shown a pitiful little tyke in overalls, as an example of underprivileged children to whom *government* is supplying milk. On page 570 we see children playing in the street "because public playgrounds either did not exist or were inadequate"; on page 571 we have a picture of a fine playground where happy youngsters are sporting—as they should. But the caption under this second picture is:

> By providing public playgrounds and community play centers such as the one shown in this photograph, *citizens* tried to put into practice the democratic ideal of equality of opportunity.

Yet we are *not told* (except by the casual required credit to the source of the photograph) *that this is a playground built and provided by Standard Oil of New Jersey*. It was not the government with the taxes of *citizens*, that gave this: it was "big business" (the "devil," according to Lincoln Steffens!) operating under free enterprise.

Many of these texts gloat over the lapses of the spirit and the evils of the flesh that have afflicted the United States—as they afflict all human societies. A characteristic summary of a whole period in American life by Craven and Johnson reads:

> On the surface, life in the "roaring twenties" was dominated by an unbelievable, irrelevant potpourri of speak-easies, Teapot Dome scandals, bathing-beauty contests, and Bolshevist scares. It was a generation that was primarily interested in escaping from serious problems, domestic or international. It was an unreal world filled with raucous laughter, shoddy tinsel, and ballyhoo. (P. 686.)

This, as it stands, is in some ways justified. But it is used to conclude a chapter and to clinch an impression. An even greater mischief is that these writers fail to show the center of American life and the depth that lies between center and surface. They say it is "difficult" to do this; but their proper function is to surmount that difficulty and to bring students the *real* America. They do not, however, tell students that, if there was Teapot Dome, there was also the moral integrity of Calvin Coolidge, who opened the government files and bade the culprits fall as they might, whatever their party. They do not tell students that, in these years, Thornton Wilder's *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* probed time with Eternity. They do not tell students that Robert Frost was writing the tender insights of "the Death of the Hired Man" and the terrible

beauty of "Home Burial." They do not tell students that Admiral Byrd was daring the wastes of the Antarctic. Why mute all these and stress the "raucous laughter, shoddy tinsel, and ballyhoo"?

Or why begin the study of a period in this way:

> The post-war era was launched in an environment super-charged with emotion and intolerance, and Socialist and other radical meetings were broken up by mobs [*sic*] which contained many ex-servicemen. (P. 656.)

In these "mobs," doubtless, there were some Negroes, or some Jews, or some Catholics; but if I were to say that the "mobs" contained "many Jews and Negroes and Catholics," I would justly be accused of prejudice. Why, then, do these authors select "*many ex-servicemen?* Perhaps it is explained by Craven and Johnson's charge of a "revival of nativism" (p. 661) or their statement (p. 656): "In the 1920 many Americans were *excessively nationalistic and intolerantly patriotic*." Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill tell us:

> ...there was an increase in the number of so-called "*100 per cent Americans*" whose behavior was quite un-American and undemocratic. The Ku Klux Klan, for example...(P. 650.)

Patriotism is seldom mentioned by the authors of most of these textbooks except in relation to extremists and crackpots; students are conditioned in this manner to associate love of country with those racists and bigots who misleadingly label themselves "100 per cent Americans."

One of the evils of American life, as Gavian and Hamm see it, is business:

> The public in general seemed satisfied to have the government help big business. The old fear of the great corporations had largely disappeared....As automobiles, radios, mechanical refrigerators, and other conveniences came into common use, people felt that the companies who made them were doing a public service and deserved every consideration from the government. Big business helped to encourage this way of thinking. (P. 532.)

Why should people *not* feel that the companies that mass produced automobiles, radios, and refrigerators at a price that the people could pay "were doing a public service"? And why should business *not* say so in advertisements? Notice, however, the sly way in which these authors tell this: "The public in general *seemed* satisfied..." "people *felt*..." and "big business *helped to encourage* this way of thinking." Why could the authors not merely say, as von Mises does, that mass production of useful articles *is* a service to all the people, that the people know it, and that businesses are justified in

pointing to their record for making it possible for the poorest to possess what once were luxuries?

They carry their distaste for free enterprise into every expression of society. They say:

> ...the American people were having "a whirl." In the cities, theatres and night clubs with floor shows were packed. Hundreds of thousands traveled abroad. City habits and dress found their way into the country. The average American found money and time to "take in a movie" twice a week. College and university students increased from a total of 356,694 at the beginning of the 1920's to nearly a million in 1929. Many Americans thought that a college education was a key to a better job and a position in "society." It was a "dress-up" age. Stores became "shoppes," undertakers became "morticians," and you took your car to be greased at a "lubritorium." (Pp. 428-429.)

This, of course, was life under Coolidge and the early Hoover—that is why it was a "dress-up age." A decade later, under Franklin D. Roosevelt, if the same free-and-easy prosperity had occurred, it would have been "progressive," "reform," and a noble advance in the standard of living for the common man." But these lovers of "the common man" feel it superficial or even wrong that "the average American found money and time to 'take in a movie' twice a week," Why should the authors present these facts so as to make them seem shameful or silly? The theaters were filled, people traveled abroad, city fashions spilled over into the country, students thronged to colleges...what's wrong with this? But the authors, *wishing to deflate the values of this period*, reduce the whole business to artifice and flimflam. Why should the authors, if they must find motivations, impute only the inferior motivations of wishing to improve one's chances for a better job and one's "position in 'society'"? How can they be sure that some did not wish to grow in stature and favor with God and man? They present innocent facts as if they were symptoms of some malady of the spirit. No wonder they prefer the solemn Puritanism of the collectivists to the heady exuberance of free enterprise! These macabre authors distrust the fizz in ginger ale the bubbles in champagne. They need a little high living and plain thinking.

Another way of taking the United States down a few pegs is to press the charge that the country, in a great period of its history, engaged in "imperialism" and "colonialism." In November 1956, one saw on television a debate by high-school students in which they soberly took for granted that the United States *had* engaged in both, and that such independence as we have

given the Philippines is, of course, in our own material interests. And why should students *not* take this for granted? The charge is flatly made in every one of these eleven texts: that America has been "imperialistic," that we have had an "empire," and that we have engaged in "colonialism."

These texts all assert that, after the Spanish-American War, the United States "embarked upon the path of empire" (the phrasing differs, the substance is the same). This has always been the Communist (and Socialist) interpretation of American history. It is a jagged verbal stone that Communists like to toss, even though they live in glass houses; it bruised many a prisoner in Korea. The truth is that the *responsibility* (heavy and sacred), to the surprise and chagrin of the McKinley administration, was saddled upon the United States not only of freeing the Philippines but of keeping them free. To have shuffled off that responsibility would have subjected the Philippines to seizure by predatory powers. After stabilizing the islands, protecting them with a hands-off notice to the world, the United States promised them independence. That promise was kept. In view of the Communist propaganda which attacks such a policy as "imperialistic," it is imprudent and false for American textbooks to give credence to the charge.

If the authors had *defined* "imperialism," they could easily have shown that the term does not apply to the United States. "Imperialism" means deliberate conquests of lands not one's own, with intent to seize and rule and exploit them. W*ebster's Collegiate Dictionary* (Second Edition) defines "imperialism" as:

> The policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking to extend the control, dominion, or empire of a nation.

The same dictionary defines "empire" as:

> A state characterized by having great extent of territories and variety of peoples united under one rule, or by having *emperor* as the title of its ruler.

In relation to the territories freed from Spain, the United States never indulged in the policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking to extend its control, dominion, or empire. It had the bewildering responsibility of protecting and helping these territories, but from the beginning it was only with the avowed intent of securing their independence. Spain built up an empire in the Americas; England and France built up empires in India and Africa; the Dutch

built up an empire in the Far East. Soviet Russia is busily building the empire of communism. The United States has never, in any similar sense, built up an empire or sought to do so. The conflict about the so-called "empire" was actually the old contest of "isolationist" *versus* "internationalist": in that contest, here, we take on sides; but we do say, flatly, that it was not a contest of "imperialist" and "anti-imperialist." Our war with Spain was disinterested and idealistic; we held Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines in interim only to keep them free; and we gave them complete independence.

No historian of integrity should apply the word "imperialism" to our course, especially since to do so is to misinterpret America and to play into the hands of the brainwashers. Yet every one of these texts makes the charge. Craven and Johnson tell us:

> The American people believed that they went to war to *free the Cubans; the fact that the war was to create an empire for the nation* was not foreseen or expected by the mass of Americans. (P. 572.)

Or we are told: "But the imperialists won out..." (Dumond, Dale, and Wesley, p. 546) or that we fell into "economic imperialism" (Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill, pp. 613, 615)—into an exploitation of other lands by the dollar, made picturesque by occasional forays by the Marines. Or: "Others felt it was just more 'Yankee bullying.'" (*Ibid*., p. 615.) We are told that we decided to "Take up the White Man's burden" (Kipling is quoted)...and that the "first" result of the Spanish-American War was that "it made the United States an empire." (Gavian and Hamm, p. 465.) We are told that there was a "trend toward American imperialism." (Wirth p. 382.) We are told (*ibid.,* p. 399) of "the creation of a colonial empire with alien [*sic*] people living under the Stars and Stripes." Even when the word "imperialism" is avoided, the suggestion of its presence is clear. Thus Harlow:

> *The leading Republican members* of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate *were determined to have the Philippines.* (P. 529.)

Kipling is here referred to once more, and "the White Man's burden." We are told:

> When the fighting was over, the War Department of the United States became a colonial office. (P. 530.)

It is all tied up, by Muzzey, with "nationalism" and "big business," the

favorite devils of these texts:

> Against the "*jingoes*" who were boastful of the spread of the American flag and marines to any part of the world, *against the great industrialists and bankers* who wanted new markets for the disposal of surplus goods and the investment of surplus funds, against even the moralists [sic] like McKinley, who argued that it was *our duty to* "*take up the white man's burden*" *and do our part in civilizing the* "*backward*" *people of the earth*, the anti-imperialists insisted that all our institutions were designed for the free citizens of a republic and not for the rulers of an empire. (Pp. 408-409.)

And Muzzey entitles this chapter, with evident relish for empire, "DOMINION OVER PALM AND PINE."

Todd and Curti (p. 589) say: "*The United States Becomes Interested in Empire.*" And they continue:

> The reasons for the growing interest of more and more Americans *in the worldwide scramble for empire differed only in degree from those prevailing elsewhere.* (*Loc. cit.*)

On the next page: "THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR STARTS THE UNITED STATES DOWN THE ROAD TO IMPERIALISM."

In another text (Bragdon and McCutchen, p. 444) we read of "mounting imperialist sentiment in the United States" as a reason for making Hawaii a territory. The authors add:

> Business interests were won over by the hope of new markets for American goods and new fields for investment. Public opinion at large was excited by the prospect of acquiring an empire over which the sun never set. Kipling, the most popular author of the day, had made imperialism seem both glamorous and virtuous. (*Loc. cit.*)

Canfield and Wilder tell us (p. 616): "THE UNITED STATES ADOPTS A POLICY OF IMPERIALISM." The charge is never qualified or criticized. Mowrer and Cummings make "Imperialism, U.S.," a major item in their index. They interpret Theodore Roosevelt's philosophy (p. 326): "The easiest, most natural way was that of expansionism, *the conquest and appropriation of other territories.*"

A peculiarly illuminating statement occurs in Dumond, Dale, and Wesley, in a section entitled "SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES":

> 6. Draw a cartoon *showing big; imperialistic United States bullying small Latin American countries*, or one portraying the United States as a big brother *aiding* its *weak little brothers*. (P. 653.)

Every one of these texts makes the flat, unqualified charge of United States *imperialism*. They do not even suggest that the charge is substantially erroneous and often is made by Communists and others hostile to the United States.

Some of the texts, too, judge and applaud modern American *literature* in relation to its presentation of what is *wrong* with America father than what is *right* with America. Characteristic is this, from Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill:

> ...In the early 1900's a new group of writers startled America. These were the *realists* [italics in original] who wrote about life as they saw it. You have read elsewhere in this book of muckrakers, authors who laid bare the terrible conditions in some of our cities and industries. More recently, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, Sherwood Anderson, John Dos Passos, and Eugene O'Neill have written novels and plays about American life. The *realistic* [italics in original] poets such as Edgar Lee Masters and Carl Sandburg have followed the same pattern, *writing of life as it is*. (P. 550.)

It is odd that Thornton Wilder, Kenneth Roberts, Taylor Caldwell, and Robert Frost (our one indubitably great poet)—all omitted entirely—do not write "of life as it is." Even Thomas Wolfe and Ernest Hemingway, it seems, do not write "of life as it is." Carl Sandburg, who at his best is not a "realist" at all, is tossed into a bag with Masters. Apparently one must be a "muckraker" or a "debunker," laying bare "terrible conditions," before one can write "of life as it is."

Standards of literary criticism in terms of social utility prevail in most of these texts. Wilder and Wolfe are never even mentioned; Roberts, only casually, in one. Frost is passingly mentioned in only four. Upton Sinclair and Lincoln Steffens, who don't move in the same literary league with Wolfe and Wilder, are ballyhooed over a number of pages in most of the texts. Edgar Lee Masters, almost forgotten now, and at best a quaint exhibit in a literary museum among the stuffed animals, does not belong in the same class with Robert Frost. One might as well exhibit Nathaniel Parker Willis as a more important poet than Walt Whitman or Edgar Allan Poe. The source of the mischief is that, incompetent to stand on grounds of esthetic criticism, the authors judge in terms of social criticism of "terrible conditions." But what a view of life they must have, if they suppose that the totality of life is anything like the vision of Theodore Dreiser, dedicated to sex, money, and the

mechanistic nature of the human soul; or the vision of the confused and adolescent Sherwood Anderson; or of the bleak and narrow Eugene O'Neill!

Symptomatic of the bad taste and deplorable standards of these authors is, for example, their estimate of Robert Frost. Only four texts, as we have seen, deign to mention him. They either do so without appraisal, or they so devaluate him that it would have been better to ignore him entirely. Robert Frost is nowhere recognized as the great modern poet of the American spirit: in Harlow (p. 618) he is said to be in some respects the "spiritual successor to Whittier," which is as far from the mark as an arrow can get. Canfield and Wilder say (p. 604), "Robert Frost has portrayed the New England scene." And that is all. Yet the same authors have plenty to say about the *debunkers*. On page 603 they write:

> The writers just after World War I would more properly be called "debunkers" than "muckrakers." *Like the era in which they lived, they were disillusioned and cynical. They took delight in exploring the hypocrisy and the folly they saw around them and in ridiculing many of the accepted attitudes and ideals.*

It is a curious thing that the authors should so frequently applaud "the common man" in the abstract but so continually degrade "the common man" in the particular. If the folkways are full of "hypocrisy" and "folly," why waste so much praise on "the common man," who is *closest* to the folkways? These writers praise ideological man, but can't countenance the real man of flesh and bone. That is why, beneath their pretenses of "democracy," they want to plan for and manage us all (including "the common man") through the remote control of big government.

They pass on to the poets:

> In his *Spoon River Anthology*, a best seller in 1915, Edgar Lee Masters attacked *the drabness and pettiness of the lives of people we meet every day.* (P. 604.)

Now, surely, the "people we meet every day" are "the common people": if their lives are things of "drabness and pettiness," why are they, in *political* affairs, the criterion and the ideal, as against, for example, the "aristocrats" of the Constitutional Convention? For all their easy patter about "democracy," *the authors do not like people*. They go into detail about Masters; they do not even characterize Frost correctly. But *Frost* is the poet who loves people, and who writes about them as they are—in terms not of drabness and pettiness,"

but of humor and tragedy, of their fears and their dramas, of their lives and their picturesque, racy worth. Frost's work, too, like *North of Boston* and the later books, were among the "best sellers"—and Frost, too, has won Pulitzer prizes. Why, then, is the fact of being a "best seller" and of winning a Pulitzer prize mentioned of the minor Masters but not of the major Frost? Canfield and Wilder, it would seem, prefer Masters' dull, tiresome photography of the drab and the petty, his dislike of people; they appear not to like Frost's clear-sighted love of people, his tenderness and wisdom, his tragic height: Frost's true portrayal of people, they dismiss as a portrayal of "The New England scene." It is like saying of Tolstoi that he portrayed the Russian steppes! And, unfairly to Masters, they do not notice that even he observed more than "drabness and pettiness."

Todd and Curti, in picturing American literature of the period, skilfully confine their examples to the literature of nihilism. They say:

> Much of the literature in the 1920's and 1930's dealt with ever-popular themes such as love, personal conflicts, and adventure. Many writers, however, expressed the conflicts and the confusions of the machine age. Among them was Robinson Jeffers, whose poetry portrayed the relentless force of a science that was driving men before it like a flock of helpless sheep. In *The Waste Land,* T. S. Eliot pictured society in the machine age as grim, barren, standardized, commercialized, cheap, and vulgar. Edwin A. Robinson revealed the emptiness and futility of a society which found its deepest satisfactions in a materialistic world of money and mechanical gadgets....(P. 672.)

They go on to mention F. Scott Fitzgerald, Theodore Dreiser, the earlier work of John Dos Passos, and John Steinbeck (but they cite by name only *The Grapes of Wrath*). There is, one may fairly say, a selectivity here that is partisan. All these writers tend to accentuate the negative. But there were equal, or greater writers, finely critical of things that were wrong, who did *not* accentuate the negative because they affirmed the positive. In the "1920's and 1930's" we had the poems of Vachel Lindsay, which criticized undoubted evils but which affirmed life and America. We had also the splendid *John Brown's Body* of Stephen Vincent Benét, Thornton Wilder's *The Bridge of San Luis Rey*, the novels of Willa Gather, Robert Nathan's *Portrait of Jennie*, and the poems of Robert Frost. Even in the writers they choose, they sometimes ignore the positive: thus, T. S. Eliot not only realized the Waste Land of modern life, he moved onward into affirmative areas of religion. And E. A. Robinson, in many poems and notably in "The Man Against the Sky,"

repudiated mechanistic materialism and affirmed (even in the "1920's and 1930's") a new mysticism. Why should the authors lead students to notice only the writers who are negative, or only the negative in the authors they do cite?

Todd and Curti continue:

> In *Main Street, Babbitt*, and other stories, Sinclair Lewis portrayed *the hypocrisy and the shallowness* of men who worshipped the dollar and *the material comforts with which the machine provided them*. The short stories of Sherwood Anderson poignantly reflected the loss of *the old craft skills*....Dreiser, in *An American Tragedy*, pictured youth caught in *the mad drive for power and width, and condemned a society whose ideals and morals were materialistic and grasping.* (Loc. cit.)

Every citation here, as in the other texts we have quoted, emphasizes "the hypocrisy and the shallowness," the "materialistic and grasping" tendencies. But might they not suggest that what we *need*, rather, is a *creation of values* which will change all that? This, they never even hint at. Also, they are confused in their own thinking, bewildered about their own values. Through the greater part of their book, they accept as their political criterion the availability by more and more people ("the masses") of more and more *material things*. Is it "hypocrisy" and "shallowness" for men to worship "the dollar and the material comforts with which the machine [provides] them"? Why, then, is it an aim of idealism to provide "the common man" with more and more "dollars" and more and more "material comforts"? Also, again and again, they praise factories, cities, factory workers; nowhere do they deplore the loss of the old colonial hand skills and "craft skills"—why, then, do they do so here? Are they *against* the machine and the machine age? How, then, do they expect their beloved "masses" to have ever more "material comforts" and a higher standard of living? They never think things through. They want all that industrialism *offers*, but, illogically, they *use* the vulgarization that industrialism brings as a convenient stick with which to beat free enterprise. Let them get their own values straight before they try to destroy the values of free enterprise!

One thing is perfectly clear: they accept any author as pertinent—whether, like Jeffers, he is non-political and anti-human or, like Eliot, he is moving on toward a religious conception of life that these authors nowhere uphold—if they can use him as a lever to downgrade America.

Harlow is particularly obvious in his use of literature to criticize the American scene. He selects for comment the debunking and negative authors (with the single exception of Willa Cather, whom he cites in passing). He writes (p. 617):

> In *Spoon River Anthology* Edgar Lee Masters described life as he thought he saw it in a small midwestern town. According to Masters *there was no decency in the people there, nothing but horror and cruelty.* (P. 617.)

In the first place, this statement is incorrect. Masters does *not* say there "was no decency" in the people of Spoon River or that there was "nothing but horror and cruelty." He makes Anne Rutledge say that out of her dust rise "the vibrations of deathless music"; she bids the Republic bloom from her bosom. Another character, the last of the pioneers, says wisely, "It takes life to love life," and scorns the wailers and complainers. There are other characters who have great decency and no "horror and cruelty." Why does Harlow stress *only the nihilistic emphases of Masters*?

He passes over Robert Frost with a mere mention and has nothing to say about the "Santa Fe Trail" or the other romantic and lovely poems of Vachel Lindsay.

Harlow, splashing his negativism luridly, writes:

> Erskine Caldwell, in *Tobacco Road, described life in the South. His characters lived on a level considerably lower, morally and intellectually, than blooded hogs.* (*Loc. cit.*)

Harlow is saying flatly that Caldwell "*described life in the South*." If he had said "some low characters on the fringe of Southern life" or "what he alleges to be the life of the South," it would be different. But Harlow says that Caldwell "*described life in the South.*" To imply that "life in the South" is "on a level considerably lower, morally and intellectually, than blooded hogs" is to falsify. Writers and critics like Donald Davidson, Allen Tate, and William Faulkner dignify "the life of the South." To accept Caldwell as the interpreter of the South and to omit all mention of the excellences of the South is to misrepresent a great part of America.

Why does Harlow make no mention of such other interpretations of America and man as Saroyan's *The Human Comedy*, Thornton Wilder's *Our Town*, Robert Nathan's *Portrait of Jennie?*

Upton Sinclair—a strong, sincere, humane writer but quite yeasty in his enthusiasms and undisciplined in his idealism—is cited in all volumes except Mowrer and Cummings and lauded in most. One may giant that much of *The Jungle* is trenchant and valid writing, and that Upton Sinclair did yeoman's service in bringing pitiless publicity upon abuses in education, journalism, and even religion. It would be well to point out, however, as a fearless critic like the late Ludwig Lewisohn did, that Sinclair was one-sided and partial and that his Socialistic colleges would be as lacking in sweetness and light as the worst of the "capitalistic" colleges ever were. He would substitute narrow socialism for narrow capitalism. Lincoln, Steffens, at best a trenchant journalist and at worst the dupe of a communism that he saluted as the way out of "big business," is said in two texts to have written one of the great modern autobiographies. In their "SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY" (p. 532) Craven and Johnson say:

> LINCOLN STEFFENS' *Autobiography*, a *must* book for any intelligent American, brilliantly written and by far the best autobiography produced in recent years...(Italics in original.)

Steffens's hostility to "big business" and his sentimental yen for a collectivist society are mistaken for literary values. Jack London, Frank Norris, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, Sherwood Anderson—writers of negativism and debunking—are discussed. Steinbeck is praised—for one book.

In none of these texts is the influence of instrumentalism, the impact of John Dewey, *adversely criticized* or called in question. John Dewey is mentioned in several texts, but always with approval or respect. Cummings and Mowrer apply his pragmatism approvingly to law: "Up to [Oliver Wendell Holmes's] time, most great jurists had considered law a series of unchanging truths inscribed on stone tablets" (p. 213). Today, these authors seem to think, all this is changed: there is no longer any absolute, there is only a shifting relativism of laws and morals. (The "stone tablets" must be the Ten Commandments.) John Dewey is praised:

> He frankly defined thoughts as *plans of action* [italics in original]. Dewey viewed life as a steady adjustment of individuals to their environments, and found democracy particularly admirable as the experimental method for testing ideas on the stage of *social issues*(P. 213. Italics in original.)

The authors seemingly agree with Dewey—in making "steady adjustment of individuals to their environments" a major criterion of conduct, and life a mere "adjustment." Religion and philosophy, on the contrary, have always posited *the adjustment of environment to the creative purposes of the individual soul* as the true nature of *life*.

The authors go on to appraise John Dewey thus: "He [Dewey] concluded that 'democracy must have a type of education giving individuals a personal interest in social relationships. *It must aim at forming habits of mind capable of creating social change, without revolutionary disorder.*'" Certainly this appraisal of pragmatism, and especially of that segment of it known as "instrumentalism," undermines the absolutes of all thought and accentuates the worst in American philosophy. It ignores or denies the genesis and genius of American thought, either in the Founding Fathers or in the transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau.

We have the duty and the right to reject the brooding upon the seamy side of American history and the accentuation of the negative. The authors whom we have been discussing have drawn a caricature of America. They imply that poverty, conflict, ugliness, and the shabby are the substance of the country's history. They distort the motivation underlying the Spanish-American War, hinting that we were "imperialists" concerned with seizing, exploiting, and colonizing other lands. They deflate our greatest literature and overpraise our acidulous journalists. The esthetic and spiritual substance of America becomes, in their hands, a grossness and a shame.

Why do they do this? Why do they choose to fall within the categories of Representative Shafer?

> America is not perfect [says Shafer]—but I believe that an educational movement and philosophy which "accentuates the negative," which minimizes, ignores, or denies the strengths, accomplishments and potentialities of our government, our economic system and our social arrangements, is subversive.

9—How to Apply the Double Standard to History: the New Deal

THE period from the Civil War to Woodrow Wilson, as we have seen, is preponderantly presented in these history texts as a spectacle of exploitation, corruption, and reaction. It is made to seem a period antidemocratic and evil; the "interests" were in the saddle and rode "the common man." It is presented as a time redeemed only by muckrakers and debunkers, by William Jennings Bryan and "Hi, Ho, Silver!", by Populists and Progressives who alone were on the side of the angels. But, of course, as Lincoln Steffens is quoted as saying, "'Big Business' was, and it still is, the current name of the devil."

But the texts favor the same appraisal of *all* periods of American history. Any period in which advocates of "social change," whose panacea is less free enterprise and more government, are not in the ascendant is a bad period. Any period in which the advocates of bigger and better government put free enterprise into a strait-jacket is a good period. As Muzzey puts it (p. 501), even wartime has its virtues when "our country [under Woodrow Wilson] was transformed suddenly from the scene of thousands of *independent competing businesses into one great workshop under government direction.* But a period is to be considered bad when Presidents Coolidge and Hoover left enterprise alone (p. 525): "The decade of the 1920's was one upon which, in spite of its material prosperity, the American people must look backward with a sense of shame."

And Muzzey is not alone. Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill say (p. 430): "The 1920's were the days of 'the rugged individual' when two-listed businessmen were permitted to go ahead without government interference." Dumond, Dale, and Wesley, speaking of "the advantages of government supervision," lament that supervision was removed and refer (p. 674) to the reaction from Woodrow Wilson's idealism as a "return to private enterprise." Canfield and Wilder sum it up in a subheading (p. 748): "A CONSERVATIVE REACTION FOLLOWS THE ERA OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM."

The credo seems to be that a belief in the American virtue of individual initiative leads to "a conservative reaction," whereas, a belief in the panacea of more and more government and less and less initiative leads to an "era of progressive reform." Naturally, the texts that hold this creed rate the parties

and men who uphold private initiative, free enterprise, and the dynamic of individual energy as "reactionary." Just as naturally, they rate as "progressive" the parties and men who uphold the coercion of the state. Individualism leads, as Craven and Johnson put it (p. 557), to "America's waste and wreckage and failure to be interested in social welfare."

A curious symptom of the prejudice against free enterprise occurs in Dumond, Dale, and Wesley. In their index (p. 828), under "Business," they gratuitously add: "*See also* Panic."

With the exception of *History of a Free People* by Bragdon and McCutchen, these volumes judge American parties and leaders by a double standard. In Muzzey (p. 393) the Republican party is "guided by men whose God was Mammon," except when it was shocked awake by a political mutation like Theodore Roosevelt. Even Theodore Roosevelt, however, seems reactionary and anti-democratic to such supercharged "liberals" as Craven and Johnson. They say of him:

> During his seven years in the White House, although Roosevelt took vigorous action along many lines, he did *nothing to change the basic organization of American life*. He was interested in eradicating bad men and bad practices from industry, finance, and the government, and nothing more. *In this he represented the will of middle-class America*. (p. 542.)

What can this mean except that Craven and Johnson *wish* to "change the basic organization of American life," that they *wish* something "more" than to eliminate the incidental evils of "industry, finance, and the government," and that they *prefer* something else to "the will of middle-class America"? What can that something "more" be but a social revolution and a *proletarian* will?

On the other hand, to most of the texts, the Democratic party is invariably the party of sweetness and light. But, lest Democrats feel too happy about this, they should remember that the party so favored is *not* the traditional Democratic party, but a vehicle and "weapon" for "the disgruntled and oppressed." The authors most generally approve of the Democratic party when it leans far left. They criticize it whenever it behaves like the traditional Democratic party; then, they say, with Craven and Johnson (p. 743), that under John W. Davis or Alfred E. Smith (!) it was "as conservative as the Republican party."

During recent times, beginning with Woodrow Wilson and resuming with the New Deal, the Democratic party has been used by advocates of the welfare state. In relation to these times, the authors employ a double standard in political morality. The "liberalized" Democratic party can do no wrong; the "conservative" Republican party can do no right. Certain men, regardless of their depth or their folly, are "good" because they are for "social reform." Other men, like Herbert Hoover, no matter how sound and humanitarian they may be, are "bad" because they represent "conservative reaction." These authors are not Communists, and they sincerely believe they are anti-Communistic; yet they use the same yardsticks of "social good" that the Communists use. Neither "social reform" nor "conservative reaction" is deeply studied or firmly defined. Both are appraised in terms of superficial utilitarian and popular considerations. Presidents Coolidge and Hoover (and even Grover Cleveland) were on the wrong side (individualism) and so are mediocre or reactionary. These presidents, believing in the American dream of individual initiative and personal freedom, are invariably wrong. On the contrary, presidents or men who aspired to be presidents, such as William Jennings Bryan, Robert M. La Follette, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and (touched by the sanctity of their "social" and "liberal" halos) even Harry Truman, were on the right side and can do no wrong. Calvin Coolidge is a "mediocrity"; but Harry Truman is *not* a mediocrity. Any political figure who believed in "social reform," in "the common man" as an idol, in "government control" was on the side of the "liberal" angels.

Let us look at a table of relative evaluations, in terms of space allotted by these texts. Turn to the indices of these volumes: look up the number of lines of reference devoted to Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, on the one hand, and to Presidents Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt on the other. If one says that perhaps this is so because Wilson and Roosevelt were more colorful and dynamic figures than Coolidge and Hoover, let us also list the number of lines devoted to a greater and more colorful President than any of them, Abraham Lincoln. (And let us remember that Abraham Lincoln was a Republican.) Here is the table:

Here is a curious lack of perspective! Abraham Lincoln, tested by time and

universally accepted as one of our two greatest presidents, rates only 107 lines in the indices of these texts. He is surpassed by Wilson, who rates on lines. He is surpassed almost 50 percent by Franklin D. Roosevelt. And the steady, patient, deeply rooted Herbert Hoover, whose stature grows with the decades, is given only 67 lines as compared with Wilson's on and Roosevelt's 151! Coolidge received 35. Yet Coolidge, at a critical period in our history, affirmed the basic integrity of the American spirit.

Woodrow Wilson is truly criticized in only one of these texts. In the others he is presented as a shining knight upon a white horse, who could no no wrong. His regime is characteristically eulogized by Muzzey (p. 494): "Thus ended a chapter of unusual glory and inspiration in our history." His folly in involving us in the European blood bath, his political rigidity and aridity, his fatuous phrase about making the world safe for democracy" go unchallenged. The American people rebuked his grandiose dream, but Canfield and Wilder report it this way (p. 676): "The United States Rejects World Leadership." And (p. 744): "The American people had spoken; the League of Nations was rejected; *war idealism was a thing of the past; and the Progressive era was over*." Wilson, as a domestic do-gooder, is praised by Craven and Johnson (p. 557) as one who criticized "America's waste and wreckage and failure to be interested in social welfare." And Wirth tells us that, after Woodrow Wilson and the New Freedom, America fell into "the return to conservatism." This return to conservatism, Muzzey says (p. 506), was "a Republican *reaction.*"

Everything that Wilson did was right; everything that his Republican heirs did was wrong. "We shall also see," says Muzzey (p. 505), "on what false and flimsy bases this seeming prosperity [i.e. the Coolidge—Hoover regime] was built, and how, when it was put to the test by the touch of sober reality, it collapsed like a house of cards." That the waste and wreckage of the war which Wilson insisted on joining had harmed the economy of the world, thus preparing for worldwide depression, we are not told. We are assured that the war was not Wilson's fault but that the depression was Hoover's fault. The period that followed Wilson's war is referred to as "The Mad Decade," and its madness is ascribed by Harlow (p. 607) not to the war but to the Republicans. We are lectured by Todd and Curti (p. 677) on "prosperity and its limitations" and warned (p. 686) that the Republican administrations "*did little to interfere with what seemed to be* a smoothly running economic system." The business

of government, it seems, is to "interfere."

A characteristic eulogy of Woodrow Wilson's policy of interference is Muzzey's:

> As if with prophetic vision of that tremendous extension of the authority of the Federal government into every sphere of business which we witnessed under the "New Deal," he [Wilson] wrote in 1912, "We are just upon the threshold of a time when the systematic life of this country will be sustained or at least supplemented at every point by governmental activity." (P. 455.)

Woodrow Wilson is acclaimed for the wrong thing—not for the new freedom but for the new slavery: he is made the prophet of statism.

Adulation of Woodrow Wilson as a "progressive" and an advocate of "social reform" is followed by an attack upon all the Republican administrations that followed. No lapse into tinsel and ballyhoo, no loosening of standards nor evidence of scandal in the 1920s is explained as even partially an effect of Wilson's war but rather as a consequence of the policies of Coolidge and Hoover. But Coolidge and Hoover *inherited* the laxity and disillusionment, the materialism and cynicism so alien to their natures which were a natural aftermath of war. The "Mad Decade" of the 1920s is not considered in these texts as the fruit of the dragon's teeth that Wilson sowed; it is pointed out as the work of the conservatives, who had to cope with the dragon harvest.

Muzzey, in his treatment of the 1920s, entitles Chapter 27, dealing with the Republican administration, "WORSHIPING THE GOLDEN CALF"—and he describes it as "Republican reaction"; he crams it with headings like "Social Demoralization" (p. 525), "Conservative Forces Still Control [*sic*] the Government" (p. 526), "The Plight of the Farmer" (p. 529). And he quotes Stuart Chase approvingly:

> ...Hoover was to be our first business executive, fitly corresponding to the age in which, in the words of Stuart Chase, "the business man had become the dictator of our destinies and the final authority on the conduct of American society." (P. 542.)

These texts, naturally, butcher President Harding to make a progressive holiday. Certainly no American can ever be proud of him. But they do not make it clear enough that he himself was not corrupt but only weak and that the same party which had nominated him cleansed the corruption that he left.

But, to Muzzey, it was a *Republican* orgy of "Wickedness in High Places." He does not say that it was the Republicans who restored integrity.

Muzzey, indeed, is illustrative of the double standard so pervasive in these texts. He accuses President Harding (p. 506) of "attachment to personal friends like the crooked politicians of the 'Ohio gang.'" But he never mentions the even greater attachment of President Truman to "personal friends" like Pendergast and the Missouri gang. What is sauce for President Harding is not even a sprinkling of pepper for President Truman.

Muzzey, indeed, goes all out to present President Harding as an example of Republican wickedness and reaction. He says:

> Harding's triumphant election in November foreshadowed a return to the "good old days" of McKinley and Hanna, when the big-business interests of the country were unhampered by government interference, labor was kept in its place, *and prosperity was measured by the abundance of crumbs which dropped from the rich men's tables.* (p. 506.)

Muzzey does not explain—he does not even mention—one strange fact. In 1920, Harding won 64 per cent of the total vote cast, and his successor, Calvin Coolidge, in 1924, got 65 per cent. On the other hand, Muzzey's hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1932, won only 59 per cent and in 1936, at the height of his popularity, only 62 per cent. Apparently the American people, *including labor*, placed a different appraisal on the Republican administrations from that of Muzzey.

Muzzey sneers (p. 506) at Harding as "a small-town man" who enjoyed a game of poker "among 'the boys.'" He says (p. 520) that it was long before "a President of the United States could bring himself to go to Marion to dedicate the memorial" to Harding. "The Harding administration," he says (p. 521), "marked what William Allen White called 'the zero hour of our courage and faith.'"

It is in relation to President Coolidge, however, that these texts are at their unfair worst. Most of them exploit to the fullest the scandals of Teapot Dome. Almost none of them, and none of them fully and fairly, makes it clear that President Coolidge faced the scandals squarely, opened all government files to the prosecution, and bade the guilty be hunted out no matter what their party. *And not one of these texts hints at the scandals that occurred during the administration of President Truman.*

Craven and Johnson distort the honest, quiet, solid Coolidge into a gargoyle (see pp. 697-699). They speak of "Coolidge's Vermont," where "the old America lingered on, unspoiled by the devastation of industrial America. Vermont remained *a social game preserve of the old rural order while the rest of America was embarking on new ways*."

A curious double standard! Vermont is sneered at because it does not embark on new ways—the ways of "industrial America," which also is sneered at, because it wrought "devastation"! Coolidge, the authors tell us, "imbibed from his environment *the Puritan belief in a morally guided universe*" In Moscow, of course, people are more sophisticated. "A shrewd and calculating politician," Coolidge soon rose to power; but he was "blind" to the "unequal distribution of wealth and the exploitive features of twentieth-century America." He was a "respectable mediocrity." He "had on idealism, no desire to make the world a better place, and no fighting devotion to a cause except that *of encouraging the benevolent feudalism of money.*"

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley follow the same pattern:

> Coolidge said very little, thus winning a reputation for great wisdom....*He was not a reformer.* He had none of the vibrant energy of Theodore Roosevelt, none of the passionate idealism of Woodrow Wilson, not even the friendliness and generosity of Harding. He was a discreet politician, but a rather uninspiring and unimaginative leader. (P. 726.)

The crux of the criticism, of course, is that Coolidge "was not a reformer." The folly of speculation among the American people is attributed to Coolidge —the most unspeculative of men! The authors tell us:

> The boom was preparing the way for panic and depression. Coolidge had retired from office before the crash came, bringing the wrath of the people upon his successor, Herbert Hoover. (P. 727.)

Woodrow Wilson's entanglement of America in the European war and the consequent destruction and disillusionment are never referred to in this connection—Coolidge and Hoover caused the depression and brought down "the wrath of the people." "The wrath of the people" is an exaggeration—President Hoover still got 41 per cent of the vote.

Muzzey says (p. 523), "'The business of America is business,' he [Coolidge] said in address of December, 1923; *and by 'business' he meant big business*."

One marvels at the esoteric insight of Muzzey, who professes to sense Coolidge's real meaning. Muzzey continues to damn Coolidge:

> The new President *was a conservative*, quietly resisting the "socialistic" [note the quotation marks!] tendencies of groups in Congress such as the "farm bloc" or the "soak the rich" advocates, *and rejoicing in the renewed prosperity of the middle 1920's which brought large surpluses into the Treasury and a consequent steady reduction of the public debt and taxes.* (P. 523.)

It is wrong, of course, for Coolidge to have been a "conservative" and wicked, of course, in any American president to "rejoice" In "renewed prosperity" or any steady reduction of the "public debt and taxes." No wonder that Muzzey goes on to refer to President Hoovers administration as largely characterized by "Crime on a Large Scale" (heading, p. 544) and by the fact that in it "The Great Depression Begins" (heading, p. 545). And he speaks gloatingly of "The *dawn* of the New Deal."

A picturesque example of the double standard of evaluation occurs in Gavian and Hamm. They characterize the Republican years of the 1920s thus:

> The years 1922 to 1929 brought the greatest *business prosperity* the nation had ever known. *Although farmers were going through hard times and there were never less than two million unemployed wage earners, the earnings of businessmen and stockholders and many industrial workers were rising. This created a spirit of rosy optimism.* (P. 534.)

Notice that it is "*business prosperity*," not "*prosperity*" The fact of two million unemployed—a figure which, when all factors are considered, is a constant in the best of times—is insinuated in a peculiarly odd way. "The earnings of businessmen and stockholders and *many* industrial workers" are brought in as if this were almost the sum of the prosperity. And, we are told, this "created a spirit of rosy optimism."

Contrast this with the same authors' account of the *Roosevelt* depression of 1939:

> The New Deal did not solve the problem of unemployment. Between 1930 and 1941 the number of persons able and willing to work but unable to find jobs was never less than seven million. By 1940 business had fully recovered; industrial output was greater than in 1929; yet unemployment was still a major problem. At the beginning of 1941, despite huge orders for war and defense materials, there were still seven or eight million workers who could not find jobs. (P. 553.)

What a difference in tone! The figures *have* to be admitted, yet, actually,

they are minimized. Our authors tell us that the number of unemployed was "never less than seven million." In this way they escape having to say that in 1939 *the unemployed numbered 13,000,000*—almost or quite as many as during the "Hoover depression." Neatly, too, they slide out of the slump by the third sentence—and here the hope that "business had fully recovered" is not slurred off as "a spirit of rosy optimism." Prosperity under Coolidge and Hoover was "*business* prosperity"; a depression under the "liberal" Franklin D. Roosevelt was a popular prosperity slightly affected with the botts. Why the double standard?

Gavian, and Hamm feature and italicize the depression in the Hoover years with pictures, cartoons, questions; they unearth the term "Hooverville." They suggest as subject for talks or written reports:

> 8....How the [bonus] marchers were treated. 9. The farmers' holiday movement in the early thirties. 10. The problem of migrant boys during the depression. 11. Life in a *Hooverville*. (Hooverville was the name given to shacks built by the jobless on a vacant lot out of discarded lumber.) (P. 541.)

They do not even hint that the "Bonus March" was Communist-inspired and that its leaders had orders to provoke police and troops into firing on men, women, and children. They do not say that President Hoover's sympathy with the jobless and General Douglas MacArthur's determination not to open fire kept many unarmed and misled people from being killed.{19} Hoover was no more responsible for the jobless than Franklin D. Roosevelt was for the 13,000,000 unemployed in 1939. The ungracious and unfair resurrection of the term "Hooverville" is as cheap and superficial as were many of the remarks that some conservatives unfortunately made about *every* W.P.A. project.

These authors present two small but excellent pictures of Coolidge and Hoover. But that is all—save a huge cartoon entitled "THE CRAZE FOR GAMBLING IN STOCKS" (p. 528) and a picture entitled "FORECLOSURE OF A CORN-BELT FARM IN 1932" (p. 538). On the other hand, Franklin B. Roosevelt, also presented in an excellent picture (p. 543), is represented in a cartoon in smiling, headlong course as he leads America into a triumphant future (p. 544); his Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, is glamorized (p. 549); his building of dams is glorified in a mighty, full-page, utopian extravaganza (facing p. 550); the Supreme Court decisions against him are

cartooned (p. 552); his work-relief projects are presented romantically (p. 555).

Most of these texts present the exploits of the New Deal, especially in pictures, in unmitigated glory. Craven and Johnson give Franklin D. Roosevelt a full-page portrait (p. 711), as they do to no other president, including Washington and Lincoln; they give all of page 717 to his favorite apostles, including Harry Hopkins and Henry A. Wallace—nine in all. On the other hand, they picture the combined administrations of Presidents Coolidge and Hoover with only *one* illustration—a cartoon (p. 698) of a bleak-faced Coolidge who "Refuses Point-blank to Vacate the White House until His Other Rubber Is Found." Todd and Curti illustrate all the years of Coolidge and Hoover with three negative pictures—one of idle freight cars (p. 690); one of bread lines (p. 691); and one of a despairing, jobless youth on a park bench (p. 692). But they show hilarious humor in a Rooseveltian broadcast (p. 693); a picture of reforestation under the New Deal (p. 699); a picture of Hoover Dam (p. 703), named for Hoover but credited to the New Deal and captioned: "...built with funds advanced by the *federal government*" (p. 703); a picture of the New Deal National Labor Relations Board in action (p. 705); and two whole pages (708 and 709) of radiant pictures entitled "Freedom from hunger," "Social security in youth," "Social security in old age," "Housing," and "Medical attention."

This disproportionate and dualistic emphasis is continuous. Harlow gives Senator Walsh all the credit for the exposure of the Teapot Dome scandal, though he never could have accomplished that needed and enviable feat if President Coolidge had not opened to him the government files and given him a green light to probe and expose. Harlow says (p. 628) that supporters of Senator Robert M. La Follette "promised to restore *control of the government* [again!] to the people." Since Coolidge was elected to the presidency by a proportionately larger popular vote than Franklin D. Roosevelt ever received, it would hardly seem necessary to give the people a gift that they themselves had bestowed. (Sixty-five per cent of the people voted for Coolidge.) Harlow says grudgingly of the Coolidge administration (p. 628) that it brought "more comfort and luxuries for industrial laborers and *increase*[*ed*] *the huge fortunes of businessmen.*" He explains Coolidge's popularity by saying (*loc. cit.*) that Republicans had long identified themselves with good times, till "the voters

came to believe this doctrine."

The administration of President Hoover is, of course, a gleeful playground for these advocates of "social reform," who identify the Republican party with depression times. Actually, the depression was not caused by "conservatism." It was caused, partly, by the cumulative wreck and ruin of World War I, which eventually had caught up with the world. (It began in Europe and continued there, both before and after the depression in the United States.) With that war, President Hoover and the Republican party had had nothing to do: it was a war fought under a Democratic president who (like President Franklin D. Roosevelt later), after being elected on a promise to keep us out of war, immediately got us into war. The depression was partly furthered by the heady exuberance of lusty people who, happy to have seen war's end, threw themselves without restraint into a wild expansion. Neither President Coolidge nor President Hoover was, by nature, one to indulge personally in, or to lead the nation into, such gaudy extravagances as the American people, in their rebound from the war, chose to fall into. Yet President Hoover was long blamed for the depression, largely because of the superior press agents of the New Deal and the personal magnetism of Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Hoover was somewhat dour and aloof; President Roosevelt was a glamorous political playboy of the western world. But President Roosevelt did not cure, by his flashy magnetism, the depression: it continued until he nudged us into war.

Meanwhile, President Hoover, wholly blamed for the depression which broke upon his last two years and which continued almost unabated through Roosevelt's pre-war administration, is never credited with the long-continuing and genuine prosperity of his first two years. The twenties remain a period which the authors of the eleven texts passionately regret in retrospect as they masochistically rejoice in the depression which ended the prosperity.

They begin smearing Herbert Hoover even before he became president. Herbert Hoover, says Wirth (p. 626), even as Coolidge's Secretary of Commerce, "was especially concerned with promoting the interests of big business." He says (p. 627) that this policy "of giving free rein to big business had been followed by Presidents Harding and Coolidge, and Hoover felt that the continuation of such a course would insure prosperity for all groups in

American society." Wirth not only charges that Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were for big business: he adds (p. 462), "During the 1920s labor was *further handicapped by the unfriendly attitude of a conservative government.*" But on the same page we are told as a subheading, "THE NEW DEAL AIDS LABOR."

Canfield and Wilder characterize (p. 752) the candidacy of the Progressive, Robert La Follette, as appealing "to the discontented farmers, to labor, and to those who *favored social and political reform*." But the best, they can find to say of President Hoover (p. 754) is that he "fully approved the capitalistic system of industry." Did Senator La Follette disbelieve in "the capitalistic system of industry"? Do the authors themselves disbelieve in it? It is, to say the least, curious to single out President Hoover, as if it made him an anomaly like the Great Auk, as one who "*fully approved the capitalistic system of industry.*" They say, with equal wonder (p. 752), that President Coolidge stood for *laissez faire*.

Muzzey, an extreme booster of Woodrow Wilson, is an extreme critic of Herbert Hoover. He says (p. 551):

> His [Hoover's] efforts to restore prosperity by bolstering up the very system of big business, banking, and finance which was largely held responsible [by whom?] was soundly defeated...and when he left the White House...*the country was at the lowest depths of faithlessness to its past, discouragement with its present, and apprehension for its future.*

And Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill say of President Hoover (P-435):

> President Hoover's plans for recovery were such that aid went out to big business and banks and was supposed to trickle through to Mr. Average Man.

They gleefully see the depression as a dynamic toward statism, saying (*loc. cit.*) as a subheading: "STUNNED BY DEPRESSION, AMERICANS CONSIDER A PLANNED WAY OF LIFE."

Craven and Johnson (p. 705) also regard President Hoover's efforts as "the seeping down' theory of prosperity, the belief that prosperity would trickle down from the rich at the top to the poor at the bottom."

This is a partisan interpretation of Hoover's philosophy. Hoover was not for the rich, nor against "Mr. Average Man"; he believed, with much validity, that the way to restore the economy was to start the fountains of industry

flowing. Then prosperity would not "trickle through to Mr. Average Man" but would flow like a broad river, by whose shores the nation as a whole might flourish and its leaf not wither. He believed, rightly, that free enterprise—*not* just "big business and banks," but industry as a whole, including little business and "Mr. Average Man"—would profit most not by direct handouts of aid but by an endeavor to help the center of our economy. The authors oversimplify his philosophy and interpret it in partisan fashion along class lines.

The authors, as so often, divide the nation in terms of economic classes and predicate an abiding class war. They also quote (p. 709) C. C. Regier, who said in his *The Era of the Muckrakers* that conditions in the America of the early 1930s were similar to those of thirty years before—"corruption in every type of government unit, from the small town or country [*sic*] up to the federal government..." buying and selling of votes, maltreatment of labor, exploitation by the power and utility companies, gangs rampant, corruption in unemployment relief and in broadcasting, bludgeoning of "the so-called radicals." "The list could be extended almost indefinitely." And they add. "And behind all this, today as thirty years ago, is business." It is a vicious indictment of President Hoover's administration; one may at least suggest that there were *some* admirable things that might have been said about that administration, and that *some* terrible things might have been said about the administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

Gavian and Hamm thus sum up the Coolidge and Hoover administrations:

> After World War I the people of the United States seemed weary of hardships and self-sacrifice. *Many wanted to give their whole attention to making money, often through speculation and sometimes through fraud. Others gave themselves to the pursuit of pleasure. Idealism was out of style.* (P. 527.)

One does not object to some of the facts or to the condemnation of such a mood in so far as it was a fact; one does object to the attribution of this to the Republican administrations that inherited it and not to the Democratic administrations that had a part in it. The authors never attribute the cause to Wilson's war; they do attribute it to Harding and Coolidge and Hoover. Also they ignore completely the abiding "idealism" that sent Charles Lindbergh on his epic flight or that protested the execution of two simple anarchists, Sacco and Vanzetti, by stupid people in Boston, Massachusetts. It was a bad period,

they tell us, simply because (p. 531) "For twelve years...*the government was in the hands of conservative, or 'Old Guard,' Republicans*." This is not history: it is prejudice.

A corresponding prejudice is, characteristically, revealed by Muzzey. His subheading (p. 548) is "THE DAWN OF THE NEW DEAL." The "Republican reaction" was, to him, the night; the coming of the New Deal was "the dawn." He ignores the fact that this was to bring the blood-red noon of World War II, a pyramiding debt upon the shoulders of the unborn, the relegation of the American people to the status of tax slaves, an inflation that cuts the value of the dollar to thirty-five cents and an era of massive Communist and pro-Communist penetration of American government. To Muzzey, it is just "the dawn."

The style is the man—the style is the *doctrine*. Where the heart is, there the style will glow. Even when the authors—all but Bragdon and McCutchen—try to be fair, their pages on "conservatives" are dull, their pages on "liberals" are exciting. Their pages grow incandescent over the New Deal.

Craven and Johnson, with Chapter XXXIII ("The Resurgence of Progressivism"), abandon all pretense of scholarship and write straight propaganda in praise of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Fulsome praise is heaped on Roosevelt, while none of his numerous faults, failures, and errors of judgment are mentioned. The textbook admits that because of the necessity for haste there were a few mistakes and leaves the impression with the reader that these mistakes were minor and the achievements were major. The authors devote eleven pages to describing the early life, character, and thinking of Roosevelt—*which is twice the space they devote to either Washington or Lincoln*. The authors build a *Roosevelt myth*, picturing him as the greatest of American heroes. A full page (711) is devoted to Roosevelt's portrait. Washington and Jefferson rate only a quarter page each (p. 157). Six other cartoons and pictures refer to and glorify Roosevelt's prowess and pomp. Such adulation is evidently uncritical partisanship. The result is a distorted perspective of American history.

This same adulation, in varying degrees, disfigures nine of the texts.

The following comparison of the proportionate emphasis of the texts by number of pages, in relation to the American Revolution and to the New Deal,

includes the pages that *specifically* treat the New Deal and omits the many pages that discuss Franklin D. Roosevelt and World War II:

Even this is not the true proportion, since, as we said, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal are *also eulogized* in many pages that deal With World War II. But, even with every advantage granted to these authors, their proportioning is fantastic. They give over 50 per cent more space to the New Deal than they do to the American Revolution! Yet, how much more important, how much more interesting and exciting and creative, and how much more fully evaluated by the judgment of time the American Revolution is! These texts give to the dynamics, the dramatic struggle, and the birth of our Constitutional Republic only 203 pages. They give to the New Deal, which at best, is too near to be critically evaluated, 307 pages.

Todd and Curti say that after Washington's death, American "patriots" created "a myth of his godlike qualities." What of the "myth" created by these uncritical partisans of F.D.R.?

The New Deal is praised by Craven and Johnson because it was *anti-capitalistic*. They say (p. 718) that it was opposed by the press of the nation because that press is interested "*in protecting the* status quo *of exploitation*," whereas, the New Deal "*was aware of the fundamental defects in the capitalistic system*." "Fundamental defects," logically, means basic or essential defects: the authors, then, are charging not that capitalism, like all human systems, needs amelioration—but that it is, in heart and root, a fundamentally bad system. What do they prefer—socialism? The welfare state?

By the strange reversal of meaning into its opposite that George Orwell lampooned in the collectivism triumphant of 1984, they even charge the Republicans with causing the class war!

The New' Deal's planning showed definite partiality for the average American. Every man must be protected in his "right to make a comfortable living" and be sure of "the safety of his savings." "The reward for a day's work will have to be greater on the average than it has been," Roosevelt observed, "and the reward to capital, especially the capital which is speculative, will have to be less." For such statements the New Deal was charged with stirring class consciousness. Actually, the Republican policies of the twenties, ending in the

depression, had stirred class consciousness to a high degree. (P. 718.)

Now, the American idea is that there are *no* "average Americans," only *Americans*. No system can protect a man's "right to make a comfortable living": droughts, hurricanes, bad world markets, a Soviet blitz with the atomic bomb—these may destroy any man's opportunity of making "a comfortable living." Men have no "right" to a "comfortable living," only opportunities for making it, and the right not to be arbitrarily hindered in the process. A government can help to protect the country and to equalize loss, but no government—including Socialist governments—can guarantee a man's making "a comfortable living." The labor government in England certainly did not enhance even the workers' *chance* of making "a comfortable living." The free-enterprise system, in itself, especially when the government has left it alone, has constantly been increasing "the reward for a day's work." And, as the labor government in England found, it is impossible to keep increasing "the reward for a day's work" except as that day's work *produces more and more goods and services which make more and more profit*. Unless there is "profit" which encourages investment capital—which Roosevelt confused always with "the capital which is speculative"—there will be less expansion, fewer factories and businesses, fewer jobs, and less and less "reward for a day's work." As to class consciousness, the very phrase "*definite partiality for the average American*" and the very insinuation that "capital" is inhuman and hostile to "the average American" are a stirring of "class consciousness." The charge that the Republicans "stirred class consciousness to a high degree" is false: if people lost money because of unhappy industrial conditions, they did not cease to regard themselves as all equally Americans. All "classes" (if we admit the use of the word)—the rich even as the poor—suffered equally. More suicides occurred among the rich than among the migrant Okies. It was a human debacle, not a "class" exploitation.

Craven and Johnson call the New Deal "The Resurgence of Progressivism" (Chapter XXXIII); Dumond, Dale, and Wesley entitle it "Building a Government" and "Rising among Nations." Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill show a partiality for government control by saying of the New Deal: "The Federal Government Acts to Promote the General Welfare." Gavian and Hamm give sixteen pages to the domestic aspects of the New Deal alone, not to speak of its eulogies of the New Deal's international programs—as against

eleven pages allowed for the *whole decade of the 1920s*. Wirth gives the New Deal three full chapters: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal," "The Reform Measures of the New Deal," "Political Activities of the New Deal Era," exactly the same number that he allots to the whole Civil War! Harlow eulogistically says, "Franklin D. Roosevelt brought the New Deal," and Muzzey glorifies it with a subheading, "On Top of the Wave." Todd and Curti label it "The Great Experiment." Canfield and Wilder say, "Franklin D. Roosevelt Introduces a New Deal" (ending what they call, not eulogistically, "A Conservative Reaction").

Uncritical eulogy becomes pathological in regard to Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court. Here, as in these texts' almost universal defense of Andrew Jackson's spoils system, there is only special pleading. We are told by Craven and Johnson:

> Senator Hugo Black of Alabama was elevated to Van Devanter's position. Black had made a brilliant record...*and he had been an ardent supporter of New Deal laws*. After he had taken the oath of office, it was revealed that he *once had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. His liberal court record since his appointment, however, seemed to justify the President's faith in him*. (P. 750.)

This is, of course, special pleading. Read the same authors' blasting of the Ku Klux Klan—as long as it was equated with "nativism" and "100 per cent Americanism"—on pages 662 and 663. They can find nothing evil enough to say about it. But here, *because* he "had been an ardent supporter of New Deal laws." All this is forgotten. The Ku Klux Klan (they said before) "tended to be the refuge of the mediocre man"; but since Black had been a faithful yes-man of the New Deal, "the President's faith in him" was justified. A double standard with a vengeance!

Almost all these texts favor Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court. Dumond, Dale, and Wesley tell us:

> This interpretation [by which the NRA and AAA were declared unconstitutional] by the Supreme Court *hindered the New Deal program, which the people had endorsed, and the reform efforts of the President and Congress, whom the people had twice elected*. (P. 735.)

To the authors, truth and law are determined by majority vote! Equally characteristic is this, from Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill:

> Liberals were becoming annoyed [*sic!*]. *They felt that the court was not keeping up with the needs of the times...the liberals told the court that we were in the Machine Age and not the*

"*horse-and-buggy*" *age*....To the liberals, therefore, the battle became one again of the *right of property against the rights of man.* (Pp. 198-199.)

The authors endorse the functions of the Supreme Court as long as it "swung with the political weather vane" and merely registered "the changing needs of democracy" (p. 197). Their view is that the Court is to be only a stamp of approval upon "the needs of the times" and that the economic class war rather than law and truth is to be the criterion. They say naïvely that "the New Deal" became "impatient with the Supreme Court"—as if to say that the Supreme Court must bow to the importunities of the moment. Gavian and Hamm tell us:

> Four of the justices, *who were very old and very conservative* [notice the coupling of "old" and "conservative"], *nearly always found that any given reform* was contrary to the Constitution. (P. 151.)

After the death or retirement of some of the members, and Roosevelt's new appointments, say these authors.

> The Court was now more inclined to interpret the Constitution in such a way as to carry out the will of Congress. To the ordinary citizen it seemed as if the Court had a new interest in the rights and needs of the common people. (P. 553.)

Thus Gavian and Hamm, too, regard the ideal Supreme Court as a yes-man for the majority decisions of the moment rather than as a magnetic needle pointing inexorably to the north. Wirth (p. 667) carries on the same theme: "The President came to believe that the judges were thinking of governmental affairs as they existed in the 'horse-and-buggy' days." Muzzey is peculiarly confused. He says (p. 569): "Everywhere liberals [*sic*] were discussing ways and means of depriving the 'nine old men' [*sic*] of their power to invalidate laws passed by a large majority of Congress." Not content with editorial comment on history as he sees it, he offers a querulous cartoon on page 570 that pictures the Supreme Court as a trailer full of quarrelsome fellows, dragged behind the dashing automobile of President Roosevelt. The comment is: "Hasn't this trailer craze gone far enough?"

Todd and Curti revert to the theme of *age*, saying (p. 718): "He [Roosevelt] concluded that the *advanced age* of most of the justices kept them from thinking about problems in terms of modern needs." The same authors' final wisdom is: "President Roosevelt secured a Court more *responsive to the*

public will as interpreted by the President and the majority of the Congress."

Canfield and Wilder (p. 765) praise the final result of the packing of the Court: "Other decisions showed a more liberal attitude toward civil liberties and social reform." In all these curiously similar comments, Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Court is upheld; age is sneered at as "conservative" and therefore unable to think; social utility and "the public will" are made superior to law and truth. How ironic! Today "liberals" no longer criticize members of the court as too old—the Court itself has the "new look" of "liberalism."

We do not object to the rosy faith of these various authors in the New Deal. If that makes them happy and seems to them sound, let them indulge in it as long as they can. We do object, however, to *weighting the scales for the New Deal and tautening the springs against the administrations that preceded the New Deal*. We do object, especially, to the presence of the double standard, in text after text.

Not one of these texts quotes the words of a true liberal champion of genuine social welfare—and a Democrat of the Jeffersonian school—Alfred E. Smith. On January 25, 1936, Smith spoke to the American people from Washington, D.C. In the course of his address, he said:

> It is not easy for me to stand up here tonight and talk to the American people against the Democratic Administration. This is not easy. It hurts me. But I can call upon innumerable witnesses to testify to the fact that during my whole public life I put patriotism above partisanship. And when I see danger, I say danger, that is the "Stop, look and listen" to the fundamental principles upon which this government of ours was organized, it is difficult for me to refrain from speaking up.
>
> What are these dangers that I see? The first is the arraignment of class against class. It has been freely predicted that if we were ever to have civil strife again in this country, it would come from the appeal to passion and prejudices that comes from the demagogues that would incite one class of our people against the other.
>
> In my time I have met some good and bad industrialists; I have met some good and bad financiers, but I have also met some good and bad laborers, and this I know, that permanent prosperity is dependent upon both capital and labor alike.

Speaking of the Democratic Convention in Philadelphia, the preceding June, he said:

> What happens to the disciples of Jefferson and Jackson and Cleveland when that resolution is read out? Why, for us it is a washout. There is only one of two things we can do. We can either take on the mantle of hypocrisy or we can take a walk....

And, in conclusion, he said what the *true American radical* must always say:

> Now, in conclusion let me give this solemn warning. There can be only one Capital, Washington or Moscow! There can be only one atmosphere of government, the clear, pure, fresh air of free America, or the foul breath of Communistic Russia.
>
> There can be only one flag, the Stars and Stripes, or the Red Flag of the Godless Union of the Soviet.
>
> There can be only one National Anthem. The "Star Spangled Banner" or the "Internationale."
>
> There can be only one victor. If the Constitution wins, we win. But if the Constitution—stop. Stop there! The Constitution can't lose! The fact is, it has already won, but the news has not reached certain ears.

Because Al Smith saw through the New Deal and realized the collectivism to which it was leading, he is attacked and is not quoted by these texts. Craven and Johnson sneer at him (p. 743) as one who "had been" important in the Democratic party during the days "when it was as conservative as the Republican party," and link him with "wealthy industrialists like the Du Ponts," and charge that he wished to save *his* "system of private capitalism."

In the present as in the past, these texts tend to emphasize an economic class war in American history. They split the nation, which is indivisible, into rich and poor, businessmen and common men, "conservatives" and "progressives." In this connection, we should note the words of the Communist Party of America, as expressed in October 1956 in a directive to their membership as to how to vote in the forthcoming election. These are the words of the official Communist statement:

> While the Communist Party makes no endorsement of presidential candidates, its members, whether in trade unions or other civic bodies, will associate themselves with the political efforts of organizations *in the struggle against Big Business and its candidates.*{20}

This means that the Communist Party, like the texts we are considering, regards the Republican party as "the party of big business," and "democracy" not as a good crowned by the brotherhood of all men, irrespective of color, creed, or economic status, but as a war of one "class ("disgruntled and oppressed") against another "class." *These authors and these texts are not. Communistic*. Why then, do they *parallel* the Communist line?

All these texts are more deeply interested in recent and contemporary events than they are in the background, basis, and roots of American history.

Observe the number of pages they devote to the past (from the discovery of America through the American Revolution, the Civil War, and Reconstruction) and the number of pages they devote to the recent and the contemporary:{21}

Thus these texts, as a whole, give 159 *more* pages to modern American history—roughly speaking, from 1870 through 1956—than they do to the history of America from the discovery of the continent through the Civil War.

The dynamic of America—both as to its origin and its goal—is implicit and explicit in the earlier periods. Nothing in modern times equals in importance the American Revolution, the creation of the Constitution and the Republic, the great struggle that preserved the Union. But these authors give *more* space to the events, too near us yet for clear perspective, which occupy the recent and contemporary areas.

Compare the importance of three phases of American history as the texts assess them: the Civil War, World War I, and the New Deal. The following list{22} gives the number of pages devoted to these subjects:

The Civil War, the great epic of our history—from which both Walt Whitman and Stephen Vincent Benét produced outstanding poetry—is considered of less importance than our blood bath in Europe and the New Deal!

Historical truth, as Hilaire Belloc said, rests in proportion!

10—Brainwashing in Foreign Affairs

MAJOR MAYER found, as we have seen (p. 4), that the brainwashed prisoners who went over to the enemy were "even more poorly informed about the politics, economics and social problems of other countries" than about those of their own. After a study of these texts we shall see why it is so. These "historians" of the modern world in relation to America *do* leave the student "poorly informed to an extreme degree" about the facts which today mean life or death for our country.

To know Soviet Russia as it is, of course, is a life-or-death matter today. Yet, these volumes do not give the facts about Russian communism. They do not state unequivocally the *origin of the Soviet, its similarity to the total state of the Nazis, its aggressions and cynical power politics, or its uncompromising design of turning the world clock ahead to Orwell's* 1984.

All these texts seem to agree with this statement in Dumond, Dale, and Wesley:

> At the end of World War I the source of greatest danger *was thought* [*sic*] to be Russia, *where after centuries of oppression the masses had revolted and established a Communist regime which attempted to effect such reforms as nationalizing the natural resources and redistributing the land.* (P. 698.)

Now, "the masses" (an unfortunate term for a people acting in spiritual unison) revolted against a mismanaged war, overthrew the Czar, and *established a constitutional republic.* "*The masses*" *did not establish* "*a Communist regime*." Next, an armed minority group, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, first by fraud and last by force overthrew *not the Czar but the constitutional republic*. The facts are these:

> In spite of the fact that the Communists were in power and had directed and supervised the elections [i.e. *even after their seizure of power*!], they had received a minority of votes: 175 seats out of a total of 701. About eighteen million votes were cast for Kerensky's political party, or a little more than 55 percent of all votes. Together with those of other democratic parties, Kerensky's total votes were 22,690,202, against 9,562,358 received by the Communists. It was a disappointment to the Communists, for they had felt sure of controlling the election in their favor.{23}

Thus, even after they had seized power, and while they held it by goon squads and terrorism, the Bolsheviks were in a miserable minority. How then

can these authors possibly assert that "*the masses* had revolted and *established a Communist regime*"?

They are incorrect, also, in their statement of the purpose and procedure of the Communist, regime. A part of the fraud by which the Communist regime won some of its followers was the *pretense* that it intended to "effect such reforms as nationalizing the natural resources and redistributing the land." *It never did redistribute the land*, but—to the dismay and anger of the cheated peasants—*collectivized the land.*

How can students understand the nature of Soviet Russia—how can they answer the Communist brainwashers in Korea—when their own schools have indoctrinated them with such garbled inaccuracies about the origin, genesis, and essential nature of the Communist regime?

This statement in Dumond, Dale, and Wesley sets a pattern that either is followed or is never set right in the other texts. We are told by Gavian and Hamm (p. 643) of "the Bolshevik (Communist) Revolution in Russia in 1917," but no student is warned that the "Revolution" was a *reactionary armed overthrow* of the constitutional republic set up by the free, spontaneous action of the people of Russia. Now this is a crucial fact. Unless it is understood that the people of Russia overthrew the Czar and that the Communists overthrew the republic established by the people of Russia, you cannot understand the genesis and essence of communism or the history of modern Russia.

Text after text compounds the confusion. We are told by Harlow (p. 557), for example, "In 1917 *revolutionists in Russia overthrew the government of the Czar and established a communist nation*." We are told by Bragdon and McCutchen (p. 512) that "the Russians" overthrew the Czarist government in March and that "the Bolsheviks" "seized power" in November. But this is ambiguous: students are not clearly told that the *Russian revolution* established a constitutional republic but that *Communist reaction* under Lenin overthrew it. What a difference this simple fact might have made if our prisoners in Korea had known it!

Craven and Johnson tell us (p. 613), inaccurately, that "the Russian Revolution soon took Russia out of the war...."But the Russian revolution *kept Russia in the war*; *the Bolshevik reaction took Russia out of the war.*

Following the same pattern, Wirth says (p. 529), "The Soviet regime had come into power as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917." There is no explanation of how the *Bolshevik reaction overthrew the Russian revolution*. Muzzey tells us (p. 478) that a "revolution in Russia" overthrew the Czar but then adds, without explanation, that the Bolsheviks "got control of" (*how*?) the Russian Revolution. We are told by Canfield and Wilder:

> ....*a series* [*sic*] *of revolutions overthrew the Russian czar* and established a new form of government. *This new Communist government*, which was led by Nicholai Lenin..." (P. 689.)

This does not make sense. Once the Russian Czar was overthrown, he was overthrown. To say that "a series of revolutions" overthrew him is like saying that "a series of executions" liquidated Joan of Arc! Notice, too, the glib way in which "a new form of government" slides, *without explanation*, into "This new *Communist* government." Todd and Curti (p. 643) speak, with no explanation whatsoever, of "the newly established Bolshevik regime in Russia," leaving students in a pink fog. Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill completely ignore the nature of the Russian revolution and the Bolshevik reaction that overthrew it. Where, in any of these texts, can the student learn the facts of life?

Mowrer and Cummings, while often critical of communism, still do not make its genesis clear. They seem at times credulous, as when they say (p. 157): "Notable progress has been made *in many sections of the country* (Russia), particularly in those that are remote from Moscow, *as shown by the really remarkable expansion in the Arctic*." They do not add that any "expansion in the Arctic" *has been carried out by slave-labor camps*.

A double standard is used in these history texts about totalitarian regimes that are similar to communism: fascism and Nazism are criticized fiercely; communism is criticized faintly. The differences between fascism and communism are exaggerated; the similarities are never explained. The evils of fascism are shouted; the equal, similar evils of communism are whispered. Thus, Wirth says (p. 531) that "The three important totalitarian powers were Japan, Germany, and Italy." Japan was not a "totalitarian" state; *Russia was*. Yet Japan is listed, Russia is omitted. The Communist version of the genesis of Nazism is accepted without criticism in every one of these texts that touches upon it. Nazism is never seen for what it is—*national collectivism*, as

communism is *international collectivism*; the *collectivist right*, as communism is the *collectivist left*. In so far as these texts touch on the matter, they naïvely accept the cliché Communist interpretation that the Junkers, big business, and the army helped Hitler to power. Craven and Johnson say:

> Hitler and his National Socialist party had ridden into power with the backing of *German militarists, Junker landlords, and industrialists*, who supported him *as a means of checking a democratic Germany*. (P. 777.)

Actually, the Junkers despised Hitler as a plebeian upstart; the army never fully accepted him and was the one force that tried to overthrow him; and the industrialists expected to use and buy him off, as today too many of them hope to use and buy off communism. The authors catalogue the suppressions, the concentration camps, the regimentation, the Ministry of Propaganda in Hitler's Third Reich (p. 777). But why do they not catalogue with equal fervor the more ruthless policies and practices of Russian communism? Perhaps they unwittingly let the secret out of the bag:

> ...the Prussian landlords, the military caste, and the industrial magnates continued to have tremendous strength. To head off the development of a real German democracy, these groups, in 1933, were to help to deliver Germany into the hands of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. *A real social revolution was needed in Germany in 1918 and 1919 to sweep these groups out, of power*...." (P. 633.)

Since the Social Democrats *did*, in 1918 and 1919, establish a *Socialist republic*, "a real social revolution" (which the authors espouse) *can mean only one thing—a Communist revolution*.

This curious yen for blackening the Nazis and whitening the Communists is explicit or implicit in most of these volumes. Take a characteristic example from Todd and Curti:

> Fascist Italy and the rising Nazi regime in Germany realized that they, too, could safely embark upon a program of aggression. (P. 746.)

But the authors do not tell the equal truth that Communist Russia embarked "upon a program of aggression" whenever it could be done "safely." The Nazis are rightly said (p. 755) to have claimed that "democracy was hopelessly bankrupt" and that they must "lead the world along the new way." But there is no balancing statement that the Communists believe exactly the same things with equal fervor. The authors tell us (p. 756) that Nazi conquest

was partly carried on "by building up groups in other countries which could seize power and establish Nazilike states." At no time are we told that this is an equally perfect description of Communist plans and techniques.

We are told (*loc. cit.*): "Hence the Nazi regime constructed huge, modern armies, strong in mobile units and air power. It also regimented the whole German nation, which was put on a war basis." We are never told that this is equally true of the Communist regime. We are told (p. 757) that Hitler "forced the Lithuanians to hand over to him the important seaport of Memel." We are not told that Communist Russia swallowed the Baltic countries alive, as a college boy used to swallow goldfish, and forced Finland to hand over valuable territory and a naval base.

But, most serious, Todd and Curti explain—and, it seems, excuse—Soviet tyranny *by laying it all on the Czar*! They say:

> Having inherited from the czarist regime not only terrorist methods but suspicion of the outside world, the Russian government blocked virtually every effort to promote mutual understanding. (P. 807.)

The fact that the Czar tolerated Tolstoi and Andreyev and that at his worst he imprisoned only his thousands in Siberia, whereas, the Soviets tolerate *no* critical authors and imprison *their millions at slave labor* is never indicated. The sins of the Communists are really hangovers from the Czar!

Harlow writes (p. 606) of the "brown-shirted Nazi gangsters" and the "black-shirted Fascist plunderers." He too accepts (p. 606) the Communist cliché concerning Nazism—that this Socialistic mass movement was sired by "German big-business interests and the army." The Communists, on the contrary, are mildly treated (*loc. cit.*): "Meanwhile, Russia had *organized* [*sic*] the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was ruled by a handful of Communist party members led by Josef Stalin." Why is this "handful" of usurpers of the constitutional republic not called "red-shirted gangsters" or "hammer-and-sickle reactionaries"? If you call the big bad wolf names, you should call the big bad hyena names.

Canfield and Wilder say of Hitler:

> In 1933, Hitler was named to the high office of Chancellor. By illegal means [whatever one thinks of Hitler, this particular charge is false] he soon gained control of all branches of the government, overthrew the constitution of the republic, and declared himself *Der Führer*....(Pp.

691-692.)

This recital (especially in the ascription of illegal means) is truer of *Lenin's* seizure of power in Russia. But, though it is savagely applied to Hitler, it is never applied to Lenin. The authors say (p. 692) that "every phase" of German life was controlled by the Nazi state: "Every individual had to bow to the will of the state." But, why is this any worse in Germany than it is in Russia? The total state in Communist Russia is nowhere painted with such angry jabs of the brush.

These texts, also, do not hold the balance fair between the Nazis and the Communists in relation to World War II. France and England are charged by Craven and Johnson (p. 779) with "appeasing Hitler rather than [with] collaborating with Russia to check Hitler." But Soviet Russia's collaboration with Nazi Germany to unleash World War II and to loot Poland is (p. 783) softened out of infamy: "Although late in August, 1939, Russia and Germany had *signed a nonaggression pact*..." And Soviet loot of Poland is cold-creamed into this (*loc. cit.*): "In the midst of the German war on Poland, *Russia moved in from the east and established a boundary of her own.*" From this, what student would know that the cynical collaborators were simply sharing a predetermined loot?

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley write (p. 759) that Russia failed to persuade the Western democracies to consent to her establishment of bases "in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland in return for an alliance against Germany" and that "Russia, *therefore*, signed a nonaggression pact with Germany." The gentle phrase "nonaggression pact" is used to disguise the blunt truth that it was a pact of collaboration for war and plunder. Always the fact that *Russia, equally with Germany, invaded Poland* is hidden under fancy phrases.

The same presentation occurs in Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill (p. 672): "Early in 1941 Germany had signed a treaty of friendship [*sic*] with Russia. Six months later the Russians learned what German friendship meant." That Russia sought to sign, just as much as Germany sought to get her to sign, and that it was at bottom a shameful collaboration, we are not told. In Gavian and Hamm we *are* told (p. 595): "...in August, Hitler surprised the world by signing a nonaggression pact with Russia...." We are *not* told that Stalin equally surprised a too-gullible world by *seeking* to sign it and that *he* signed

it just as much as Hitler. These authors say (*loc. cit.*): "While the Nazis quickly *overran* the western half of Poland, the Russians *occupied* the eastern half." The same *fact*—but how differently worded! "*Overran...occupied...*!"

Wirth merely says (p. 534) that Russia and Germany signed a nonaggression pact. He does not even say that Soviet Russia invaded and subjugated half of Poland, as its imperial loot, though he says that Hitler did. Harlow does the same thing (p. 682); he also fails to give as one reason that Poland fell to Hitler the fact that Russia stabbed the last Polish resistance in the back. Muzzey evades the nonaggression pact entirely and does not mention Soviet Russia's division of the spoils with Hitler. Bragdon and McCutchen (p. 606) are similar in their treatment of the affair; Russia "occupied" eastern Poland as part of her "bargain" with Nazi Germany. "Occupied" and "bargain" are words far too mild for the shameful fact.

Todd and Curti (p. 757) help to make it a song of sweet accord: "Hitler suddenly announced that Germany and the Soviet Union had...entered into a nonaggression pact..." And they say in almost exactly the same words we have read before (in Gavian and Hamm), "While *Nazi storm troops quickly overran* the western part of the country [Poland], *Russian armies occupied* the eastern half..." The Germans who "overran" the western half of Poland are gratuitously called "storm troops"; the Red "storm troops" are, on the contrary, dignified as "Russian armies," and they did not overrun the country —they merely "*occupied*" it. To make the act fully palatable, they finish off the reference to the eastern half of Poland this way: "*...which they claimed as part of their own Ukraine*."

Canfield and Wilder, disregarding the fact that Nazis and Communists had long collaborated in Germany against the Social Democrats (whom the Communists called "social Fascists" and hated more than the Nazis did), say (p. 693) that the Nazis and Communists had "long been bitter enemies"; the authors see the collaboration pact as causing a sort of cosmic gasp of surprise. The way they describe the dual invasion is a masterpiece of equivocation: Hitler, they say (p. 696), "rolled" over Poland, his bombers "hurled death and destruction" from the skies; but "Russian troops *invaded* from the East."

Thus, text after text gives a slanted view, emasculating or ignoring the nonaggression pact between Germany and Russia, Russia's eager sharing of

the spoils, and the Russian invasion of Poland.

The same superficiality, due apparently to an unwillingness to delve into dangerous material and to discover shocking truths, characterizes the discussions of Soviet Russia's part in World War II. In all these texts, if the war is described at all, the Russian people are pictured as a firm, cohesive unit against Hitler. In not one text are we told that, until Hitler's stupid savagery drove them to despair of his help in escaping Communist tyranny, whole immense districts (like the Ukraine), whole Russian armies, and their most brilliant General (Vlasov) went over en masse to the German side—in the hope of destroying the Communist oppression of the Russian people.

The Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives of the United States, on September 23, 1956, published and released a bulletin entitled: "SOVIET TOTAL WAR, Historic Mission of Violence and Deceit, Volume I." One article in this symposium of experts is "Age of Unease" by Major Reginald Hargreaves, M.C., who says (p. 240):

> Even war failed to unify and consolidate national sentiment [Russian] solidly in favor of the regime [Communist]. If Hitler had not so dementedly mishandled the situation in the Ukraine, by turning loose Kock and Sauckel and their S.S. thugs to "discipline" a population which had hailed the Germans as their liberators, he would have found these turbulent, freedom-loving people remarkably benevolent neutrals, if not—as is far more likely—eager and active allies. For it is not to be forgotten that during this selfsame period disgruntled Red Army officers and men voluntarily surrendered to the Reich forces by the thousands.

A footnote on the same page says:

> There is a mass of evidence to show that, at the outset, volunteer units of Russian deserters, up to a total of 200,000, were formed for guard duties on the German lines of communication. They were under the overall charge of General Koestring, former military attaché in Moscow.

The same page contains also this passage:

> At the time of the German advance on Stalingrad there were insurrections among the Kalmucks, Tchetnics, Tartars of the Nogai Steppes, and many of the Kuban Cossack clans. The Cossacks deliberately slaughtered their political Commissars and put up a tremendous fight before they were overwhelmed, disarmed, and marched off to the Bykovsky-Peresov detention camp....The Kalmucks were in successful rebellion from August to November 1942....

Not one of these texts even hints at the disaffection, disunity, and even armed revolt which seethed under the Soviet surface during the war. On the

contrary, they either are ignorant of or they deliberately stifle the facts. We are told by Canfield and Wilder (p. 697), for example: "The Russians stubbornly resisted...the Russian armies kept up the struggle doggedly....*Morale remained high and the fifth-column activities were insignificant.*"

In none of these texts is the knowledge imparted that, as a retired army officer said, "Hopkins ran the whole damn war"; and that, in lend-lease to Russia, Harry Hopkins "placed Russia's needs above all others, even our own."{24} The subtle play of favoritism to Soviet Russia and naïveté concerning communism is never exposed. The authors never show, for example, Roosevelt's incredible naïveté, as when he said to Martin Dies: "Several of the best friends I've got are Communists. You're all wrong about this thing....I'm not defending the Communists as such, but I'm telling you it represents a tremendous advance over what existed in Russia."{25}

From none of these texts will a student learn that fascism and communism are twin extremes of the same thing. He will not know that fascism (*founded by a former Communist*{26}) and Nazism are t*he collectivist right and communism* the *collectivist left:* that *both are mass movements of socialism*, one being *nationalist socialism,* the other *internationalist socialism*. No student will learn, from these texts, that Nazism and communism, by their very natures, meet and collaborate against individualism and free enterprise. No student, from these texts, will learn that the evil of Nazis and Communists is the same: both worship the state; both seek to destroy the individual; both believe that truth is the most convenient lie.

As a further expression of the authors' favoritism of international socialism, some even ascribe the blame for the cold war and the threat of a hot war equally to the Soviets and the United States. Thus, Muzzey writes:

> ....the United States and the Soviet Union...stood facing each other *in an attitude of mutual suspicion* which threatened to supplant the noble ideal of One World of United Nations by a world divided into two hostile blocs of nations.... (P. 589.)

What can this mean but that *both* the United States and the Soviet Union have *equal grounds* for "mutual suspicion" and that their conflict is something for which *both are equally to blame*? And Muzzey, to make his attitude even clearer, writes (p. 624): "So the rivalry between the Soviet government and the democracies" threatened to keep Germany divided. "*Rivalry*"! Thus, too,

Todd and Curti say:

> The world's two most powerful nations began to hurl bitter charges and counter-charges against each other, and the tension between the two great powers increased alarmingly. (P. 808.)

And the authors lay the tension to American suspicion, abetted by the American press:

> A growing number of Americans began to ask: What are the Russians plotting that they need be so secretive? Why do they find it necessary to hide their activities behind an "iron curtain"? *As these suspicions grew, the American press and Americans in general became increasingly hostile.* (*Loc. cit.*)

As an interpretation of the nature of communism and of the cause of tension between collectivist totality and free enterprise in a constitutional republic, this is incredible.

Even the best of these texts, *History of a Free People by* Bragdon and McCutchen, makes a superficial estimate of the relative dangers of Nazism and communism:

> Worry as to whether Communist Russia might some day prove a more dangerous foe than Nazi Germany was silenced by Churchill the day Hiller invaded Russia. "Any man or state," Churchill told the House of Commons, "that fights on against Nazidom will have our aid...." (P. 627.)

This is a curious statement, for Churchill's words in no way eliminate "worry" as to whether or not Communist Russia was a more dangerous foe. Churchill merely meant that, under mortal peril, we may and must choose to fight side by side with an enslaved people and their evil system when, for the moment, they have the same interest as we do. To suggest that this eliminates the final "worry" about the danger of communism is misleading and may be fatal.

Almost all the texts are equally unreliable and misleading about China. Only one of them, the Bragdon and McCutchen text, tells (p. 662) the flat truth.

Craven and Johnson say:

> The people of China *had needed a Government that would attempt to solve problems of poverty and disease, and the Nationalists had failed to supply the social reforms necessary.* (P. 846.)

By innuendo, and with no explanation of just how "the Nationalists" could have done much about health or poverty while fighting a gallant and destructive war with Japan for many years, these authors seem to suggest that *communism was needed because it could and would* "*solve problems of poverty and disease*."

Dumond, Dale, and Wesley, in giving General Stilwell (who strongly disliked Chiang Kai-shek) credit for his military successes (p. 781), pay scant attention to the gallantry of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese as our faithful allies. They offer no discussion of our lack of policy in China; no explanation of Communist infiltration into the minds, or of Russian stores of weapons to crush the bodies, of the Chinese people.

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill simply omit the story entirely, substituting silence for the disturbing truth. Gavian and Hamm offer the usual version (pp. 676-677): we gave military supplies to the Nationalists, only to lose them "as one Nationalist regiment after another went over to the enemy"; General Marshall "called on Chiang Kai-shek...*to end the corruption in his government so that it might regain the confidence of the Chinese people*"*;* the State Department put out a "White Paper" which declared that all the billions we had given to China "had accomplished nothing because of the inefficiency and dishonesty of the Chiang government."

Wirth avoids the China story entirely, which is to leave students with a vacuum about the most tragic debacle in modern American policy. So does Muzzey. Todd and Curti (p. 817) use the "liberal" line that is worn too threadbare to hold: General Marshall reported that "both" Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists "were at fault for the continued strife that tore the country." The General "made it clear" that "until Chiang Kai-shek could rid himself of corrupt generals and administrators, China could hope for little in the way of improved conditions." Just why the government of China, which had been our faithful ally all through the war, was not too corrupt to fight Japan but was too corrupt to fight the Communists, is one of the enigmas of the "liberal" mind. The authors continue: Chiang was "greatly weakened" (why not, when Marshall turned against him?), and the Communists "swept" over large areas of China. The fact that they were armed with the latest weapons—many of which we had given in lend-lease to Russia!—is not told.

Harlow writes (p. 749) that neither Chiang Kai-shek nor the Communists would "accept to [*sic*] Marshall's proposals." So "civil war in China seemed to be permanent and Chinese Communist strength appeared to be growing faster." *Why* it was "growing faster" is never delved into. Canfield and Wilder write (p. 722) that "the Chinese Reds abandoned their attacks on the government and made common cause against the Japanese." It does not seem to trouble them that this is not so. They ape the usual "liberal" line: "Marshall *did not favor the Communists, but he recognized the inefficiency and corruption in Chiang Kai-shek's government.*" They have no insight into the either/or nature of the war with communism. They give no explanation of why Chiang Kai-shek, a faithful ally and a prince of men as long as he was fighting Japan, should be held an ally of inefficiency and corruption as soon as he fought the Communists. They provide no documentation whatsoever, any more than the "White Paper" of the State Department does, of the nature or extent of the "inefficiency and corruption."

Mowrer and Cummings, whose book specializes in world affairs, shed no light on this Asian debacle, our most tragic of modern defeats, leading to the further defeat of Korea. They simply bury it under silence.

About the causes of our war with Japan, and especially about the genesis of Pearl Harbor, these texts present, without exception, the official Rooseveltian explanation and are either unaware of the new revisionist historians or deliberately ignore them. Not a single text mentions those historians whose critical researches have raised disturbing questions on Pearl Harbor. Such historians as the mature Charles A. Beard, George Morgenstern, Charles C. Tansill, Admiral Robert A. Theobald, and Frederick Sanborn are not referred to.

Partisanship is at its worst in Harlow. He writes:

> The two top commanders at Pearl Harbor, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, said that warnings from Washington were not definite enough. *This excuse deserves to go down in history as the lamest thing of its kind ever recorded. Other comments concerning this disaster have been less charitable.* (P. 693.)

Harlow's statement ignores the enigma as to General Marshall's whereabouts on horseback at the time of peril; the fact that the Japanese code had been broken and the Roosevelt administration was aware of Japan's

aggressive intentions; the warnings given to high officers in Washington by those who had intercepted messages; and the lack of any *specific* warning to General Short or Admiral Kimmel, who had, as a matter of fact, been conducting air and sea patrols over vast areas of the Pacific—more conscientiously than instructions or advice from Washington called for.{27} Harlow's treatment casts gratuitous aspersions upon two gallant officers who seem to have been made the scapegoats for a planned debacle.

Harlow's treatment of Japan is so prejudiced as to make the finding of truth impossible. In relation to the Japanese signing of the Kellogg-Briand pact, for example, he says:

> Why then did Japanese leaders sign the Pact? Certainly not because they believed in it, or because they had any intention of living up to their pledge. They probably thought the Pact would lull the world into a false sense of security. If nobody expected war, the Japanese would find it easier to defeat their victims. So the world put its trust in pledges and signatures, without making the slightest effort to look into the good faith or lack of good faith of the governments which signed. (P. 596.)

But Harlow himself makes no effort to "look into the good faith or lack of good faith" of Communist Russia offering pledges: he writes:

> As one condition of recognition, the Russian authorities pledged themselves to retrain from any and all propaganda against the political and economic system in the United States. Russia gave the pledge, and diplomatic relations were resumed. (P. 677.)

So skeptical a historian as Harlow might have suspected the Russians equally with the Japanese. But he lets the Russian "pledge" go unquestioned and uncriticized, *at no time telling students that the Communists never kept it and never intended to keep it.*

Harlow makes the statement (p. 672), "From the very days of their defeat in World War I, the Germans plotted for a greater and—for them—successful war." This is not true of the German people as a whole or of the Weimar Republic as their government.

One of the most serious faults in these texts is the lack of satisfactory critiques of the Yalta Conference. The pretended aims are accepted as if they were the real aims. In Craven and Johnson (p. 824) we find this: "In February, 1945. Roosevelt met with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta to *make plans for the final blows against Germany and Japan*..." Dumond, Dale, and Wesley (p. 788): "Some agreement between Russia, Great Britain, and the United States

as to post-war treatment of Germany was made at Yalta, *though details still remain* in dispute." Gavian and Hamm (p. 670): "At the Yalta conference...Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin outlined a plan for dividing both Germany and Austria..." Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill (p. 688): "At the Yalta Conference...Russia, Great Britain, and the United States had agreed that the liberated peoples should 'create governments of their own choice'...." Wirth (p. 566): At Yalta, "Provision was made for dealing with the various liberated countries in *Europe*." Harlow (pp. 707-708): "...Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt met at Yalta in Russia...to agree upon the policy *for handling a beaten Germany*." Muzzey (pp. 599-600): "At Yalta the three heads of stale discussed such problems as *the occupation and control of Germany*, the political situation of the liberated countries, and the establishment of a permanent organization for peace." Todd and Curti (p. 798): "...Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt met at Yalta early in 1945 to discuss problems of the war..." Canfield and Wilder (p. 715): "There they [Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill] planned the combined military operations for the final phase of the *war against Germany*." Mowrer and Cummings (p. 355): "At Yalta, in the Soviet Crimea, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed among themselves on the kind of world organization they wanted."

Not a single text, with the exception of Bragdon and McCutchen's, gives us any insight into what was really done at Yalta or into the nature of the debacle it proved to be for the United States. *Not one of them*, with the same exception, mentions that the division of China (our faithful ally) was there agreed upon, *in the absence of Chiang Kai-shek* and in violation of the Cairo agreement of 1943 and the Atlantic Charter.

Compare the superficialities of the ten misleading texts with the words of Elizabeth Churchill Brown:

> Yalta has become a new word with a new meaning because it was a turning point in world history. It produced death instead of life, war instead of peace, hate instead of friendship, lies instead of truth.{28}

And:

> The story of Yalta is strange and shocking. Future historians will always wonder why President Roosevelt, speaking before a joint session of the Congress of the United States, March 1, 1945, said, "Quite naturally, this conference concerned itself only with the European war and with the political problems of Europe and not with the Pacific war."{29}

And, finally, consider these words: "*The result of Yalta remains a triumph for Communist diplomacy*."{30}

In relation to the war in the Pacific, it is to be noticed also that these texts preponderantly share the "liberal' dislike of General Douglas MacArthur. Only Bragdon and McCutchen even pretend to impartiality in Truman's firing of MacArthur. And one author, Wirth, seems to say that Admiral Halsey and General Walter Krueger won the war in the Pacific!

Is it any wonder that young people who study such texts should, as Major Mayer says, be "even more poorly informed about the politics, economics and social problems of other countries"? These books would leave any student as helpless and ignorant as the Babes in the Wood, and there will be no tender-hearted birds to cover them, in pity, with leaves.

11—Anti-anticommunism

IN EVALUATING these authors' interpretation of the "Red Scare" (as they call it) even in the 1920s, we must remember that all the texts were written from a perspective in time that should have made it possible for the authors to see the Communist menace as it is. These events had happened before any of these texts were written: The Nazi-Soviet Pact, the invasion of Finland by the Soviets, the imperialistic gobbling up of the Baltic countries and half of Poland (later, all Poland), the Soviet reduction to satellite status of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany, the Communist subversion and seizure of the Republic of China, and the Berlin airlift.{31} There had also been an exposure of the Harold Ware cell in the United States Department of Agriculture which made public the pervasive and serious infiltration of the Communist conspiracy even into the government at Washington. After such educative events—which even he who shuns should at least heed—there is no excuse for the dual standard of regarding Nazi Bunds as deadly serious but Soviet espionage and infiltration as faintly comic. From the perspective of time, historians should accept the fact of the Soviet conspiracy and should not refer to an attempt to face it as a "Red Scare" that foolishly excited (as Craven and Johnson put it, p. 661) "old ladies of both sexes."

In all these history textbooks but one,{32} every attempt of the American people to meet infiltration and subversion by the Communist conspiracy is misinterpreted, attacked, ridiculed—or ignored. Investigations into subversive activities are linked with fascism, the Ku Klux Klan, anti-Semitism, and "nativism" or "100 per cent Americanism." Craven and Johnson, for example, in a subheading (p. 661) describe our will to end subversion in the "Roaring Twenties" as "THE REVIVAL OF NATIVISM." They say:

> Part and parcel of the Red scare [*sic*] and growing out of the same psychological background was the glorification of the "100 per cent American." Outbreaks against the Jews, the Roman Catholics, and the Negroes were frequent. Not only radicals, but any group that seemed alien or "un-American" to many of the dominant white Protestants was viewed with suspicion.

Now, it is unhappily true that some erratic and volatile Americans have gone haywire at times. That is true among all great peoples. Some dimwits

and crackpots have used the phrase "100 per cent American" to cover things that the sun should not look upon. There have been outbreaks against the Jews, the Roman Catholics, and the Negroes; and these deserve unequivocal condemnation. The point is not that these authors are wrong in criticizing such violations of the true spirit of 100 per cent Americanism. The point is that they insinuate that the violations were "part and parcel of the Red scare." They confuse unpardonable attacks on minority groups with containment of Communist subversion and condemn *all defense against subversion* as "the Red scare." *This is not honest*; nor is it honest to dignify such violations by the term "patriotism"—even if the guilty ones assume the label of "patriots." It is not right, either, to hint that genuine 100 per cent Americanism is a bad thing. George Washington was 100 per cent American when he said, at a crucial hour, "Let none but Americans stand guard tonight." Nathan Hale was a 100 per cent American when he said, "I regret that I have but one life to give for my country." Dr. Joseph Warren was a 100 per cent American when, dying at the battle of Bunker Hill to which he had hurried as a volunteer in the front ranks, he quoted, "*Dulce et decorum est, pro patria mori*." Because frothy incompetents abuse the term, there is no justification for Craven and Johnson to abuse it in a different way.

It is uncalled for to confuse a deeply concerned patriotism with blind racial and religious prejudice. It is false to dismiss as a "Red scare" a justifiable concern with Communist subversion because "any group that seemed alien or 'un-American' to many of the dominant white Protestants" was sometimes called "Red" by crackpots.

But Craven and Johnson do precisely that. They say:

> *Old ladies of both sexes* discovered, during the Red scare, that they could defeat whatever they wanted to defeat by charging it with radicalism. The *hysteria* [*sic*] that was created was not unlike the hysteria *that Hitler was able to whip up in Germany against the pacifists and the liberals by the same technique of smearing them with the taint of* "*Communism.*" (P. 661.)

Several curious gems are imbedded in this mélange. The cant term "hysteria" is a cliché phrase used by contemporary "liberals" to divert the mind from thinking. The expression "old ladies of both sexes" is scarcely the chaste language of one who sees life steadily and sees it whole. The argument that Hitler pretended to hate communism, *therefore* anyone who opposes

communism is a Hitler, is a *non sequitur* that a Socrates or even a modern professor of logic would reduce to absurdity.

But the most equivocal pages of all come at the end of the book—pages written in schoolboy English and with schoolboy naïveté; the authors say, concerning Communist subversion in the late 1940s:

> The Attorney General issued a long list of organizations *charged* [*sic!*] with being under Communist influence and any member of these organizations was held [*sic*] to be at the least pro-Communist *by the act of association*....After two years of work, the Loyalty Review Board had discovered only *a few cases* of doubtful loyalty on the part of governmental employees.
>
> Charges of "Red" and "disloyal" *were levied* [*sic*] against some people without substantial evidence. (P. 855.)

This is curious. The Attorney General of the United States is given no chance to call in his witnesses or present his evidence. Should not the authors suggest that there *may* be *some* slight reason for the Attorney General to make out a list of organizations that, with the superior resources at his command and with the evidence furnished by the F.B.I., he has discovered to be dangerous to the security of the United States? It is a legal decision of the Attorney General's: should the authors not cite some evidence before they say of his decision that it only *charges* organizations with being subversive? If a man, of his own free will, has set himself down as a member of organizations that the Attorney General has found to be Communist-controlled, has he not given reasonable grounds for presumption that he was friendly to communism? Boris Morros, who served his country as an undercover agent, is clear on the point. *The New York Times* of August 26, 1957, said:

> Mr. Morros spoke positively about the existence of Americans on the Federal payroll and now spying for Russia. [He also said] several Americans employed by the United States overseas were spying for Russia.

He declared under oath before a committee of Congress that Martha Dodd Stern (daughter of the late Ambassador William E. Dodd) and her husband, Alfred K. Stern, had been Soviet agents in the United States. The Sterns at present, continues the *Times*, "have fled behind the Iron Curtain, ignoring a subpoena to testify before a New York grand jury." Are such "associations" lightly to be dismissed? Are such statements "levied" lightly and "without substantial evidence" by the staid *New York Times*? The Stern case, occurring a few years after the Craven and Johnson volume went to press, is fresh

evidence of the authors' failure to give the facts.

Consider what Victor Riesel's column of August 29, 1957, says:

> Paris.—And now I will board the luxurious Lufthansa trans-oceanic airliner and fly into the western sun leaving behind me a peaceful continent, crawling with Communist spies and saboteurs *among whom are many Americans*. Some of them once worked for the U.S. government. High up, too. And some still do.
>
> These are the homing pigeons for Russia's international spy network, the KGB. Some go home along with Russian agents. They have an underground railroad all their own. They slip into the U.S. from Canada. They go out via Mexico, Paris, Amsterdam, Zurich, Vienna and Prague.
>
> In Czechoslovakia, many of them join a cozy little American center all their own run by an old U.S. government official by the name of George Shaw Wheeler. They go into Prague, but they seldom come out.
>
> Another old U.S. government chap, Noel Field, a friend of Alger Hiss, now is working for the Russians in Budapest. He broadcasts nasty things about us over the wireless.
>
> ...These espionage rings are hooked up to sabotage cells. Pardon my cloak and dagger stuff, but their instructions are to infiltrate key factories across the world and be ready to blow them as high as an experimental balloon when KGB flashes the word via shortwave.
>
> And for this type of infiltration you don't need a big Communist party. My friends in the French counter-espionage business tell me that the French Communist party operates its sabotage and infiltration activities with an *apparat* of only 4.000, exclusive of professional spies of course....
>
> ...So don't anybody back home rest easy because the American Communist party has only some 20,000 members. We have a Hors-Cadre unit, too, in the same form, in addition to the spies.
>
> This could cost us many a battle before the war starts.

Why do we not find candor of this kind in Craven and Johnson? Why do they sneer at awareness of the unremitting Communist conspiracy and at attempts to flush out infiltration, spies, and saboteurs as, collectively, a "Red scare"?

Representative Gordon M. Scherer, of Ohio, a member of the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives, in a special statement released June 26, 1957, says of anti-anticommunism:

> ...[It] assumes that the Un-American Activities Committee is investigating Communism as an economic and political philosophy and that the Communist Party in the United States is a political party as we know political parties in this country....However, every school boy should know by this time that the Communist Party is not a political party but a conspirational apparatus—a fifth-column arm of the Soviet Union with whom we are at war though it may not be a shooting war. In fact, the Congress of the United States has by law so stated.

Why do Craven and Johnson leave it to be inferred that investigation of

communism is investigation of "an economic and political philosophy," and not of a conspiracy against the United States?

Other texts, too, follow the anti-anticommunist line. Dumond, Dale, and Wesley say:

> Because a number of liberals were interested in the cause of the Socialists and of the laboring classes, some of whom were Communists [a curious and puzzling charge, which should be criticized by labor!], *all liberals were suspected of holding communistic beliefs. This suspicion hampered the Progressive movement in the United States.* (P. 700.)

This, too, is a cliché charge always made against any attempt to investigate subversion. Apparently, it is more important to the authors that "the Progressive movement" should not be hampered—though a true progressive movement never has been so hampered—than that the United States should be protected against subversion.

The authors continue:

> Many *conservative people, perhaps occasionally* with some justification, feared that teachers were indoctrinating pupils with liberal, if not radical, ideas. The result was *a wave of legislation designed to restrict the teaching of the social studies.* It took the form of teachers' oath laws....*These laws were designed to prevent full and frank discussion of social, economic, and political questions.*
>
> *Agitation against radical ideas developed into a hysterical wave of censorship and other restrictions upon free speech.* (Pp. 704-705.)

This is the opposite of the truth: it is the anti-Communist and conservative who pays the price—often with his career and social status. Charges of "hysteria" and assertions that an attempt to end subversion is an attempt to stifle "ideas" show a complete lack of insight. No explanation is given of the serious dangers of brainwashing in American culture, of which Major Mayer speaks. No student, reading the passage above, would have any idea that there was any infiltration or subversion at all.

Gavian and Hamm, whose edition of 1951 we are considering, parrot the same line. They call the 1920s "mad"—one reason being that it was "a period of nationalism" (p. 529). They tell us:

> After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia (October 1917), *men of wealth everywhere feared the spread of Communism*....The Department of Justice rounded up thousands of aliens *thought* [*sic*] to have *radical ideas* [*sic*] and deported them without the benefit of a regular trial. (P. 529.)

Many "men of wealth" have feared the growth of communism, true; but no rich man's association has ever "feared" or opposed it with the consistent courage of the American Federation of Labor (now merged with the CIO). Millions of simple, "poor" men all over the world have hated communism because of its arrogance, its violence, its falsity, its atheism, its crushing of human rights. Some of the wealthiest men in the world, on the other hand, have given their energy and poured out their money to aid the spread of communism. Boris Morros tells of the espionage of the Alfred K. Sterns: Mrs. Stern was the daughter of an American ambassador; her husband a broker and a man of millions. Yet, says Mr. Morros, they were both "a part of the Soviet spy apparatus," according to *The New York Times,* August 25, 1957, which added:

> "There are two sisters," he continued. "One sister is married to the richest celluloid man in Europe, while the other sister is married to an important and prominent engineer in Los Alamos."

Yet both, he says, are "Americans now engaged in spying abroad for the Soviet." Why, then, should Gavian and Hamm insinuate that it is the "men of wealth" who fear communism, as if it were the poor men who welcome communism?

The authors cannot see the truth because of their anti-anticommunism. They say:

> During the twenties *anyone who criticized business or the government was considered un-American and suspected of being a "Red.*"...Most of the states passed laws *intended to force people to be loyal to the American political and economic system....A new Ku Klux Klan sprang up....* (Pp. 529-530.)

They also say:

> ...politicians [*sic*] at times turned the fear to their own account by accusing their opponents of being un-American, radical, and sympathetic to communism. Labor leaders and persons advocating *any kind of economic reform* were often attacked as "red." Academic freedom suffered from "red" hunts. High school and college teachers became reluctant to permit the free discussion of *social and economic questions....* (P. 649.)

Here the authors play up the extravagance and abuses of a legitimate national concern over subversion, which for years has been successfully carried on by Communists, pro-Communists, fellow travelers, and their dupes. By playing up the extravagances, the authors deflect attention from the true

nature and extent of the problem of subversion that is with us on all sides. The result—which hardly can be thought unintentional—is to suggest to the student that particular known cases of subversion and sabotage are mirages. What is the motivation in keeping students in mid-Victorian ignorance of the facts of life?

Bragdon and McCutchen{33} are at their worst in discussing this matter. They say quaintly (p. 526), "During the period of this 'red scare' [*sic*] some measures taken to suppress radicalism [*sic*] were so extreme that they endangered traditional American freedoms." But no such charge is made against the *suppression of Nazi subversion.* Of the later attempt by the United States to curb Communist infiltration and subversion—which had reached the proportions of treachery on high echelons of the government itself—they say (p. 667), "In the face of the threat of communism there was a natural tendency to take *extreme precautions* [*sic*] against conspiracy—precautions *which tended to hurt innocent people and to narrow the liberties of loyal Americans.*" Indeed, Alger Hiss, William Remington, Harry Dexter White, Gregory Silvermaster, and many others were in Washington! "Some [*sic*] Communist agents have been trusted officials of the State Department." (*loc. cit.*). But why are students not told who they were and what they did? "Others have passed on atomic secrets." Again, why the hush-hush? Isn't it important for students to know who the traitors were who passed the secrets of life and death over to a ruthless enemy of the United States? All this is watered down as the authors secrete the betrayal of America under "some" and "others." *The index of this volume contains no mention, by name, of a single one of the figures in high places who betrayed their country.*

This arbitrary treatment is carried further in Harlow,{34} who knows that there have been *Nazi* fifth columnists in the United States.

> World War II gave rise to two descriptive terms: "ideological warfare" and "fifth column." The first is an attack upon basic beliefs and convictions; the second refers to the agents who make this attack. (P. 718.)

True, but *he applies the statement only to Nazi agents,* whom he calls "termites that bore from within." He lists the German-American Bund and Fritz Kuhn and waxes very serious about the sound and fury, signifying nothing, of native crackpots like William Dudley Pelley, Robert Noble, and

George W. Christians—*who had little popular support and no effect whatsoever upon intellectuals, mass communications, or central publicity.* He says of them: "Fifth columnists fought countless shrewd ideological battles." But there is no mention of any Communist operatives of the 1940s. Harlow ridicules the fear of Communist danger: he says (p. 608), as a subheading, "ADVOCATES OF SOCIALISM FRIGHTENED THE CONSERVATIVES." He equates anticommunism in 1919 with the Ku Klux Klan (p. 609): "The most impressive organization used [*sic!*] to oppose radicalism was the Ku Klux Klan." He sums it up (*loc. cit.*): "CONSERVATIVES OPPOSED THE 'REDS.'" Students, naturally, would suppose that a few frightened old fogies kept looking under beds for the little man who wasn't there: they would never know that one of the greatest enemies of communism has been the American Federation of Labor.

Harlow is peculiarly unjust to the Japanese. He justifies the unnecessary and brutal actions against loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II. saying (p. 719): "Because of *the Japanese record of dishonesty* and the nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans had every reason to be suspicious of the Japanese."

Todd and Curti{35} also know that there were fifth columnists—*for the Nazis!* They tell us:

> German, Japanese, and Italian agents *had long been carrying on propaganda in the country, strengthening the hands of the isolationists* [*sic*], and slowing down preparedness operations....*Aware of the danger of fifth columnists*, the government increased the number of G-men whose chief job it was to track down *subversive Axis operations*. (P. 762.)

But, on the other hand, these same authors—so approving of G-men when they are tracking down Axis agents and so opposed to the "propaganda" of the Nazis—nowhere attack the fifth column of communism in America or praise the G-men for the more thankless and much more dangerous task or rooting out *Soviet* agents.

In this whole text there is *no discussion* of the infiltration of American education, culture, or government by the Communist fifth column. It is ignored, as if it did not exist. Students are incited to oppose Nazi infiltration (*as they should be*): they are given a clear picture of its presence and its peril. But why, when this is done, is there silence on the greater, continuing, even

more sinister infiltration of communism?

Muzzey,{36} also, gives us on hint of the danger of the inner door, no warning against the sly infiltration of the alien conspiracy called Communism. On the contrary, he tells us merely (p. 487) that action against the Bolshevists in America after World War I "*was unnecessarily harsh, to say the least*....One of the worst features of this campaign of suspicion was the encouragement it gave to busybodies [*sic*] to spy upon their neighbors." A similar part truth is elaborated on page 499, leading to only one possible inference, that anticommunism in America is a greater danger than communism! "Reds" (in the index as in the text) is used in quotation marks, as if it were a pretense or a joke. Muzzey speaks (p. 631) of "'The Foes of Our Own Household,'" and one hopes that at last, he is ready to grapple with subversion. But the foes of our own household are our national waste, our labor troubles, our "manufacture of useless luxuries," our "adulterated food," our use of drugs, our fires, burglaries, and homicides!

Wirth{37} (p. 609) connects any attempt to curb communism in 1919 with "the rise of a spirit of intolerance and suspicion." He says, "Such activities tended to arouse public fears, *and anyone with even mild radical leanings to as viewed with suspicion.*" A characteristic herring across the trail of counter-subversion occurs on the same page: "An outstanding example of intolerance was seen in the rapid growth of a new Ku Klux Klan." Why are these authors so sensitive to the charge of "radicalism"?

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill—Canfield and Wilder—Mowrer and Cummings—simply ignore the whole story of subversion. They leave students wholly unsophisticated about the most crucial facts of life. Apparently, communism is a red-light district that is best left alone, with a quiet "We will not speak of *that*!"

So goes the anti-anti-Communist line in our schools in the late 1940s and into the 1950s. Subversion is "hysteria" and a "Red scare." But is this true? Testifying before the Senate Internal Subcommittee in August 1957, Boris Morros, the F.B.I. counterspy, said:

> I want to emphasize that the Russian plot is far more strongly organized in this Country and throughout the world than is generally understood by our people....

And why not, when texts like these have lulled us with the opiate of the people? In answer to a question, Morros continued:

> I say "Russian plot"...because the schemes of the present dictatorship in the Soviet Union go beyond Communism. They are for pan-Slavism on a scale more ambitious than Hitler's fanatical dreams of world conquest.

Nor should we, he said, be unaware of subversion by Americans—and by *rich* Americans. Of many of Russia's agents in the United States, he said:

> ...important people financially independent and often held in high esteem. They are people who have the kind of contacts which will be useful to [the] Soviets and they are being paid to do their jobs of treason to the United States.

These are the words of a man who *knows*, because, as a counterspy, he has had intimate acquaintance with low and high in the Soviet apparatus itself.

That government secrets were stolen, that government policies were manipulated to disastrous ends, that conferences like Yalta were rigged by hidden Soviet agents sitting side by side with naïve government officials, that know-how of atomic bombs was stolen never receive the treatment their importance demands. Every attempt of good Americans to uncover or to expose the chicanery and betrayal is treated in these texts either as a crime to be attacked or a disease unmentionable in chaste Victorian parlors.

Seeing the commissions by omission, the anti-anticommunism, the slant and superficiality of these texts in regard to the Communist conspiracy, we can only say that students so insulated from the political facts of life will always be putty in the hands of the brainwashers of the world. It is no wonder that one third of Americans made prisoner in Korea gave in to the enemy. It is no wonder we are losing the cold war.

12—Tainted Sources

THE bias of an author of history texts can be predicated if we find him citing, quoting, and recommending only those sources and authorities who speak for one side and ignoring those who speak for the other side. In these eleven texts, with no exception, the sources and authorities tend to be disproportionately "liberal," collectivist, and, while quite drastic toward fascism, quite lenient toward communism. In relation to the betrayal of Free China, the nature of the Soviets, and the genesis of Pearl Harbor, not one text mentions authorities like Freda Utley, Richard Walker, John T. Flynn, Harry Elmer Barnes, Admiral Robert A. Theobald, William Henry Chamberlin, Max Eastman, or David Dallin. Not a single text, of those issued or reprinted after 1951, mentions one of the great classics of history and literature of our time, Whittaker Chambers's *Witness*. Not one text refers to the leading contemporary critics of collectivism and philosophers of free enterprise, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek.

Let it be said that "liberal" historians and collectivist apologists should neither be ignored nor omitted. These must be cited, for they are a part of the orbit of reality. But if they are cited, they ought to be balanced by historians who represent the other side and they should be subjected to critique and evaluation. In none of these texts are these things done. Radical conservatism is not given a chance to speak; it is not even admitted to exist. It is simply ignored; it is not represented at all. It is not a matter of *dis*proportion: it is a matter of no proportion. In not one of these texts are the great literary works of anticommunism, which are an essential part of contemporary history, even mentioned: *Animal Farm, Darkness at Noon, The Road Ahead,* or Yvor Thomas's *The Tragedy of Socialism.*

Further, is it fair to ask students to read, and even to buy for their own libraries, books by government-listed pro-Communists—with no warning as to the background and affiliations of the men recommended? In none of the texts which cite these authorities are qualifications made. The authorities are presented as if they were impartial scholars. The fact that one of them, W.E.B. DuBois, has a long record of pro-Soviet associations is never even suggested.

Let us see in detail whom these authors give as reputable sources and authorities.

In the first place, most of the authors make cross references to one another. Muzzey frequently refers students to Gavian and Hamm, to Wirth, to Canfield and Wilder, to Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill, to Todd and Curti, to Craven and Johnson. Other volumes, in turn, refer to Muzzey—and to each other down the familiar list. In the 1920s a Socialist gad fly of conservatism, Upton Sinclair, rightly pointed out that this practice, carried on among conservative trustees of colleges, constituted an "interlocking directorate." But it is no less an "interlocking directorate" when it occurs among "liberals"; nor is it any more savory.

In the second place, these texts all tend to refer to the same list of authors, books, texts, authorities. One would suppose that they used the same card index. As one traces the references in book after book, through the whole eleven, the repetition becomes soporific. An example of these references is Louis Adamic,{39} an enigmatic propagandist first for the Soviets and then for the schism of Tito: always he is an apologist for extreme collectivism. He died in circumstances that have pointed either to suicide or to murder. This person is cited, and his books are recommended, by all but Mowrer and Cummings. No explanation of his associations is offered. Yet ten of eleven texts seem to regard him as a dear ruin around which their feelings entwine themselves like ivy. Todd and Curti recommend Adamic's *From Many Lands* for a classroom library. Wirth recommends his *The Story of Class Violence*. Bragdon and McCutchen recommend his *Nation of Nations*. Yet none of the volumes offers a hint as to what Adamic stands for.

Albert E. Kahn's book *Sabotage* is recommended (Craven and Johnson, p. 802) and is even labeled "valuable." Albert E. Kahn has for years been known as a Soviet apologist, and now is partner in the book-publishing firm of Cameron and Kahn. The other hall of the partnership, Angus Cameron, was editor-in-chief of the publishing firm of Little, Brown. He pleaded the Fifth Amendment and he resigned from his editorship. Cameron and Kahn are publishers of *False Witness* by Harvey Matusow, who recanted from testimony exposing the Communist Party. Surely these authors are aware of Albert E. Kahn's sympathies.

Maxwell S. Stewart{40} is recommended. John Roy Carlson's unsavory *Undercover* is recommended in text after text: not a single author tells that a citizen sued Carlson for false charges and won the suit; and that, to avoid a further suit, Carlson's publishers paid the sum of $10,000.

In book after book the following are cited as authorities—most of them in most of the texts, all of them in several of the texts, some of them in all the texts.

Frederick L. Schuman

Vera Micheles Dean

Philip C. Jessup

Carey McWilliams

Matthew Josephson

Robert G. and Helen M. Lynd

Lee Huberman

Howard Fast

I. F. Stone

Max Lerner

W.E.B. DuBois

Gunnar Myrdal

Gene Weltfish

All these are known to sophisticated minds as collectivists, and some to have been apologists for the Soviets even in the hours of the Soviets' most dubious actions. Schuman (a registered Republican") is a long-time apologist for the Soviets; Vera Micheles Dean and Philip C. Jessup have written few critical and many laudatory words about Soviet actions and politics; Carey McWilliams is a joiner of front organizations and, in his writings and speeches, a defender of Soviet economics and politics; the Lynds have criticized free enterprise to an extreme degree and upheld collectivism to an extreme degree. (Craven and Johnson [p. 686], characteristically, say of the Lynds' *Middletown*, a bitterly hostile study of an American town and its

economic life under free enterprise, "a mine of valuable material.") Lee Huberman has had fifteen affiliations with organizations or activities officially cited as Communist controlled (see House Un-American Activities Committee, review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, April 1949, p. 18). Matthew Josephson's record will be cited later in connection with his publications. Howard Fast has long been a pro-Soviet writer, whose present break over Hungary still does not keep him from defending the Soviet philosophy. I. F. Stone, publisher of the *I. F. Stone Weekly*, was a writer for the *Daily Compass* (a Communist-line newspaper), has been associated with eleven organizations and activities officially cited as Communist controlled, and urges nondefense of the Chinese Nationalist islands (*Daily Worker*, April 12, 1955). Max Lerner is a long-time collectivist "liberal." DuBois's record has already been given; Gene Welt fish refused to testify as to her membership in the Communist Party, publicly asserted that the United States had engaged in germ warfare in Korea, and was dismissed from Columbia University because she pleaded the Fifth Amendment.

Examination of these history texts shows that they often quote propaganda material without so identifying it. Dumond, Dale, and Wesley repeatedly (pp. 528, 600, 624, 654) cite Josephson's *Politicos* as if the author were a bona-fide historian. Gavian and Hamm also cite Josephson. Harlow cites Josephson. Bragdon and McCutchen cite Josephson. Muzzey cites Josephson (pp. 355, 377, etc.): he recommends in particular such a book as *Robber Barons: the Great Capitalists*. What justice can one expect for any "American capitalist," great or small, at the hands of so resolute a collectivist? Yet Muzzey, in recommending the book, never warns students of the author's bias. Josephson is presented as an objective and scholarly historian! None of the authors, indeed, gives any warning as to the facts of Josephson's career or points out, for example, that Josephson was (in 1949) one of the chief sponsors of the Communist-controlled "Peace Conference" in New York City and had affiliations with sixteen organizations and activities officially cited as Communist controlled. This was after the Berlin airlift.{41}

Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill recommend{42} the publications of the Public Affairs Committee of New York City. The editor of the Public Affairs pamphlets is Maxwell S. Stewart (for whose record, see p. 249); the publications are apologetics for the Soviet propaganda for collectivism. Public

Affairs Pamphlet No. 227, by Alan Barth, entitled "When Congress Investigates," is an example. Alan Barth is an editorial writer for the *Washington Post*, a "liberal" who seems to have been frozen somewhere just left of center. His pamphlet is a propaganda sheet against Congressional investigations—not of Teapot Dome but of communism.{43} In pictures and in words it attacks the United States Congress as it seeks, by mandate of the people, to investigate the alien conspiracy known as communism. To recommend or even to cite such a pamphlet as legitimate source material for students of American history, without warning as to its prejudices and its propaganda, is to make a monkey out of scholarship. Yet the Public Affairs pamphlets are recommended by several of these texts as reliable source material!

Repeatedly cited and recommended for reading as source material is the Building America Series. The Education Committee of the California State Senate conducted hearings into the pro-Communist content of these series; their conclusion was that "the Building America Series [are] unfit for use in our schools." Fifty authors of the reference material there cited, quoted, or recommended were found to have Communist-front affiliations. The combined membership of the authors, as computed by this Committee, revealed a total of 113 fronts.{44}

Harlow is one who (p. 724) refers students to the Building America Series. He refers to the Foreign Policy Association often but gives no explanation of what it stands for. He does not tell us that it is headed by Vera Micheles Dean (author of *Russia—Promise or Menace?*) and has been consistently eulogistic of Soviet Russia and Mao Tse-tung's China. In relation to this Foreign Policy Association, Harlow asks students to make written reports on "Fascist organizations in the United States" (p. 725); he nowhere asks students to make written reports on the vastly more widespread and sinister Communist organizations in the United States. While Harlow recommends, in passing, a Public Affairs pamphlet, he never recommends or cites *Counterattack, Human Events, or U.S.A.* Nor do any of the eleven texts.

Leaving aside the more drastic collectivists, all the authors refer students to prevailingly "liberal" historians. The same stale list recurs: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Henry Steele Commager, Allan Nevins, Walter Lippmann,

Claude A. Bowers, Merle Curti, Herbert Croly, Stuart Chase, J. A. Magruder, John K. Fairbank (especially *Rich Man, Poor Man*), Foster Rhea Dulles, Henry Wallace (especially *Century of the Common Man*), Prof. Fred Rodell of Yale, Norman Cousins, Zechariah Chafee, James A. Wechsler, Edgar Snow, O. K. Fraenkel,{45} Vilhjalmur Steffanson, George Seldes,{46} Herbert Agar, George S. Counts (who once wished teachers to be engineers of a new social order), Robert E. Sherwood, and many others. The reference lists read like a *Who's Who* of the leading "liberals."

Not one of the revisionist historians, the nonconformists who dare to look boldly at Roosevelt's ogling of war until it crossed the street and slugged us, is listed or recommended. Not one radical conservative, except Richard M. Weaver, is recommended—and he is overbalanced by Julian Huxley, Henry Steele Commager, Herbert Agar, Robert E. Sherwood, Norman Cousins, Philip C. Jessup, and Allan Nevins! So students are led, by default of information, to believe there are no brave nonconformists facing up to the sacred cows of "liberalism."

In earlier American literature, the favorite writers in all the texts are social democrats or muckrakers or de bunkers. Ida M. Tarbell, Frank Norris, Upton Sinclair (*Little Steel, The Jungle*, etc.), Lincoln Steffens, Jack London (in his Socialist emphasis only) are cited and upheld. Several authors overpraise Steffens's *Autobiography* as a "great" work of "literature"; Craven and Johnson say:

> *Autobiography*, *a must* book for any intelligent American, brilliantly written and by far the best autobiography in recent years. (P. 532.)

They do not warn students of Steffens's full endorsement of the Communist Party as the best purger of "Big Business." No text mentions Jack London's greatest novel, *Martin Eden*, which subordinates socialism to London's own true individualist philosophy; but several recommend *War of the Classes* and *Revolution*, which stem from his sentimental militant socialism. (For those who think Socialists are "pacifists," a study of London's socialism might be a good thing).

About the genesis of Pearl Harbor, as we have seen, the authors in general take the conformist, official line that a treacherous Japan struck at an unsuspecting America. Thus Harlow says (p. 695) *only* that the Japanese had

"planned war for a long time, and they planned war on the United States." He blames only the Japanese and the "isolationists" for the war, and adds (p. 697): "Americans needed more understanding of world affairs."

At no point does Harlow's book, or any of the other texts, cite, quote, or refer to the revisionist historians. If the full truth had not yet been aired, should not these authors, as historians, have sought it out themselves, instead of conforming to the official line? Books like Admiral Robert A. Theobald's *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* or William A. Neumann's *The Genesis of Pearl Harbor* dispute Harlow's limited interpretation.

On other matters these eleven texts ignore source material, sound, essential, open to all, which modifies the whole interpretation of history. As we have seen, they treat the Nazi-Soviet collaboration as an innocent "peace pact." Yet the facts were fully available, from sources they cannot controvert, *in 1947*. The State Department publication *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* was there to be looked at. But all the texts ignore it as if it had never existed!

As to the debacle of our relations toward our faithful ally Chiang Kai-shek and our failure to support Free China, the same ignorance or suppression of sources occurs. Not one text refers to Freda Utley's *China Story*; Richard Walker's *Communist China, The First Five Years;* W. W. Rostow's *Prospects for Communist China*; or Robert C. North's *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*. Not one of them shows how the "liberals" supported Chiang Kai-shek as a noble statesman against *Japanese* aggression but undermined him as a "corrupt" politician when he fought *Communist* aggression. Not one text mentions the American embargo on arms to Nationalist China from July 1946 to July 1947. General Stilwell is mentioned with praise; General Wedemeyer is slighted or ignored.

Even Bragdon and McCutchen say:

> It is difficult to judge the truth of the opposing views, partly because China policy has become a political issue, with extreme charges made by both sides. (P. 662.)

But why not list the "extreme charges" (if there are such) of the *radical conservatives?* Why burn their books?

Another example of the slanted interpretation that comes when sources are ignored is the question of the Bonus Marchers. Muzzey says:

In the midsummer a "Bonus Expeditionary Force" of more than ten thousand veterans marched on Washington, like "Coxey's army" of forty years before, and encamped on the banks of the Potomac and the grounds of the Capitol, determined to remain until Congress voted them the full cash payment of their certificates. They were not dislodged until the government moved upon them with tear gas and army tanks. (Pp. 548-549.)

Wirth says:

During the summer more than ten thousand veterans of the First World War organized a "Bonus Expeditionary Force" and assembled in or near Washington. They demanded that Congress grant them a full cash payment for their annuity certificates without further delay. The government finally resorted to force to remove the veterans from the camps which had been thrown up on the Capitol grounds and along the Potomac River. (P. 633.)

Bragdon and McCutchen say:

In the summer of 1932 an "army" of some fifteen hundred veterans of World War I moved on Washington to demand immediate payment of the bonus which was not due them until 1944. The Bonus Army was finally dispersed only by the use of troops armed with bayonets and tear-gas bombs. (P. 567.)

Canfield and Wilder say:

At the end of July the federal government resorted to the use of troops, tanks, and gas bombs to drive the "bonus expeditionary force" from Washington. (P. 750.)

Todd and Curti say:

Unemployed veterans, better organized than most Americans, marched on Washington to demand relief. (P. 688.)

Craven and Johnson say of the "breaking up" of the Bonus Army:

President Hoover was frightened by what he apparently considered to be the precursor of revolution, and he ordered out the army, which broke up the bonus army's camp. Public opinion was shocked at this use of force against ex-soldiers, and Hoover lost the support of many conservative people who disliked this show of militarism. (P. 690.)

Notice certain strange facts. The first two accounts use almost the same words: did they both draw their material from the same sources? The third changes "ten thousand" to "fifteen hundred"; what is the true figure? They *all* stress the use of force. Craven and Johnson impute fear of revolution to President Hoover: what he—and most inhabitants of Washington did fear—was intolerable social and sanitary conditions if the Bonus Army were allowed to camp in Washington. The basic truth—and the authors should have told it—is that *Communist agents incited and directed the march because they*

had orders from Moscow to force the Hoover administration to call out troops and then open fire.{47} The Communist plan failed because President Hoover wished no violence and because General Douglas MacArthur ordered the troops not to fire, no matter what the provocation.

The New York Times, for the Sunday following the Bonus March, reports:

> The Communist Party, at its Headquarters here, accepted responsibility yesterday for the demonstration that resulted in the bonus-army riots in Washington.
>
> "We agitated for the bonus and led the demonstrations of the veterans in Washington," a spokesman for the party said....

The Whole of Their Lives by former Communist Benjamin Gitlow, published in 1948, says:

> On July 5 Earl Browder declared that the veterans were the shock troops of the unemployed. Said he, "The Bonus revolutionary force in Washington is the most significant beginning of the mass struggle against the deepening consequences of the crisis."

John T. Pace, also a former Communist, testified in 1949:

> I feel responsible in part for this oft-repeated lie about President Hoover and General MacArthur....
>
> I led the left-wing or Communist section of the bonus march. I was ordered by my Red superiors to provoke riots. I was told to use every trick to bring about bloodshed in the hopes that President Hoover would be forced to call out the Army. The Communists didn't care how many veterans were killed. I was told Moscow had ordered riots and bloodshed in hopes that this might set off the revolution. My Communist bosses were jumping with joy on July 28 when the Washington police killed one veteran. The Army was called out by President Hoover and didn't fire a shot or kill a man. General MacArthur had put down a Moscow-directed revolution without bloodshed, and that's why the Communists hate him even today.

The authors of the six textbooks simply have not given the *whole* story.

Take another instance of partisan selectivity of sources. Craven and Johnson are hostile to the Supreme Court throughout their text. (This was before the "liberal" switch of 1956 and 1957.) In relation to Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempted packing of that Court with yes-men instead of with interpreters of the Constitution, they quote two professors of the law who supported him*; they omit the names of the many eminent professors and jurists who denounced the attempt.*{48}

Gavian and Hamm give (p. 682) a list of books to supplement their discussion of relations with Russia. All save one are pro-Soviet or anti-anti-Communist; not one is really critical of Russia. Writers like Max Eastman,

David Dallin, James Burnham, Arthur Koestler (*The Yogi and the Commissar*) are the great men who are not there. It is a list that leaves students as innocent of the facts of political life as Mrs. O'Leary's cow was about the danger of upsetting lanterns.

Why are we losing the cold war? Read the texts that are imposed upon the captive audience of the classroom and see. The brainwashers in the world's Korea really do not need to do very much. American "liberals" have already softened students up, making them harshly critical of free enterprise and sentimentally sympathetic to collectivism. What remains for the brainwashers to do?

A recent episode ties all this in directly with the brainwashers in Korea. As we have seen, some of these authors cite the works of Albert E. Kahn; Mr. Kahn is co-author (with Michael Sayers) of a book called *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia* (Boni and Gaer). The Internal Security Committee of the Congress, in 1954, was investigating the "perjurious *Harvey Matusow*" (Counterattack, August 8, 1958). Mr. Kahn took the Fifth Amendment as to whether he had ever been a member of the Communist Party, USA. And the Committee, reporting on this subject, said of Mr. Kahn and his book:

> Five years later, the book [*The Great Conspiracy*] turned up in the North Korea prison camps *where Chinese Communists were brutally attempting to* "*brainwash*" *American prisoners of war.* Another of Kahn's books, High Treason, was also part of the brainwashing equipment. American boys were forced by their captors to read and report favorably on these works of Albert E. Kahn, or face starvation, torture and probable death.
>
> Kahn was informed of all this during his testimony before the subcommittee. *He gave every appearance of being proud of his achievements as an author.* [See *Counterattack*, August 8, 1958, for full details.]

Thus one of the "authorities" recommended by some of these texts played a part in the actual brainwashing that won American prisoners over to Communist ideology!

13—How to Win the Cold War

FOR many years we have been losing the cold war. For many years we have been losing the war of ideas and ideals which is the real war. On the field of international diplomacy we have been outmaneuvered and checkmated, and international communism has been confident that it will win the world without dropping a bomb or firing a shot. But it would be very easy to change all that. We have only to *win*, as we easily may, *the cold war* in our homes, our churches, our schools, and so in our whole culture.

In the fall of 1956, on the anniversary of the Bolshevik power coup that overthrew the constitutional republic of the Russian people, the conscience of the world recoiled from the spectacle of Communist tanks and storm troopers drowning in blood the revolution of the Hungarian people. Collectivism, grown to stature, showed itself for what it always was and is and will be—the attempt of men to rule men, irrespective of God, as they follow their own power drives and, in the name of "the people," enslave the people.

In the Hungarian revolution, it was the workers and the students who turned not only against communism but against all forms of collectivism. Students and workers wished *individual freedom:* the right to choose their jobs and studies, their books and their friends; the right of patriotism in a nation free to be itself; the right to travel freely over the country and the world; the right to a decent wage that they could spend as they chose on the free market. They wished to be free men with free minds. The workers and the students who were supposed to serve international collectivism were revolted by it and so revolted against it. Hungarians preferred death as free men to life as slaves. They said in effect, "*Give us liberty, or give us death*"

In Hungary, professors and students know that it is true revolution when men die to overthrow collectivism; in America, some professors and students think it is "revolution" to live while upholding collectivism. Why are professors and students here too often on the side not of individualist revolution but on the side of collectivist reaction?

We have seen a part of the reason. American professors and students have not had any realistic experience of what collectivism is when it openly seizes the power and the glory. They idealize it in terms of its slogans and its

glamorous promises; they too often fail to criticize it in terms of its practices. And they write, or they are brought up on, textbooks such as we have studied and in an intellectual and spiritual climate that criticizes free enterprise in terms of its flaws but idealizes collectivism in terms of its promises. Students are prevented from seeing history, at home or abroad, as it is. They do not know that individualism, competition, free enterprise, the free market, and well-distributed private property are necessities of life is to be free. And unless *life* is free, the *mind* cannot be free. Students are led to believe that America is "reactionary" unless it cramps free enterprise with the fetters of government and "progressive" only if it moves in the strait-jacket of socialism. They are led to believe that collectivism *is* "revolutionary," whereas, it is reactionary. They are never frankly confronted with the *name* "socialism," but they are led to idealize the *thing* which is socialism. (That is the trick of Fabianism.) Is it any wonder that, so misled, they are bewildered and confused, until in Korea one third of the American young men who were taken prisoner were brainwashed by the enemy?

What American schools need is a thorough housecleaning.

I do not know where, as that housecleaning begins, they will immediately find the new textbooks that they need. I do not know where they will find realistic and revolutionary textbooks in American history—or in any subject. But I do say that the big publishing companies will see to it that schools get these texts when schools *ask* for these texts. Demand will create supply. The Bragdon and McCutchen text was added to the Evanston High School list because individuals demanded a book that did not so grossly follow the leftist line as did the others in use. Let the schools refuse to use the texts in question and insist that texts be provided that present American history as it is—in terms of free enterprise, of the Constitutional Republic, of the American fact and the American dream. Meanwhile, as and if they still have to use slanted texts, let teachers *mercilessly criticize them.* American schools need young teachers like the Hungarian rebels: revolutionists against the entrenched power groups of collectivism. We need what Friedrich Nietzsche called "the transvaluation of values." We need a return to self-reliance, the "infinitude of the private man," free enterprise and competition, individualism, the free market, and a realization that in this world "there is no security but only opportunity."

There are healthy signs that this genuine American revolution is being born again. An organization known as Young Americans for the Republic was formed by a group of patriotic young Americans present at a Counter-Subversive Seminar held in Indianapolis at the Broad Ripple Legion Post (No. 312) in September 1955. Composed of high-school students in Marion County, Indiana, it was organized to study our nation's historical documents, such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, and the achievements of our historical leaders—Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, and Lincoln.

The Young Americans presented facsimiles of the Declaration of Independence to every history and social-science room in the high schools of Marion County. The required 125 copies were accepted and are now on display.

In October 1955, the Young Americans appeared on Donald Bruce's program, "Our Community in Action," to discuss activities that are being carried on in communities in Indiana and throughout the country. The Young Americans' constitution and preamble reads:

> We, the Young Americans for The Republic, are proud of our heritage and believe that our form of government oilers the greatest opportunity for individual freedom, development of ideas, and pursuit of happiness. We dedicate ourselves to the understanding of the historical documents of the United States of America, which were prepared by our forefathers, who, wishing to insure for themselves and all future generations the God-given rights of free men, gave us a completely new form of government.
>
> Article I. Recognizing Almighty God as the author of all human rights, we pledge ourselves to oppose all atheistic philosophies and materialistic ideologies.
>
> Article II. We pledge ourselves to uphold, protect and preserve our American independence, our Flag, our Constitution and its Bill of Rights—and the freedom for which they stand.
>
> Article III. Realizing that no peoples desiring freedom can be helped by a weakening of the government of the United States of America, we pledge ourselves to defend its full sovereignty.
>
> Article IV. We pledge ourselves to uphold the Constitution of the Young Americans for The Republic.

Here is a renaissance of the American spirit!

The American spirit is being born again among teachers. Mrs. Amanda I. Whiteside resigned in 1956 as a teacher in the public schools of Syracuse, New York, because, she said, "it is impossible for me to follow some of these

directives [of school authorities] without violating my loyalty to my country.

Mrs. Whiteside had taught for more than twenty-five years. In resigning, she explained her reasons in a thirteen-page mimeographed statement of details, which she directed to Mrs. Theodore F. Bowes, president of the board of education. In it she charged that she was unable to follow the directives of school authorities regarding the use of teaching materials and authorized textbooks. Of the textbooks she was required to use, she said:

> The one directive which I am least able to follow is that I must use with my classes certain so-called anthologies which serve, in one way or another, to weaken and destroy American tradition and love of Country....The objectionable parts of these anthologies are of three kinds: (1) The work of Communist fronters, (2) articles belittling America, supporting collectivism and internationalism, etc., and (3) just plain trash.

Mrs. Whiteside cited such perennial favorites of the collectivist mind as Howard Fast, the earlier Langston Hughes (before his conversion), Lincoln Steffens, Louis Adamic, Bertrand Russell. She went on to say:

> The above sampling from the material available in the reading books in use at Eastwood High School seems to support the thesis that there is a conscious, deliberate movement on the part of a certain element of the teaching profession to change America into a collectivist state by means of indoctrinating the children in the schools.

Mrs. Whiteside, also, in her statement, explained her own procedure in her lonely and perilous rebuttal of such indoctrination. She said:

> Since, after all, I have been teaching American children, and since collectivism and internationalism, and the sneering at and belittling of our Nation and our heroes and achievements and traditions is un-American, I have tried, deliberately, to give my pupils a plain, understandable and emphatic testimony on the merits of American institutions.
>
> That is, whenever a question arose, either in the course of teaching the subject matter, or from the question of some interested pupil, I would explain the American way to the best of my ability.
>
> I have also, at times, given some of my pupils material to read, such as “The Life of John Birch” by Robert H. W. Welch, Jr., “The Mainspring of Human Progress” by Henry Grady Weaver, “Essays on Liberty” published (1952) by the Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., and also some things that I have written or copied that seemed to answer their need.
>
> From time to time pupils who were not in my class have come to me for material for work they were doing for some other teacher.

But there was opposition from authoritarian sources that sought to “discredit” and to “eliminate” such a teacher who sought to inculcate freedom, individuality, and the American credo:

> In conclusion, could it not be that the whole effort of the administration to discredit me, although there is nothing new or different in my activities from what they have always been, is due to the effectiveness of my activities against Communism and all forms of collectivism—against the long-standing plans of certain educationists to change America by means of the schools?...
>
> I must now be eliminated. This end has been accomplished by setting up of new directives which my conscience will not permit me to follow.

So, in brave defiance of authoritarian coercion, Mrs. Whiteside resigned. She and her husband retired to a small farm, to try to make a living in other ways than by their long-successful profession.

Many parents, many of her students, and the Onandaga County American Legion supported Mrs. Whiteside. A committee of interested parents publicly declared:

> Good teachers need and should expect the backing of the community, particularly in view of the teacher shortage....[There should be] a complete and full public report of the facts of this situation.

But the powers that be, not even pretending to be "liberal," made no provision for Mrs. Whiteside's conscience: she must conform or resign. She rightly chose to resign.

These sporadic revolts by students and teachers are healthy signs of a new day. They show that those who are really awake and aware know that collectivism is only the dead yesterday that men forgot to bury. They speak again the words of Henry David Thoreau: "There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star."

Most of all, we need a renaissance of wonder. We need to renew, in our hearts and in our souls, the deathless dream, the eternal poetry, the perennial sense that life is miracle and magic. In an Egyptian temple there was the secret shrine that contained the statue of a god. On one side of the shrine, a priest inscribed: "*I am He that was, and is, and ever shall be, and my veil hath no man lifted*." But on the other side of the shrine, a wiser priest inscribed: "*Veil after veil have we lifted, and ever the face is more beautiful.*" The true historian of America will say, of the country that we love, "*Veil after veil have we lifted, and ever the face is more beautiful.*"

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

E. MERRILL ROOT lives near Putnam, Conn. He was born in Baltimore and grew up in Providence. He was graduated from the Classical High School in Providence and from Amherst College, where he studied under Stark Young, Robert Frost, and George F. Whicher. Mr. Root, a Phi Beta Kappa man, pursued graduate studies at the University of Missouri and Andover Theological Seminary, he was called to Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, one of the foremost Quaker colleges, where he was made full professor of English in 1930; he has taught there ever since. Mr. Root has written six volumes of poetry and three prose books. *The Way of All Spirit*, *Frank Harris: A Biography*, and *Collectivism on the Campus.* His articles, reviews, and poems have appeared widely.

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{1} Emphasis by the use of italics here and in all quotations throughout this book is added by the author, unless it is indicated that italics were used in the original source.

{2} All these texts are favorable to the United Nations, the League of Nations, or some form of world government: some more so, some less so. Not one of them gives a real critique of such global plans. Even Bragdon and McCutchen say (p. 657), "the U.N. is the only bridge that is left between the Communist and non-Communist worlds."

{3} An exception to the commercial success of these books is *History of United States,* scheduled to go out of print.

{4} Craven and Johnson; Dumond, Dale, and Wesley; Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill; Wirth; Todd and Curd; Gavian and Hamm.

{5} Canfield and Wilder; Muzzey; Harlow.

{6} For further discussion of this, see Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution*.

{7} John C. Miller. *Origins of the American Revolution*. Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1913, p. 408. Quoted in Craven and Johnson, p. 112. These authors would not have selected this for quotation if it had not been their own dogma too.

{8} Quoted in *Roots of Political Behavior—Introduction to Government and Politics,* Richard Carlton Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, American Book Co., 1949.

{9} See Brown*, Charles Beard, and the Constitution.*

{10} All the quotations above from Todd and Curti are from pp. 168-169.

{11} *The Records of the Federal Convention*, ed. by Max Farrand, New Haven, 1937, PP 358, 360.

{12} Howard Fast has long been a pro-collectivist and even pro-Soviet author, who still remains a Socialist and even a defender of the Soviets after his quarrel with the Party over Hungary. *The New York Times*, August 30, 1957, quotes him as saying: "I flatly deny not only the legend of force, but every other manufactured slander that has been hurled against the Communist Party."

{13} See the *New York Times,* May 30, 1948. Also *Guide to Subversive Organizations*, May 14, 1951.

{14} It is monotonous to repeat fact, but it is too symptomatic to be ignored, that again and again these texts use the phrase "control of the government." It stems from conception of the constitutional republic which is wholly false. In a one-party, monolithic, totalitarian regime, it would be true to speak of "control of the people *controlling the government*. In the American conception they merely administer the government by the will of the people. The people not the party in power, "control" the constitutional republic.

{15} May 30, 1948; July 28, 1948, and August 3, 1948, page 1.

{16} House Committee on Un-American Activities, Report.

{17} van Nostrand Co., Princeton, New Jersey.

{18} Ballantine Books, New York, 1956, Introduction (not paged).

{19} For the true story of the Bonus March, *see Communist Tactics among Veterans' Groups: Hearing before the Committee on Un-American Activities*, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, pp. 1925-1964. See also pp. 256-259 of this book.

{20} See *Counterattack*, Vol. 10, No. 43, October 26, 1956.

{21} Mowrer and Cummings, not having a chronological arrangement, are not included.

{22} Mowrer and Cummings are not included.

{23} *The White Nights*, Boris Sokoloff, Devin-Adair Co., p. 206.

{24} *The Enemy at His Back*, Elizabeth Churchill Brown, a Free Enterprise publication, pp. 46-47.

{25} *U.S. News & World Report*, August 20, 1954.

{26} Not one of these texts mentions that significant fact.

{27} According to the records of Admiral Kimmel's command.

{28} *The Enemy at His Back,* p. 82.

{29} *Ibid*., p. 67.

{30} MacArthur Hearings, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, First Session, Vol. V, p. 3591.

{31} The Department of Justice makes the Berlin airlift a crucial point in evaluating sympathy with the Soviets.

{32} *The United States and World Relations*, by Mowrer and Cummings. This text has little to say about domestic problems, so it does not touch upon investigations either pro or con.

{33} 1954 edition.

{34} 1951 edition.

{35} 1950 edition.

{36} 1950 edition.

{37} 1952 edition.

{38} Dr. W.E.B DuBois is discussed by Louis Budenz in *Techniques of Communism*, p. 177. Dr. DuBois supported the Soviet point of view during the Korean War: sponsored activities of (lie American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born (*Daily Worker*, October 21, 1951); was former chairman of the Peace Information Center (*New York Times*, July 20, 1950); signed an appeal to President Eisenhower asking for amnesty for Smith Act violators (*Daily Worker*, November 16, 1951); was elected to the praesidium of the World Peace Partisans (*Daily Worker*, November 22, 1950). All the above organizations and activities have been officially cited as Communist controlled. In 1949 Dr. DuBois sponsored the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, arranged by the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions.

{39} Louis Adamic. Deceased. Writer. Sponsored Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace; affiliated with 30 organizations cited by the Attorney General and/or other governmental agencies as Communist controlled, including the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship. Civil Rights Congress, Joint anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, Progressive Citizens of America (See House Un-American Activities Committee, review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, April 19, 1949, pp. 2. 18; see also California Education Investigation Committee. 8th. Report, 1951, p. 50). Editor and publisher of the Communist-controlled *Trend and Times* (see California Un-American Activities Committee, 5th. Report, 1949, p. 548). Supported the Wallace Progressive Party in 1948. Was a contributor to the *New Masses* and *Soviet Russia Today*. See also the *New Leader*, July 14. 1952, p. 14; California Senate Investigating Committee Report (Education), 10th Report, 1952, pp. 71, 82; testimony of M. Cvetic, Senate Internal Security Committee, Communist Propaganda, part II, p. 76 See also House Un-American Activities Committee Cumulative Index, 1938-1954, January 20, 1955, p. 18.

{40} Identified as a contributor to Communist publications. See Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952, pp. 146, 148, 158, 225. Also *Counterattack*, May 13, 1955. Recommended by Faulkner, Kepner, and Merrill.

{41} See House Un-American Activities Committee, *Cumulative Index*, 1938-1954, p. 753.

{42} P. 460.

{43} On its cover is a caricature of a Congressman—tight-mouthed, fat-jowled, popeyed—looking through a microscope at a frightened pygmy stuck on a board by an outsize pin. Inside, on page 3, it has a cartoon in sickly green, on which is scrawled in what seems a student's handwriting, "Which is it?" Under this caption are pictured a magnifying glass, a blackjack, and a blacksnake whip. The orthodox answer, which the right-thinking student evidently is to give, is that Congressional investigations are the blackjack and the blacksnake whip! On page 8, a poor fish posing as a man is being stretched to the breaking point on a medieval bed of torture, while a caricature of a senator, in medieval garb and with a medieval dagger, gloats over his victim in

sadistic glee. The pamphlet, in its text, upholds the use of the Fifth Amendment—for Communists and (one would suppose if one is logical) for the underworld characters who, under investigation by Senator Kefauver, also invoked it. On page 14, a coarse Congressman in a toga is turning thumbs down on humanity as he orates: "*I* am the law!" It is obvious that this is not Senator Walsh or Wheeler investigating Teapot Dome, or Senator Kefauver investigating Rumdum Willie, but any senator wicked enough to investigate those children of light, the Communists. On page 15, a bloated, hatchet-faced Congressman is holding a crypto-Communist by the neck, obviously outraging the Constitution. On page 18, Congress is squeezing an innocent pro-Communist in an improvised wine-press, like a solitary grape of wrath, and saying (under a set of protruding eyes): "We'll make you fit into this democracy, or else!" On page 23, a horrid sort of fellow, obviously a senator, is peering into the opened head of a professor, to see if he has brains enough to be a Communist.

{44} See *A Bill of Grievances*, National Society, Sons of the American Revolution, Washington, D.C., p. 27.

{45} Vice president of the Lawyer's Guild in 1950, affiliated with eighteen other organizations cited as Communist controlled.

{46} Editor *In Fact* (cited as Communist front publication by House Un-American Activities Committee and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Counsel); member of sixteen organizations and activities officially cited as Communist controlled (see California State Investigating Committee Report, Education, 8th. Report, 1951, p. 63.)

{47} See *Communist Tactics among Veterans' Groups: Hearing before the Committee on Un-American Activities*, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, pp. 1925-1964.

{48} Compare the *Proceedings of the American Bar Association, 1937.* Also the *United States Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on S. 1392*, Seventy-fifth Congress, first session.